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Introduction
At least since the seventeenth century, rape law has included a
1
formal marital rape exemption. This exemption meant that men
could not be charged with raping their wives and, if they were,
2
marriage provided them with a complete defense. Beginning in the
1970s, feminist reformers set their sights on this antiquated rape
doctrine (as well as others that were similarly unfair to women) and
worked to eliminate it from the law. As a result, the marital rape
exemption has been subjected to about three decades of scholarly
3
criticism. Legal academics argued that the marital rape exemption
* Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., University of California at Santa Cruz. I want to thank my outstanding
colleagues: Leslie Book, Kathleen Brady, Michael Carroll, Steven Chanenson, Frank
Rudy Cooper, Ann Juliano, Greg Magarian, Anne Poulin, Richard Redding, and Lou
Sirico. This work could not have been completed without their help. I also want to thank
the law students who were my research assistants: Elizabeth Cameron, Katharine
Crawford, Amy Kearney, and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer. I am grateful for the generous
support I received for this work from the administration and library staff at Villanova
University School of Law.
1. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (Robert H.
Small ed., 1st Am. ed. 1847) (1736).
2. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857) (“[I]t would
always be competent . . . to show, in defence of a charge of rape alleged to be actually
committed by himself, that the woman on whom it was charged to have been committed
was his wife.”).
3. See Rene Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 585
(1990–91) (“State legislatures need to abolish the exemption altogether, without simply
narrowing the definition of marriage while retaining immunity for rape within marriage,
without treating marital rape as a lesser offense, and without imposing extraneous
requirements for the prosecution of cases involving marital rape.”); Thomas R. Bearrows,
Transition: Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL.
[1463]
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L. REV. 201 (“Despite lengthy debate and severe criticism, the [marital exemption for
rape] persists today as an anachronistic reminder of society’s traditional view of women
and marriage generally.”); Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in
the Law of Marital I, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 345 (1990) (“According to the theory
of implied consent, marital rape is impossible because all sexual contact within a
continuing relationship is presumed to be consensual. Thus, under statutes grounded in
the theory of implied consent, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is not a crime in the
context of an ongoing sexual relationship.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1504 (2000) (“The modern
defenders of the marital rape exemption . . . submerge and deny the harm that the rule
causes women.”); The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 313 (1977)
(“Reasons for maintaining the husband’s immunity [from marital rape convictions are not]
sufficient to justify the deprivation which the exemption imposes on wives.”); Charlotte L.
Mitra, “. . . For She Has No Right or Power to Refuse Her Consent,” 1979 CRIM. L. REV.
558 (“By thus exempting the husband from prosecution for rape on his wife, the law has
granted him an immunity which is based solely on status.”); Comment, Rape and Battery
Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720 (1954) [hereinafter Comment, Rape
and Battery] (“Clearly the criminal law gives protection to a spouse against the grossest
forms of invasion of bodily integrity.”); Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History
of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 941, 992 (1995) (“While certain
states repealed the exemption entirely, other states merely compromised between old and
new orthodoxies.”); Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses
To and Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79,
96 (1994) (“The contemporary treatment of marital rape and domestic
violence . . . demonstrates an underlying commitment to female subordination and female
difference.”); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 69 (1990) (“The irrationality of marital rape
exemptions is not their fundamental flaw. . . . The evil is that they legalize, and hence
legitimate, a form of violence that does inestimable damage to all women, not only to
those who are raped.”); Emily R. Brown, Note, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I
Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me Roar, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 657, 657 (1995) (“While
legislatures and courts have been busy creating laws to handle [domestic violence, incest
and child abuse], they have been slow in protecting women from perhaps the most
damaging form of domestic violence: spousal rape.”) (footnotes omitted); Cassandra M.
DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for all Sex
Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 858 (1996) (“This Note
argues that to fully protect victims of spousal sexual assault, the New York Legislature
should codify the Liberta decision and repeal the marital exemption for all sex offenses.”);
Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 683 (1996) (“[N]ot all recent
legislative reform aims to revoke the marital exemption’s ‘raping license.’ Several states
have actually extended their exemptions to include non-married, cohabiting couples.”);
Linda Jackson, Note, Marital Rape: A Higher Standard Is in Order, 1 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 183, 185 (1994) (concluding that “marital exemptions, unable to survive the
necessary standards of strict scrutiny, are unconstitutional”); Judith A. Lincoln, Note,
Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in Protecting Married Women from
Spousal Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1224 (1989) (“Other marital rapes occur during a
battering episode. The husband engages in some nonconsensual sexual act as part of the
abusive process. While the husband can be prosecuted under wife battering statutes, he
has also committed the crime of rape and should be prosecuted for that as well.”)
(footnotes omitted); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1986) [hereinafter To Have and To
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was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
4
Fourteenth Amendment. They called for the elimination of marital
immunity, either by deleting provisions in sexual offense statutes that
5
referred to the marital status of the parties or by inserting new
provisions in those statutes that authorized the prosecution of spouses
6
for rape.
Hold] (“[T]he marital rape exemption serves as both a manifestation of and a vehicle for
the continued subordination of women in society.”); Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The
Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 353 (1995)
[hereinafter Siegel, Note] (“[T]rue equality between women and men can never exist until
every state has completely abolished the marital rape exemption.”); Jaye Sitton,
Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital” Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261,
264 (1993) (“[T]he Comment argues that complete abolition of all laws distinguishing
among rape and sexual assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is
required in order for women to achieve equal protection under the law.”); Abigail
Andrews Tierney, Comment, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania’s Place on the Sliding
Scale of Protection from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REV. 777, 778 (1986) (“[T]his comment
suggests complete abolition of spousal immunity and equal application of the rape and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse laws of Pennsylvania to all persons, regardless of
their marital statute, as a viable solution to cure the inadequacies of the current spousal
sexual assault law.”) (footnotes omitted); Sallie Fry Waterman, Comment, For Better or
Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 611, 611 (1988) (arguing that marital rape “needs
to be confronted and given political priority until every state is willing to recognize marital
rape as a criminal act”).
4. See, e.g., West, supra note 3, at 48 (“While virtually every progressive
commentator, judge, or legislator . . . who seriously has considered the issue readily has
concluded that [marital rape exemptions] violate equal protection, . . . no major upheaval
of the law reflects or foreshadows such progressive unanimity.”) (footnotes omitted). In
1990, Professor Robin West proposed that Congress enact a Married Women’s Privacy
Act to guarantee protection to every woman against violent sexual assaults. Id. at 76. The
federal law would “prohibit irrational discrimination against married women in the
making and enforcement of rape laws,” guarantee that “states would not perpetuate or
insulate the sexualized social, private, or intimate subordination of women by men,” and
guarantee that “no state would deny to women protection of the state against private
criminality.” Id. West viewed Congress, rather than the judiciary, as the proper branch to
declare marital rape exemptions unconstitutional. Id. at 77. “Unlike the Court, Congress
does not recoil inevitably at the prospect of undertaking significant reconstructions of
social life. Indeed, this duty is clearly its business.” Id. See also Jackson, supra note 3, at
207, 216 (arguing that, if strict scrutiny “is applied correctly and consistently, all marital
rape exemptions necessarily would be found unconstitutional”).
5. See, e.g., Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing rape statute that would be
silent on relationship between perpetrator and victim and would grade offenses based on
amount of violence used); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1800
(1992) (proposing that legislatures replace marital and other rape statutes with graded
offenses based on the amount of force used); Sitton, supra note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete
abolition of all laws distinguishing among rape and sexual assault victims based on their
relationship to their assailant is required in order for women to achieve equal protection
under the law.”).
6. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 705 (rape statute should first “set[] forth a
definition of rape that neither affirmatively includes nor excludes spouses as potential
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Many people believe that reformers won the battle against the
7
marital rape exemption. This belief is, unfortunately, incorrect. The
good news is that twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
8
have abolished marital immunity for sexual offenses. The bad news
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to rape”).
Although I prefer non-gender neutral terms because rape within marriage is
overwhelmingly a crime that men commit on women, I use the term spouse because the
statutes are gender neutral. See DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 9 (exp. and
rev. ed. 1990) (“The term ‘wife rape’ is preferred over ‘marital rape’ or ‘spousal rape’
because it is not gender neutral. The term ‘spousal rape’ in particular seems to convey the
notion that rape is something that wives do to husbands, if not as readily as husbands do it
to wives, at least sufficiently often that a gender neutral term should be used.”).
7. A number of scholars have even declared victory over the marital rape immunity.
One scholar entitled her piece, “The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction,”
and another entitled her article, “Accomplishing the Impossible: An Advocate’s Notes
From the Successful Campaign to Make Marital and Date Rape a Crime in All 50 U.S.
States and Other Countries.” Siegel, Note, supra note 3, at 351; Laura X, Accomplishing
the Impossible: An Advocate’s Notes from the Successful Campaign to Make Marital and
Date Rape a Crime in All 50 U.S. States and Other Countries, in 5 VIOL. AG. WOMEN 1064
(1999).
8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987–2001) (silent on rape, Class Y felony);
§ 5-14-124 (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class A felony); § 5-14-125 (silent on
sexual assault in second degree, Class B felony); § 5-14-126 (silent on sexual assault in
third degree, Class C felony); § 5-14-127 (silent on sexual assault in fourth degree, Class A
misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital
relationship, whether established statutorily, putatively, or by common law, between an
actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any offense under this part 4 unless such
defense is specifically set forth in the applicable statutory section by having the elements
of the offense specifically exclude a spouse;” spouses exempt only from statutory rape);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment, unclassified
misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class A
misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G felony);
§ 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770 (silent on
rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree, Class B
felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on rape in
first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-3019 (2002) (“No actor is immune from prosecution under any section of this
subchapter because of marriage or cohabitation with the victim; provided, however, that
marriage of the parties may be asserted as an affirmative defense in a prosecution under
this subchapter where it is expressly so provided.”); § 22-3024 (“Laws attaching a privilege
against disclosure of communications between a husband and wife are inapplicable in
prosecutions under subchapter II of this chapter where the defendant is or was married to
the victim or where the victim is a child.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2002)
amended by 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2002-211 (H.B. 1399) (West) (silent on sexual
battery); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person
allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of rape.”);
§ 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall
not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West
2002) (silent on rape, Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-2 (silent on criminal deviate conduct,
Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-8 (silent on sexual battery, Class C or D felony); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (West 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Laws Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent
on rape in first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on

ANDERSON13

July 2003]

8/25/2003 3:07 PM

A NEW LAW ON SEXUAL OFFENSES BY INTIMATES

1467

rape in third degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on
sodomy in second degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent
on sodomy in fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third
degree); § 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253
(West 2002) (silent on gross sexual assault, Class A, B or C crime); § 255 (silent on
unlawful sexual contact); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West 2002) (silent on rape);
§ 34 (silent on crime against nature); § 35 (silent on unnatural and lascivious acts); § 3
(silent on drugging persons for sexual intercourse); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2002)
(silent on rape); § 566.040 (silent on sexual assault); § 566.060 (silent on forcible sodomy);
§ 566.070 (silent on deviate sexual assault); § 566.090 (silent on sexual misconduct in first
degree); § 566.100 (silent on sexual abuse); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2001) (silent
on sexual assault); § 45-5-503 (silent on sexual intercourse without consent); § 45-5-505
(silent on deviate sexual conduct); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001) (silent on sexual
assault in first degree, Class II felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault in second or third
degree, Class III felony and Class I misdemeanor); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5
(2002) (“An actor commits a crime under this chapter [sexual offenses] even though the
victim is the actor’s legal spouse.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002) (“No actor
shall be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of age
or impotency or marriage to the victim.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie 1978–2001)
(silent on criminal sexual penetration); § 30-9-12 (silent on criminal sexual contact); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002) (“A person may be prosecuted under this Article whether or
not the victim is the person’s legal spouse at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape or sexual offense.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1999–2001) (silent on gross
sexual imposition, Class A or B felony); § 12.1-20-04 (silent on sexual imposition, Class B
felony); § 12.1-20-07 (silent on sexual assault, Class C felony or Class A misdemeanor);
§ 12.1-20-12 (silent on deviate sexual act, Class A misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.355 (2001) (silent on rape in the third degree, Class C felony); § 163.365 (2001)
(silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.375 (silent on rape in first degree,
Class A felony); § 163.385 (silent on sodomy in third degree, Class C felony); § 163.395
(silent on sodomy in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.405 (silent on sodomy in first
degree, Class A felony); § 163.408 (silent on unlawful sexual penetration in second degree,
Class B felony); § 163.411 (silent on unlawful sexual penetration in first degree, Class A
felony); § 163.415 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, Class A misdemeanor); § 163.425
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree, Class C felony); § 163.427 (silent on sexual abuse
in first degree, Class B felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 2002) (silent on
rape); § 3123 (silent on involuntary deviate sexual intercourse); § 3124.1 (silent on sexual
assault); § 3125 (silent on aggravated indecent assault); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 22.011, 22.021 (Vernon 2002) (silent on sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(2) (1953–2001) (“This section [rape] applies whether or not
the actor is married to the victim.”), § 76-5-405 (aggravated sexual assault; includes
definition of rape in statute which applies “whether or not the actor is married to the
victim”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent on sexual assault), § 3253 (silent on
aggravated sexual assault); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1966–2002) (silent on sexual assault
in first degree, felony); § 61-8B-4 (silent on sexual assault in second degree, felony); § 618B-5 (silent on sexual assault in third degree, felony); § 61-8B-7 (silent on sexual abuse in
first degree, felony); § 61-8B-8 (silent on sexual abuse in second degree, misdemeanor);
§ 61-8B-9 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, misdemeanor); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(6) (West 2002) (“A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating
this section because of marriage to the complainant.”).
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is that twenty-six states retain marital immunity in one form or
9
Although in some of these twenty-six states marital
another.
9. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is a defense to sexual assault
in third degree, Class C felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (West 2002) (it is a
defense to sexual abuse that person was spouse of other person at time of commission of
act; sexual abuse is Class 5 felony); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West 2002) (rape of
spouse must be reported within one year after date of violation; reporting requirement
shall not apply if victim’s allegation of offense is corroborated by independent evidence);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70a (West 2002) (marital immunity for aggravated sexual
assault in the first degree, Class B felony); § 53a-71 (marital immunity for sexual assault in
second degree); § 53a-72a (marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree); § 53a-72b
(marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree with firearm); § 53a-73a (marital
immunity for sexual assault in fourth degree); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in
2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and cohabitants are exempt
from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if actor submits other person to sexual
contact through strong compulsion or other person is mentally defective); § 707-733 (2001)
note in H.B. 2560 (spouses and cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth
degree, a misdemeanor, if actor submits other person to sexual contact by compulsion);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person shall be convicted of rape for
any act or acts with that person’s spouse, except under the circumstances cited in
paragraphs 3 [force] and 4 [threats of harm or use of intoxicating substance] of section 186101.”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is
barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/1214), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if
not reported to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.4 West 2002 (marital immunity for mentally incapacitated and
physically helpless sexual assault); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2517 (2001) (marriage is defense
to sexual battery, Class A person misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002)
(marital immunity for simple rape); § 43.1 (spouses exempt from sexual battery); MD.
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree,
rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living
separately); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be
prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his
or her spouse being under age 16, mentally incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B.
2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if
actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is mentally impaired, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of
alleged victim may be found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible
sexual penetration without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002)
(marriage is no defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by
threat of force); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.0 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from
sexual battery, third degree felony); § 2907.05 (spouses exempt from gross sexual
imposition, third or fourth degree felony); § 2907.06 (spouses exempt from sexual
imposition, first degree misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002)
amended by 2002 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be
accompanied by actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of
execution against victim or third person); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001)
(spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated,
mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op.
2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in third degree); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact
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immunity for the specific crime of forcible rape is dead, immunity for
10
For example, twenty states grant
other sexual offenses thrives.
marital immunity for sex with a wife who is incapacitated or
11
Fifteen states grant marital
unconscious and cannot consent.
without consent with person who is capable of consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires defendant to be
armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living separately and
filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West
2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual
penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses were living separate or defendant
caused bodily injury to spouse by use of force or violence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from rape in third degree, Class C felony);
§ 9A.44.100(1)(c) (West 2002) (marital immunity for indecent liberties, Class A or B
felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-304 (Michie 1977–2001) (marriage is defense to third
degree sexual assault if no injury has occurred); § 6-2-313 (marriage is defense to sexual
battery).
Additionally, the statutes of New York and Alabama still contain provisions allowing
for marital immunity from most sexual offenses with the exception of rape. The New
York Court of Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court have arguably abolished the
marital immunities in these codes, yet the statutes have remained static for almost twenty
years. See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (abolishing marital immunity in
New York) and Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1986) (abolishing marital immunity
in Alabama).
10. See infra notes 68, 75 and accompanying text.
11. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to second
degree sexual assault if the victim is incapacitated or unaware the sexual act is being
committed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity
when victim is mentally incapacitated because statute requires force for spousal conviction
of sexual assault); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(a)(3) (West 2002) (spouses or
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person
intentionally subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from
sexual assault in the second degree when the victim is physically helpless); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 707-732(d) (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002)
(spouses and cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if
victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband cannot be prosecuted for rape if wife is incapable
of giving consent or unconscious at time of act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002)
(marriage is defense to sexual abuse in third degree if victim is suffering from mental
defect or incapacity which precludes giving consent; Class C felony); LA.REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 43 (West 2002) (express exemption from simple rape which includes situation where
victim is incapable of resisting due to an intoxicating substance); MD. CRIM. LAW. § 3-318
(West 2002) (express exemption from rape in second degree and sexual offense in third
degree when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in
first through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally
incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended
by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit
criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that
complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless, as spouses are immune from prosecution for sexual
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immunity for sexual offenses unless requirements such as prompt
12
complaint, extra force, separation, or divorce are met. The law in
battery unless husband uses force); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (implied marital
immunity when victim is mentally or physically incapable as spouses are immune unless
husband uses force); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) amended by 2002
Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spousal immunity if victim is mentally
or physically incapable of consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (marital
immunity for rape where the victim is incapable of consent through mental illness,
unsoundness of mind, intoxicated or unconscious); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–
2001) (spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated,
mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (LAW. CO-OP.
2002) (implied marital immunity when the actor causes the victim to become mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless by administering a controlled substance); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact
when person is incapable of consenting, Class 4 felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507
(West 2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless because spouses are generally exempt from prosecution unless weapon is used or
there is bodily injury); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(ii) (West 2002) (marital immunity
when the victim suffers from a mental incapacity or physical helplessness); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100(1)(b) (West 2002) (marital immunity for indecent liberties when
the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless, Class A or B felony).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault when
victim is mentally incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither
party has filed with the court for separation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A)
(West 2002) (“A person commits sexual assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the
spouse by the immediate or threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one year after
date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of offense is
corroborated by independent evidence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b (West 2002)
(spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender uses force or the
threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband can only be
prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force or
violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great
bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating,
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is barred for
criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-14), criminal
sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if not reported
to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-316
(West 2002) (spouse may not be prosecuted under § 3-303 [rape in first degree], § 3-304
[rape in second degree], § 3-307 [sexual offense in third degree] or § 3-308 [sexual offense
in fourth degree] unless person committing crime uses force and act is without consent of
spouse, or couple has lived apart under written separation agreement or for at least three
months before alleged rape or sexual offense. A person may be prosecuted under these
statutes if there was decree of limited divorce at time of offense); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.F. 2433) (West)
(person does not commit criminal sexual conduct under § 609.342(a) and (b) [criminal
sexual conduct in first degree], § 609.343(a) and (b) [criminal sexual conduct in second
degree], § 609.344(a), (b), (d), and (e) [criminal sexual conduct in third degree], and
§ 609.345(a), (b), (d), (e) [criminal sexual conduct in fourth degree], if actor and
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more than half the states today makes it harder to convict men of
sexual offenses committed against their wives. In so doing, the law in
these jurisdictions degrades married women and affords men who
13
sexually assault their wives an unwarranted status preference.
In this Article, I assess the law on marital immunity in state
sexual offense statutes today and advocate much needed reform.
Structurally and doctrinally, I make two arguments. First: It is past
time for all states to eliminate marital immunity that continues to
14
contaminate their sexual offense statutes. Because discrimination

complainant were adults cohabiting in ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at time of
alleged offense, or if complainant is actor’s legal spouse, unless couple is living apart and
one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s
legal souse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not separated
and living apart unless force is used); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv.
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse cannot be charged with rape unless couple is living
separate or force is used); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by 2002
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (crime of
spousal sexual battery must be reported within thirty days, § 16-3-658 (person cannot be
guilty of criminal sexual conduct in first or second degree if victim is the legal spouse
unless couple is living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West 2002) (spousal rape
requires the defendant to be armed with a weapon, cause serious bodily injury, or living
apart and one has filed for separate maintenance or divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.261(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape,
forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses
were living separate and apart.)
13. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 870 (2001) (“In light of the
widespread social and legal reluctance to effectively address rape among familiars, the
marital rape exclusion can be seen as only the most formal expression of a tendency that
extends across the design and deep into the administration of the law to make closeness a
proxy for consent.”). West, supra note 3, at 78 (“The marital exemption, in brief, is simply
the most brutal of all possible expressions of the social inclination to trivialize women’s
interest in physical and sexual security.”).
14. Contrary to popular belief, wife rape is actually more common than stranger rape.
See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 64 (“‘[W]e believe that a woman is most likely to be
physically forced into having sexual intercourse by her husband.’ Hunt was less tentative.
‘Incredible as it may seem, more women are raped by their husbands each year than by
strangers, acquaintances or other persons.’”). Fourteen percent of the married women in
one study had been raped by their husbands. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 57 (“Eighty-seven
women in our sample of 930 women eighteen years and older were the victims of at least
one completed or attempted rape by their husbands or ex-husbands. This constitutes 14
percent of the 644 women who had ever been married (286 of the 930 women had never
been married). This means that approximately one in every seven women who has ever
been married in our San Francisco sample was willing to disclose an experience of sexual
assault by their husbands that met our quite conservative definition of rape.”) (emphasis in
original). Finkelhor and Yllo found:
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against married women who are sexually assaulted by their husbands
is indefensible, state law should provide no favorable treatment to
men who sexually assault their wives. Formal neutrality in rape law
on the marital status of the complainant and the defendant—
affording no preference to married men who rape their wives—is the
bare minimum a state must have to claim fairness to women.
Second: Formal neutrality is not enough. Formal neutrality fails
to solve a deeper and more intractable problem spawned by the
marital rape exemption. The exemption did more than just protect
men from being prosecuted for raping their wives. It presaged the
devastating impact that a prior sexual relationship between a
15
defendant and a complainant has on a claim of rape today.
Substantial bias against sexually active women who are raped by their
intimates takes the form of a common but improper inference of
consent to the sex alleged to have been rape based solely on the
16
existence of a prior intimate relationship between the parties. The
improper inference of ongoing consent in sexual relationships is a
doctrinal problem that affects all intimate rape, regardless of the
marital status of the parties.
The Department of Justice estimates that sixty-two percent of
adult rapes are committed by intimates—spouses, ex-spouses,
17
boyfriends, or ex-boyfriends. If the criminal law is to redress these
Rape by a stranger is the variety that is most likely to be reported to police, yet
10 percent of the women in our study had been sexually assaulted by their
husbands, whereas only 3 percent had been similarly assaulted by a stranger. In
addition, rape by a date was reported by 10 percent of the women. Clearly,
sexual assaults by intimates, including husbands, are by far the most common
type of rape. Thus rape by husbands appears to be one of the forms of sexual
coercion that a woman is most likely to experience in her lifetime.
DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6–7
(1985) (“Our survey showed disturbingly high rates of sexual assault by husbands. Ten
percent of the married or previously married women in our sample said that their husbands
had ‘used physical force or threat to try to have sex with them.’ We do not know whether
all these assaults meet the precise legal definition of rape or attempted rape.”) (emphasis
in original).
15. See infra notes 235–51 and accompanying text.
16. The bias against rape victims may be called “the culture of acceptance” of date
rape or “a special permissiveness regarding male sexual aggression against female social
acquaintances.” Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L.
REV. 487, 489 (1991). The stereotypes the culture of acceptance includes are the
“aggressive male” (one who actively pursues sexual relations) and the “punished” female
(one who “asks for” sex because of how she is dressed or how she communicates
nonverbally to males). Id. Friedland declared, “an active attempt must be made, at all
stages of a trial, to neutralize the latent gender-based prejudice caused by the culture of
acceptance.” Id. at 491.
17. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH REPORT:
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
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rapes, then it must attack the notion—handed down through
generations by the marital rape exemption—that husbands, exhusbands, boyfriends, and ex-boyfriends have been granted ongoing
consent to sexual intercourse simply because of their prior sexual
relationships with their victims.
I propose that states adopt a new law on sexual offenses by
intimates to correct the improper inference of ongoing consent. This
new law would cover sexual conduct between the defendant and the
complainant in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other
circumstances. It would declare that the complainant’s consent on
the instance in question may not be inferred based solely on her
consent to the same or different acts with the defendant on other
occasions.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the marital rape
exemption in this country. It begins with the history of the doctrine
under English common law, analyzing the three traditional
justifications for the marital rape exemption. It argues that the most
enduring justification has been the notion that the marriage contract
grants women’s ongoing consent to sexual activity with their
husbands. It then describes the immunities based on marital status
that continue in sexual offense statutes in the 50 states and the
District of Columbia. It analyzes the modern justification for these
current marital immunities, including the position, advanced by the
Model Penal Code and a number of scholars, that men who have
sexual relationships with women may presume consent to future
sexual intercourse with them.
It argues that these modern
justifications derive from the traditional notion of ongoing consent.
Part II argues, at a minimum, that the feminist reform agenda
begun in the 1970s must be completed. It argues for formal neutrality
in rape law on the marital status of the parties so that the law
provides no preferential treatment to men who rape their wives. It
refutes the ongoing consent ideology by analyzing the commonly held
belief that undergirds it: that wife rape is less harmful to victims than
stranger rape. After reviewing studies on the matter, it concludes
that, contrary to popular belief, wife rape tends to be more violent
and psychologically damaging than stranger rape. Abolishing the
status preference that men enjoy when they rape their wives is crucial
to redressing the harms caused by wife rape.
Part III turns to the development of the broader law on sexual
offenses by intimates in this country. It begins by revisiting the
history of the marital rape exemption. The marital rape exemption
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 44 (2000). An additional 28% of rapes are
committed by acquaintances and relatives who have not been previously intimate with
their victims. Id.
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began at a time when licit sex was confined to marriage and extramarital sex was proscribed by laws against fornication and adultery.
As society de-criminalized non-marital sexual relations in the late
twentieth century, statutory marital immunities began to include
cohabitants and voluntary social companions within their purview.
Around the same time, legislatures began to implement rape shield
laws. Despite their general prohibition on the admission of evidence
of a complainant’s prior sexual history, these laws universally
admitted evidence of her prior sexual history with the defendant,
regardless of the marital status of the parties. This Part argues that
these two legal changes—the inclusion of cohabitants and voluntary
social companions within the purview of marital immunities and the
admission of evidence of the sexual history between the complainant
and the defendant—were both modern manifestations of the ongoing
consent ideology.
In light of the development of the law on sexual offenses by
intimates, Part IV revisits the issue of formal neutrality on marital
status in sexual offense statutes. It analyzes reform proposals that
states simply abolish marital immunity in their sexual offense statutes
or that states add specific provisions indicating that men may be
prosecuted for raping their wives. After reviewing cases from
jurisdictions in which the statutes are either silent or contain specific
provisions indicating that men may be prosecuted for raping their
wives, it argues that both proposals are inadequate because they fail
to address the ongoing consent ideology based on intimate
relationships that remains embedded in rape law. Thus, not only is
the feminist reform agenda for formal neutrality begun in the 1970s
unfinished, it is also inadequate.
Part V proposes a new law on sexual offenses by married and
unmarried intimates that addresses the improper inference of ongoing
consent based on intimate relationships. After reviewing and
rejecting alternative proposals, it argues that states should abandon
statutory provisions that deal exclusively with marital status. Instead,
they should adopt a provision declaring that a prior sexual
relationship between the parties, whether in marriage, cohabitation,
dating, or another context, does not provide the defendant with a
defense to the charged sexual offense. This new provision would also
declare that consent may not be inferred when based solely on the
complainant’s prior consent to the same or another sexual act with
the defendant. In contrast to the ongoing consent ideology, this Part
offers a normative vision of consent that is temporally constrained
and act-specific. It is this more egalitarian normative vision of
consent that underlies the new law on sexual offenses by intimates.
Finally, Part V applies this new law to the cases previously discussed
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and concludes that such an application would effect a just
improvement over the status quo.
The Appendix of State Sexual Offense Statutes with Marital
Immunity details the current statutes in the 26 states that contain
some form of marital immunity.

I. Development of the Marital Rape Exemption
This Part discusses the legal development of the marital rape
exemption. It begins by analyzing the history of the marital rape
exemption under English common law, arguing that the most
enduring traditional justification for the doctrine has been the
ongoing consent ideology advanced by Sir Matthew Hale in the
seventeenth century. It then turns to the current marital immunities
that continue to exist in state statutes, despite the efforts at feminist
reform begun in the 1970s. These current immunities fall into three
categories: exemptions for certain sexual offenses, separate spousal
sexual offense statutes, and extra requirements for spousal sexual
offenses. As a final measure of analysis, this Part turns to the modern
justifications that the drafters of the Model Penal Code and others
have advanced for both the ancient and modern versions of marital
immunity for sexual offenses.
It argues that these modern
justifications ultimately depend upon Hale’s ongoing consent
ideology.
A. History of the Marital Rape Exemption

The traditional definition of rape under English common law was
18
unlawful sexual intercourse with a female without her consent. In
his leading treatise on criminal law, Rollin Perkins explained that the
marital rape exemption was built into the definition of the crime
19
through the word unlawful. Any sexual intercourse, even forced,
between a husband and his wife was lawful, and thus excluded under
20
the definition of rape. Perkins wrote, “the true reason why the
husband, who has sexual intercourse with his wife against her will, is
not guilty of rape is that such intercourse is not unlawful. . . . Sexual
intercourse between husband and wife is sanctioned by law; all other
21
sexual intercourse is unlawful.” Three major justifications existed
for the designation of all sexual intercourse between husband and

18. ROLLIN PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 110 (1982).
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id.
21. Id. I will return to Perkins’ designation of “all other sexual intercourse” as
“unlawful.” See infra Part III.A.
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wife as lawful under English common law: the property theory, the
22
unity theory, and the ongoing consent theory.
Under the property theory, women were considered to be the
property of men. Rape was a transgression against the man who
23
owned the woman as his property, not against the woman herself.
The rape of an unmarried woman transgressed against her father and
24
the rape of a married woman transgressed against her husband. The
rape of a married woman by her husband himself was not a
transgression at all because a man was allowed to treat his chattel as
25
he deemed appropriate. Because the rape of a married woman was
a violation of her husband’s property, “prosecuting a husband for
raping his wife made no more sense than indicting him for stealing his
26
own property.”
The second justification in English common law for the marital
rape exemption was the unity theory, a derivative of the feudal
doctrine of coverture, in which a woman’s independent legal identity
was abolished at marriage, becoming subsumed within her husband’s
27
identity. Sir William Blackstone explained the unity theory in his
treatise on English common law: “By marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated

22. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 43–44 (N.J. 1981).
23. Schelong, supra note 3, at 87. See also RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 3 (“The idea that
females are the property of males is the key to understanding the history of extramarital
rape and the laws pertaining to it.”); Michael Freeman, But If You Can’t Rape Your Wife
Who[m] Can You Rape?: The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L. Q. 1, 8
(1981). This idea of women as property existed in Biblical and Roman law. In Biblical
law, rape was a crime committed against a husband’s or a father’s property interest, not
against the woman. Schelong, supra note 3, at 85. See also Deuteronomy 22:28–29 (King
James) (“‘If a man finds a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on
her and lie with her,’ he had to marry her ‘because he hath humbled her,’ and he had to
pay her father fifty shekels of silver, which was the bride price. The bride price
compensated the father for the loss of his daughter’s virginity.”). See Michelle J.
Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002). The first law of marriage from
Romulus of Rome in Eighth Century B.C. stated that “obliged married women” had “no
other refuge [but] to conform themselves entirely to the temper of their husbands and the
husbands to rule their wives as necessary and inseparable possessions.” RAQUEL
KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE: UNDERSTANDING THE RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND
SERVICE PROVIDERS 8 (1996) [hereinafter BERGEN, WIFE RAPE].
24. Schelong, supra note 3, at 87. See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 3
(“Rape laws were originally enacted as property laws, to protect a man’s property (a
daughter or a wife) from other men, not as laws to protect women or their rights to control
their bodies.”).
25. Sitton, supra note 3, at 265.
26. Id.
27. Schelong, supra note 3, at 86.
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28

and consolidated” into her husband’s legal existence. Under the
unity theory, a husband was legally responsible for his wife’s conduct
29
and was able to physically punish her if she resisted his authority.
Blackstone explained that a man could:
give his wife moderate correction, for, as he is to answer for her
misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this
power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or
children.30

Once man and woman had been unified by marriage, a wife
could not “enter into a contract, sue or be sued, own personal
31
property, make a will, or deny her husband’s sexual advances.”
Since the husband and wife were considered one legal being, “a man
could no more be charged with raping his wife than be charged with
32
raping himself.”
Although powerful in their day, the justifications for the marital
rape exemption provided by the property and unity theories did not
ultimately have the legal staying power that the ongoing consent
theory garnered. In the late 1600s, the Chief Justice in England, Lord
Matthew Hale, articulated what would become the most popular
justification in modern jurisprudence for the marital rape
33
exemption. Hale understood marriage as granting a wife’s ongoing
34
consent to sexual intercourse. He wrote, “the husband cannot be
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
28. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. See also Reva B. Siegel, “The
Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122 (1996).
29. Siegel, supra note 23, at 2123. See also Schelong, supra note 3, at 86. In essence,
the right of chastisement allowed a husband to beat his wife.
30. BLACKSTONE, supra 28 note at *444. See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2123.
Blackstone’s analysis “served as a guide . . . to the legal implications of marriage” in
American courts. Linda Kerber, From the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration
of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic, 1776–1848, in 10 WOMEN,
THE LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 397, 400 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987). The first
American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries was published as early as 1771. Id. at 400
n.7. In fact, laws limiting a married woman’s legal position in colonial America closely
followed English common law and the concepts of coverture and the unity theory. At
marriage, a woman’s legal existence disappeared. She could not own property, make
contracts or sue on her own behalf. Linda Grant DePauw, Women and the Law: The
Colonial Period, in 10 WOMEN, THE LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 259, 260 (Kermit L.
Hall, ed. 1987). “Indeed, she could not even commit a crime; the law assumed that
whatever she did was under compulsion from her husband.” Id.
31. Schelong, supra note 3, at 86. See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2122.
32. Augustine, supra note 3, at 561.
33. HALE, supra note 1, at 629.
34. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 90 (“Under the ideology of obligation,
husband and wife are melded together in a unitary bond. Sex is part of the sacred glue of
this union. An implicit bargain exists by which wives make themselves sexually available
to husbands in return for being supported.”).
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their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
35
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.” A
man could not, however, force his wife to have sex with a third party:
“for tho she hath given her body to her husband, she is not to be
36
prostituted by him to another.” By giving “her body” sexually to her
husband, a woman thereby gave her ongoing contractual consent to
37
This ongoing consent
conjugal relations with him in the future.
ideology permeates rape law even today.
Scholars have noted that Hale’s assertions on marital rape were
accepted without question as law in English courts and later in
American courts, despite the fact that Hale cited no legal authority
for his position. After reviewing this history, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, concluded that “the marital rape
exemption rule expressly adopted by many of our sister states has its
source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years
38
ago.” Despite the bareness of his declaration, Hale has been the
most commonly cited source for marital immunity in sexual offense
39
statutes in both England and the United States. For example, Rollin
Perkins cited Hale as his source for the marital rape exemption in his
40
criminal law treatise.
From the seventeenth century throughout the nineteenth
century, the marital rape exemption was not questioned. Hale’s
ongoing consent theory of marital sexual relations remained the
judicially recognized foundation for the doctrine throughout this

35. Id. See also Schelong, supra note 3, at 87–88. One scholar, in analyzing why Hale’s
statement was so readily accepted into seventeenth century law, reasoned that Hale “may
simply have been enunciating the overall reality of seventeenth century English law for
married women.” Augustine, supra note 3, at 561. Augustine was referring to the theory
that women were the property of their husbands.
36. HALE, supra note 1, at 628.
37. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981). John Stuart Mill, in the 1860s, argued
that a female slave being raped by her master was considered outrageous by society yet it
was still perceived that a wife had a duty “never to reject her husband’s sexual demands.”
MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, & THE LAW IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND, 1850–1895, 157 (1989). Mill said, “‘[H]owever brutal a tyrant [a wife] may
unfortunately be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, though it may be his
daily pleasure to torment her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him—he
can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being
made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations.’” Id.
38. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981).
39. Augustine, supra note 3, at 560–61. See also Hasday, supra note 3, at 1396–98;
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 163–67. One reason for this broad acceptance,
suggested by Professor Jill Elaine Hasday of the University of Chicago, is that Hale’s
position was “grounded in principles of marital status law and common law coverture.”
Hasday, supra note 3, at 1397.
40. PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115.
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41

time. Appellate cases that mentioned the doctrine did so in passing,
42
usually in dictum while resolving other issues. In 1857, for example,
a Massachusetts court held that, although it was not necessary for a
complainant to allege that she was not the wife of the defendant in
43
order to lodge a valid complaint of rape, “it would always be
competent for a party indicted to show, in defence of a charge of rape
alleged to be actually committed by himself, that the woman on
44
whom it was charged to have been committed was his wife.”
Around the same time, women did begin to allege that rape by
their husbands constituted cruelty that should give them cause for
45
divorce. Based on the ongoing consent ideology, however, courts
46
rejected this argument. In an 1845 case, Shaw v. Shaw, for example,
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors refused to find that a man
who forced his wife to have sexual intercourse against her will had
engaged in intolerable cruelty. The court decided, “even occasional
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount
to legal cruelty. . . . Here the act in it self [sic] was a lawful act
[between husband and wife]—in ordinary circumstances, not injurious
47
nor dangerous.” The Shaw case reveals one way that the ongoing
41. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 510 (1983) (recognizing Hale’s enunciation
of spousal exemption from rape as source for exemption in United States). This
recognition existed despite the fact that the statement “should not have been considered a
binding and definitive statement of the common law.” Id. The court noted that Hale’s
statement was made “without citation,” implying that it was not supported by law and
therefore never should have been adopted. Id. The reality of the widely accepted marital
rape immunity was that “women subject to forced sex in marriage did not have the option
of seeking criminal prosecution.” Hasday, supra note 3, at 1406.
42. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8
Gray) 489 (1857). The issue in that case was not whether a man could commit rape on his
own wife; instead, the defense used Hale’s statement to show what was accepted law and
to show what the complainant must allege, i.e., that she was not the wife of the defendant.
Hasday was unable to locate any nineteenth-century prosecutions of a husband raping his
wife. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1406.
43. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 489. But see People v. Fathers, 153 N.E. 704 (Ill.
1926) (“In an indictment for the crime of rape without force, an allegation that the
prosecutrix was not the wife of the accused person is essential. The omission of that
allegation in such an indictment is fatal. . . .”).
44. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) at 489. The Fogerty case was the first United States
case to judicially recognize Hale’s “implied consent” theory. See DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d
at 510. Some rape convictions were reversed because the complainant failed to show that
she was not the wife of the defendant. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393–94.
45. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1394. At this point, some states allowed battered wives to
obtain a divorce on cruelty grounds, but the wives had to prove “extreme” and “repeated
cruelty” in order to succeed. See Siegel, supra note 28, at 2132.
46. Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189 (1845). Mrs. Shaw was petitioning for divorce on the
grounds that her husband forced her to have intercourse with him, endangering her health
in the process.
47. Id. Despite the fact that courts rejected the argument in the mid-nineteenth
century, by the late nineteenth century most courts granted divorce petitions for cruelty
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based on a husband subjecting his wife to sexual demands when those demands threatened
her health. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1467. Professor Hasday observed, “The legal
possibility of exit may have given some wives more leverage in negotiating the terms of
marital intercourse; yet it did not do more than that to protect wives from their husbands’
sexual demands while the marriage lasted. . . . Until divorce, Hale’s theory of irretractible
consent remained in place.” Id. at 1468. Making divorce somewhat more available on
these grounds did not dispel the reality that divorce was not an appealing or easily
attainable solution for most women. Id. Success in a divorce petition required wives to
demonstrate both “that their husband’s unwanted demands were unusual, either
quantitatively excessive or particularly brutal; . . . and that these demands had jeopardized
their health.” Id. at 1469. Marital rape, as an act by itself, did not qualify as cause. For a
discussion on cases that represented the limits on divorce for sexual cruelty, see id. at
1471–74. Obtaining a divorce for sexual cruelty reasons was often highly embarrassing
and even if a woman was successful in doing so, she “lacked real socioeconomic
alternatives to marriage.” Id. at 1468. One development in the late nineteenth century,
made in divorce petition cases pursued by the husband, proved to be a victory for married
women, albeit a narrow one. In these cases, the wife continued to “perform domestic and
childcare services” but refused to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband. Id.
“These wives refused to submit to marital intercourse because they did not want to have
any more children or because they no longer loved their husbands.” Id. at 1476 (footnotes
omitted). Husbands’ petitions to divorce their wives for desertion or cruelty on the
grounds that they refused all marital intercourse were denied by the majority of the courts.
Id. at 1475. Judgments for the wives were crucial in these cases because alimony and
dower were not available to wives who were held responsible for the divorce. Id. More
importantly, these decisions demonstrated some acceptance by the courts of a woman’s
refusal to engage in marital intercourse, even if it was just to show that it was not a valid
reason for divorce. Id. Courts found that other aspects of wifely obligations were more
essential, denial of which were stronger reasons for divorce than refusing marital
intercourse. One obligation a woman had was to live in the same household as the
husband and to provide domestic services to the husband and children. Id. at 1477–78.
Women’s formal marital status in the United States under the unity theory began to
change with the implementation of Married Women’s Property Acts, which gave women
the right to own property, sue and be sued, and work outside the home without their
husband’s permission. Schelong, supra note 3, at 91; see also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2128.
Women’s rights advocates of this era, of course, condemned husbands’ rights to chastise
their wives. Schelong, supra note 3, at 91. By the 1870s, a man’s right to physically
chastise his wife was no longer accepted in U.S. law. Siegel, supra note 28, at 2129. “Thus,
when a wife beater was charged with assault and battery, judges refused to entertain his
claim that a husband had a legal right to strike his wife; instead they denounced the
prerogative, and allowed the criminal prosecution to proceed.” Id. at 2129–30. A
woman’s right to have control over marital intercourse was one of the major reforms that
feminists in the mid-1800s rallied for. In fact, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a prominent
feminist of this time, perceived this right to be the most important achievement for which
women should fight. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1419. Stanton was “convinced that a wife’s
right to refuse her husband’s sexual demands was the bedrock foundation needed to
support equality.” Id. at 1422. Feminists were concerned with the reasons why married
women submitted to unwanted sex with their husbands, whether it was by force or a lack
of a plausible alternative. See id. at 1416. The phrase “legalized prostitution” was used to
represent married women who consented to sex because of their economic and social
dependence on their husbands. Id. “[T]he wife who was structurally compelled to have
sex when she did not desire the act or its reproductive consequences was different only in
name from the woman without any available option but to sell her body to strange men on
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consent theory derived in criminal rape law made an incursion into
the civil sphere of divorce law.
In an 1890 case, a man forced a third party to rape his wife
“under menace of death to both parties in case of refusal, and
48
supporting his threat by a loaded gun held over the parties.” The
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated, “It is true that [a husband]
may enforce sexual connection [on his wife]; and, in the exercise of
this marital right, it is held that he cannot be guilty of the offense of
rape. But it is too plain for argument that this privilege is a personal
49
one, only.” Citing Hale’s analysis of accomplice rape, the North
Carolina court decided, “If . . . the husband aids and abets another to
50
ravish his wife, he may be convicted as if he were a stranger.”
It was not until early in the twentieth century that a man was first
51
prosecuted for attempting to rape his wife. These early prosecutions
were unsuccessful. For example, in 1905, the Court of Criminal
the street.” Id. at 1416–17. See also id. at 1427–33 (discussing idea of marriage as legalized
prostitution). Wives “acquiesced to marital intercourse because they had no practical
alternative, nowhere else to go and no other means of negotiating their marital
relationship.” Id. at 1428. A woman’s right to her own body and the woman’s
reproductive role in the family were inseparable. Because women naturally carried the
reproductive responsibilities, “[g]iving women the right ‘to decide when she shall become
a mother, how often [and] under what circumstances’ was only just[.]” Id. at 1426. At that
time, a woman’s primary responsibility was raising her children; feminists believed that
women should be entitled to control how much of their time they spent doing so. See id.
Nevertheless, even when courts renounced the chastisement doctrine, they often
refused to enforce charges of assault against husbands, relying on the trope of marital
privacy. Id. at 2154. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868) (holding that the
defendant was not guilty for whipping his wife “because the evil of publicity would be
greater than the evil involved in the trifles complained of; and because they ought to be
left to family government”). See also State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123 (1852) (a slap
on the cheek qualifies as assault and battery in law but “cannot apply to persons in the
marriage state, [for] it would break down the great principle of mutual confidence and
dependence; throw open the bedroom to the gaze of the public; and spread discord and
misery, contention and strife, where peace and concord ought to reign.”). When faced
with such a case, for example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1868 decided that it
would “not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic
privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.” Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453
(“[W]hen trifles are taken hold of by the public, and the parties are exposed and
disgraced, . . . that which ought to be forgotten in a day, will be remembered for life.”).
48. State v. Dowell, 11 S.E. 525 (N.C. 1890). Because the facts are so violent, the most
we can infer from this case is that, at least for the most violent accomplice rapes, men
could be liable for raping their wives.
49. Id. See also People v. Chapman, 28 N.W. 896 (Mich. 1886) (holding that a husband
who arranged for another man to seduce his wife could be convicted of rape when the
seducement resulted in rape).
50. See Dowell, 11 S.E. at 525. A man could be convicted of assault with intent to
commit the rape of his wife by forcing another man, at gunpoint, to attempt sexual
intercourse with his wife. Id.
51. See Hasday, supra note 3, at 1393–94.
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Appeals of Texas heard the appeal of Frazier v. State.
Before
Frazier attempted to rape his wife Emma, she tried to divorce him,
53
but the court refused her request. Emma remained in the house but
54
slept in a separate room. She accused Frazier of entering her room
55
and assaulting her with the intent to rape. Frazier was convicted at
trial, but the appellate court reversed, because the two parties were
56
married, Frazier could not be found guilty of the crime. The court
focused on the fact that Emma “performed the ordinary duties
devolving upon the wife in regard to household matters, doing the
57
cooking and such kindred things, and they all ate at the same table.”
Emma’s desire for a divorce made no difference; Frazier still had the
58
right to force her to have sexual intercourse.
Claims regarding marital rape also continued to be unsuccessful
in the civil divorce context. In 1921, for example, the Supreme Court
of Alabama resolved a case in which the wife had withdrawn from
59
sexual relations with her husband in order to stop having children.
The husband proceeded to force her to engage in sexual intercourse
60
The wife then left the home “to avoid further
against her will.
61
instances of that character.” The Alabama court held that a wife
who left her husband under these circumstances had abandoned the
marriage without cause; therefore, she could not collect alimony or
62
obtain custody of her child. The wife’s denial of sex could not “be
excused, much less justified, and she was by her own admission guilty
63
of a grave breach of marital duty.” The breach of marital duty was
52. 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. 1905).
53. Id. at 754.
54. Id. at 755.
55. Id. She fought him off so he could not complete this attempt. Id.
56. Id. (“[A]ll the authorities hold that a man cannot himself be guilty of actual rape
upon his wife; one of the main reasons being the matrimonial consent which she gives
when she assumes the marriage relation, and which the law will not permit her to retract in
order to charge her husband with the offense of rape.”).
57. Id. The court also noted that Mr. Frazier “supported the family, provided for their
wants, [and] attended to the business about the place and farm.” Id.
58. Id. (“[W]herever the question has been adjudicated . . . the husband himself cannot
be himself guilty of actual rape upon his wife.”).
59. Anonymous, 89 So. 462 (Ala. 1921).
60. Id. at 463.
61. Id.
62. Id. In the beginning of the twentieth century, domestic relations courts were
established to handle domestic violence disputes. Instead of seeking to punish the
assaulter, however, these courts “urged couples to reconcile, providing informal or formal
counseling designed to preserve the relationship whenever possible.” Id. at 464. The
court conceded that the marital right of a husband to have sexual relations with his wife
was “not absolute, but is qualified by considerations of health and decency.” Id.
63. Id. See also Siegel, supra note 28, at 2170 (“Battered wives were discouraged from
filing criminal charges against their husbands, urged to accept responsibility for their role
in provoking the violence, and encouraged to remain in the relationship and rebuild it
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the wife’s refusal to abide by her ongoing consent to sexual
intercourse, not the man’s rape.
Until the mid-1970s in this country, there were no serious legal
challenges to the marital rape exemption, and Hale’s ongoing consent
64
theory continued to justify the doctrine.
B.

Current Marital Immunity for Sexual Offenses

In the mid-1970s, feminist reformers began to challenge the
marital rape exemption in courts and in state legislatures. Over the
next three decades, they were successful in twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia, in which marital immunity was abolished for
65
In the remaining twenty-six states, marital
sexual offenses.
66
immunity remains in one form or another.
Many legal scholars who have researched and commented upon
the marital immunity have focused on state provisions regarding
67
forcible rape. They have ignored or given short shrift to provisions
on sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse,
68
and other sexual offenses. To understand fully the way that marital

rather than attempt to separate or divorce.”) As recently as the mid-1970s, police officers
were trained to handle “family disturbances” as “personal matters requiring no direct
police action.” Id. at 2171. The Oakland Police Department’s 1975 Training Bulletin
stated, “[n]ormally, officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided. . .but
[when] one of the parties demands arrest, you should attempt to explain the ramifications
of such action . . . and encourage the parties to reason with each other.” Id.
64. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1983).
65. See statutes listed supra note 8.
66. See statutes listed supra note 9.
67. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 3, at 1496; RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 376.
68. For example, some scholars divided states into two categories: those with a partial
marital rape exemption and those with no marital rape exemption, an approach that
tended to ignore marital immunities for sexual crimes other than rape. See, e.g., RUSSELL,
supra note 6, at 376; Laura X, supra note 7, at 1064. Diana Russell, for example, listed
those states that allowed a spouse to be prosecuted for rape but did not examine the
sexual offense statutes other than rape. In Alaska, Russell notes, “Husbands can be
charged for rape of wife.” RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 376. This statement is somewhat
misleading because Alaska provides marital immunity for sexual penetration or sexual
contact when the victim is mentally incapacitated and cannot consent. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to sexual assault in third degree; sexual
assault in the third degree is when an offender “engages in sexual contact with a person
who the offender knows is mentally incapable; incapacitated; or unaware that a sexual act
is being committed,” a Class C felony); § 11.41.420 (3) (marriage is a defense to sexual
assault in the second degree if the offender “engages in sexual penetration with a person
who the offender knows is mentally incapable; incapacitated; or unaware that sexual act is
being committed.”).
Sitton, supra note 3, at 262. A few authors have examined the marital rape immunity
as it pertains to sexual crimes other than rape. Lisa Eskow, for example, discussed those
states that limited the prosecution of marital sexual offenses, but she did not examine the
specific statutes of each state. Eskow, supra note 3, at 682. Other scholars have attempted
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immunity works in a state, however, it is necessary to examine all of
the states’ sexual offense provisions. For example, the Model Penal
Code includes six separate marital immunities for sexual offenses: for
forcible rape, gross sexual imposition, forcible deviate sexual
intercourse, corruption of minors, sexual assault, and indecent
69
exposure.
Legal scholars have not systematically critiqued the twenty-six
state statutes that currently provide some form of marital immunity
for nonconsensual sexual offenses. The states that retain marital
immunity fall into three, non-mutually exclusive categories: those that
exempt spouses from sexual offenses other than forcible rape, those
that maintain separate spousal sexual offense statutes, and those that
impose extra requirements for the prosecution of marital rape. The
following sections will address each in turn.
(1) Marital Immunity for Certain Sexual Offenses

Twenty states exempt men from sexual offense charges when
70
their wives are mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.
to examine the marital rape immunity throughout criminal sexual conduct statutes, but
their research offered only a selected example of states and the conduct they prohibited,
rather than comprehensive analysis. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 3, at 1496; Sitton, supra
note 3, at 277–81; Siegel, Note, supra note 3, at 364–69; West, supra note 3, at 46–48.
Richard Posner examined the presence of marital immunity in the sexual offense
statutes of the fifty states. RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE
TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 35–43 (1996). However, his chronicle may not accurately
reflect the true existence or absence of marital immunity in state statutory law. E.g., for
Minnesota, Posner declared “No Exemptions.” A closer reading, however, reveals that
marital exemptions exist for certain sexual offenses if the victim is incapable of consenting.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381
(S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth
degree if actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is mentally impaired,
mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless).
69. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0(3); 213.1(1); 213.2(1); 213.3(1); 213.4; 213.5 (2001).
70. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to second
degree sexual assault if the victim is incapacitated or unaware the sexual act is being
committed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity
when victim is mentally incapacitated because statute requires force for spousal conviction
of sexual assault); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants
are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person intentionally
subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from sexual assault in
the second degree when the victim is physically helpless); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732(d)
(2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and cohabitants
are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if victim is mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie
1948–2002) (husband cannot be prosecuted for rape if wife is incapable of giving consent
or unconscious at time of act); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002) (marriage is defense
to sexual abuse in third degree if victim is suffering from mental defect or incapacity which
precludes giving consent; Class C felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (express
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“Mentally incapacitated” is usually defined as so drugged or
71
intoxicated that one cannot give valid consent. “Physically helpless”
is usually defined as unconscious, which includes unconsciousness due
72
In these twenty states,
to drugging or a coma, for example.
penetrating a woman who cannot consent because she is drugged or
unconscious is a crime if the man is not married to the victim.
However, it is not a crime if the man is married to the victim.
In three of these states—Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—
men are even immune from charges when they themselves administer
the drugs, intoxicants, or controlled substances to render their wives

exemption from simple rape which includes situation where victim is incapable of resisting
due to an intoxicating substance); MD. CRIM. LAW. § 3-318 (West 2002) (express
exemption from rape in second degree and sexual offense in third degree when victim is
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West
2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth
degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally incapable or
mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn.
Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit criminal sexual
conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that complainant is
mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-99 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless, as spouses are immune from prosecution for sexual battery unless husband uses
force); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (implied marital immunity when victim is
mentally or physically incapable as spouses are immune unless husband uses force); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156
(H.B. 485) (West) (spousal immunity if victim is mentally or physically incapable of
consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (marital immunity for rape where
the victim is incapable of consent through mental illness, unsoundness of mind, intoxicated
or unconscious); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (spouses exempt from first
degree sexual assault if victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically
helpless); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (implied marital immunity
when the actor causes the victim to become mentally incapacitated or physically helpless
by administering a controlled substance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–
2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact when person is incapable of consenting, Class 4
felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West 2002) (implied marital immunity when
victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless because spouses are general exempt
from prosecution unless weapon is used or there is bodily injury); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.261(A)(ii) (West 2002) (marital immunity when the victim suffers from a mental incapacity
or physical helplessness); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100(1)(b) (West 2002)
(marital immunity for indecent liberties when the victim is incapable of consent by reason
of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, Class A or B
felony).
71. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(h) (definition of mentally
incapacitated is when victim “is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or
controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other
substance administered to that person without his or her consent”).
72. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (physically helpless
is defined as unconscious, asleep, or “for any other reason physically unable to
communicate unwillingness to an act”).
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73

mentally incapacitated. In eight other states, men are immune from
charges when their wives are rendered incapable of consenting due to
drugs or intoxicants administered without consent, which may include
74
when a husband administers intoxicants without his wife’s consent.
73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(a) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess.
Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (rape includes when “for the purpose of preventing
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control by
administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person
surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1111 (West 2002) (“Rape is an act of sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal
penetration accomplished with a male or female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator”
where the victim is “incapable through mental illness or any other unsoundness of
mind; . . . [w]here the victim is intoxicated by a narcotic or anesthetic agent, administered
by or with the privity of the accused as a means of forcing the victim to submit; . . . [or]
[w]here the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act.”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual conduct in first degree includes when “the
actor causes the victim, without the victim’s consent, to become mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless by administering, distributing, dispensing, delivering . . . a controlled
substance.”).
Likewise, in South Carolina, a man is explicitly immune from charges even when he
caused his wife to be unconscious. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002)
(sexual conduct in first degree includes when actor causes victim to become physically
helpless, defined as unconscious, asleep or “for any other reason physically unable to
communicate unwillingness to an act”).
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted
for criminal sexual conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his spouse being
mentally incapacitated); § 750.520a(h) (definition of mentally incapacitated is when
“person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct
due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that
person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65 (5)
(West 2002) (definition of mentally incapacitated is when “person is rendered temporarily
incapable of appraising or controlling such person’s conduct owing to the influence of a
drug or intoxicating substance administered without such person’s consent”) (emphasis
added); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-301(C) (West 2002) (mentally incapacitated defined has “an
individual who, because of the influence of a drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance, or
because of an act committed on the individual without the individual’s consent . . . is
rendered substantially incapable of . . . [a]ppraising the nature of the individual’s
conduct”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-341, (West 2002), amended by
2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (mentally incapacitated defined as
“person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance,
administered to that person without the person’s agreement”) (emphasis added); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1(5) (1953–2001) (mentally incapacitated defined as a “person who is
rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the
influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to that person without
his or her consent”) (emphasis added); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(C) (2002) (mentally
incapacitated defined as “one rendered incapable of knowing or controlling his or her
conduct, or incapable of resisting due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or
other substance administered to that person without his or her consent”); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (mentally
incapacitated defined as person who is “rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or
controlling the person’s conduct owing to the influence of a substance administered to the
person without the person’s consent”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(4) (West 2002)
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Additionally, twelve states grant men immunity when they
commit various nonconsensual sexual offenses against their wives,
including gross sexual imposition, sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual
75
battery, sexual contact, and sexual misconduct.
(2) Separate Statutes for Marital Sexual Offenses

Six states have statutes that separate rape or sexual assault by
76
spouses from rape or sexual assault committed by others. Arizona,
(mentally incapacitated defined as “person [who is] rendered temporarily incapable of
appraising or controlling the person’s conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic
or other substance administered to that person without the person’s consent”).
Louisiana’s rape statute does not include marital immunity “when the victim is
incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or
abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other
controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the knowledge
of the victim.” However, there is marital immunity when someone other than the offender
administers the substance. LA. R.S. 14:43 (A)(1)-(2).
Likewise, one Mississippi court has held that when a husband deliberately causes his
wife’s unconsciousness by administering drugs, he is not immune to prosecution, as
drugging the victim consists of the use of force. See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2000).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.425 (Michie 2001) (marriage is defense to sexual assault in
third degree, Class C felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (West 2002) (it is
defense to sexual abuse that person was spouse of other person at time of commission of
act; sexual abuse is Class 5 felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70a (West 2002)
(marital immunity for aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, Class B felony); § 53a71 (marital immunity for sexual assault in second degree); § 53a-72a (marital immunity for
sexual assault in third degree); § 53a-72b (marital immunity for sexual assault in third
degree with firearm); § 53a-73a (marital immunity for sexual assault in fourth degree);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West
2002) (spouses and cohabitants are immune from sexual assault in third degree, Class C
felony, if actor submits other person to sexual contact through strong compulsion or other
person is mentally defective); § 707-733 (2001) note in H.B. 2560 (spouses are exempt from
sexual assault in fourth degree, a misdemeanor, if actor submits other person to sexual
contact by compulsion); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517 (2001) (marriage is defense to sexual
battery, Class A person misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (spouses
exempt from simple rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) (spouses exempt
from criminal sexual conduct in third and fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.03 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from sexual battery, third degree felony);
§ 2907.05 (spouses exempt from gross sexual imposition, third or fourth degree felony);
§ 2907.06 (spouses exempt from sexual imposition, first degree misdemeanor); S.C. CODE
ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal
sexual conduct in third degree); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002)
(spouses exempt from sexual contact without consent with person who is capable of
consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2002)
(spouses exempt from rape in third degree, Class C felony); § 9A.44.100(1)(c) (West 2002)
(marital immunity for indecent liberties, Class A or B felony); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2304 (Michie 1977–2001) (spouses are exempt from sexual assault in third degree,
punishable by not more than 15 years); § 6-2-313 (marriage is defense to sexual battery).
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral
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South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia mandate lesser penalties for
spousal rape than for other rapes regardless of the force used or
77
injury caused. These states downgrade the severity of the crime by
statute. In Arizona, sexual assault is a Class 2 felony, receiving from
5.25 to 14 years, while spousal sexual assault is a Class 6 felony, which
judges have the discretion to treat as a misdemeanor for punishment
78
purposes. In Arizona and Virginia, lessened penalties for spousal
sexual offenses can be diminished further at the discretion of the
79
In
judge, who can mandate counseling instead of jail time.
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West
2002) (rape of spouse occurs when perpetrator accomplishes sexual intercourse against the
person’s will by force or violence, or when the person is prevented from resisting by any
intoxicating or controlled substance, or when the person is unconscious at the time of the
act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b(b) (West 2002) (“No spouse or cohabitor shall
compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force
against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the threat of the use of force against such
other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes such other spouse or cohabitor to fear
physical injury.”); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (“Sexual battery,
when accomplished through the use of aggravated force by one spouse against the other
spouse if they are living together constitutes the felony of spousal sexual battery.”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery occurs when one spouse
subjects the other to unlawful sexual penetration where the defendant is armed with a
weapon or causes seriously bodily injury to the victim); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B),
§ 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002) (marital sexual assault occurs when the
perpetrator engages in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus or anal
intercourse with his or her spouse against the spouse’s will by force or a present threat of
force).
77. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (West 2002) (first offense
sexual assault of spouse is Class 6 felony) with § 13-1406(B) (sexual assault is Class 2
felony); compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal sexual
battery mandates sentence of not more than ten years) with § 16-3-652 (criminal sexual
conduct in first degree mandates sentence of not more than thirty years) and § 16-3-654
(criminal sexual conduct in third degree is punishable by imprisonment for not more than
ten years); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(c)(1)(C)(2) (West 2002) (aggravated
spousal rape is Class B felony) and § 39-13-507(b)(2)(A) (spousal rape is Class C felony)
with § 39-13-502(b) (aggravated rape is Class A felony) and § 39-13-503(b) (rape is Class B
felony); compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002) (marital sexual assault,
punishable by confinement in state correctional facility for term of not less than one year
nor more than twenty years) with § 18.2-61 (rape, punishable by confinement in state
correctional facility for life or for any term not less than five years).
78. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (West 2002) (sexual assault is a class 2
felony) with § 13-1406.01 (sexual assault of a spouse is a class 6 felony).
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(B) (West 2002) (sexual assault of spouse is
Class 6 felony; the judge has discretion to enter judgment for conviction of Class 1
misdemeanor with mandatory counseling); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(C) (West 2002)
(“[A]ll or part of any sentence imposed for a violation of subsection B [spousal rape] may
be suspended upon the defendant’s completion of counseling or therapy . . . [i]f the court
finds such action will promote maintenance of the family unit and will be in the best
interest of the complaining witness.”); § 18.2-61(D), § 18.2-67.1(D), 18.2-67.2(C) (“Upon a
finding of guilt under subsection B [spousal rape, forcible sodomy, object sexual
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Tennessee, sexual offenses of every type are downgraded for spouses.
Aggravated rape is a Class A felony, but aggravated spousal rape is a
Class B felony; rape is a Class B felony, but spousal rape is a Class C
felony. Aggravated sexual battery is a Class B felony, while spousal
sexual battery with the same aggravated circumstances is only a Class
80
D felony. In South Carolina, criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree is punishable by not more than thirty years of imprisonment,
while spousal sexual battery, the same crime by a spouse, is punished
81
by not more than ten years.
(3) Extra Requirements for Marital Sexual Offenses

A number of states require the victim and the prosecutor to
satisfy additional criteria in order to pursue instances of marital
sexual assault. While these states allow for the prosecution of spousal
sexual assault, statutes make the prosecutions more difficult to
pursue. There are three types of non-mutually exclusive criteria that
82
states have imposed: reporting requirements, the separation or

penetration] . . . the court, without entering a judgment of guilt, upon motion of the
defendant and with the consent of the complaining witness and the attorney for the
Commonwealth, may defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation
pending completion of counseling or therapy. . . . If the defendant fails to so complete
such counseling or therapy, the court may make final disposition of the case and proceed
as otherwise provided. If such counseling is completed . . . , the court may discharge the
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against him if, after consideration of the views of
the complaining witness and such other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such
action will promote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the
complaining witness.”).
80. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-502 AGGRAVATED RAPE (West 2002) with
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL EXCLUSION (West 2002); compare TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-503 RAPE (West 2002) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL
EXCLUSION (West 2002); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-504 AGGRAVATED
SEXUAL BATTERY (West 2002) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 SPOUSAL
EXCLUSION (West 2002).
81. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual
conduct in first degree punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years) with
S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal sexual battery punishable
by imprisonment of not more than ten years).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one
year after date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of
offense is corroborated by independent evidence); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725 § 5/1218(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13),
aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-14), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if not reported to law enforcement within 30
days after offense was committed); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002)
(crime of spousal sexual battery must be reported within thirty days).
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divorce of the couple at the time of the assault,
84
requirements of force or violence.

and additional

83. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault when
victim is mentally incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither
party has filed with the court for separation); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001) note in
2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (married does not include spouses living
apart); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501 (2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple if
living apart or either spouse has filed for separation or divorce or for relief under
protection from abuse act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (person not
considered spouse if judgment of separation exists or if parties are living apart and
offender knows that temporary restraining order has been issued); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3316 (West 2002) (spouse may not be prosecuted under § 3-303 [rape in first degree], § 3304 [rape in second degree], § 3-307 [sexual offense in third degree] or § 3-308 [sexual
offense in fourth degree] unless person committing crime uses force and act is without
consent of spouse, or couple has lived apart under written separation agreement or for at
least three months before alleged rape or sexual offense. A person may be prosecuted
under these statutes if there was decree of limited divorce at time of offense); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.F.
2433) (West) (person does not commit criminal sexual conduct under § 609.342(a) and (b)
[criminal sexual conduct in first degree], § 609.343(a) and (b) [criminal sexual conduct in
second degree], § 609.344(a), (b), (d), and (e) [criminal sexual conduct in third degree],
and § 609.345(a), (b), (d), (e) [criminal sexual conduct in fourth degree], if actor and
complainant were adults cohabiting in ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at time of
alleged offense, or if complainant is actor’s legal spouse, unless couple is living apart and
one of them has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s
legal spouse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not
separated and living apart unless force is used); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G)
(West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse
cannot be charged with rape unless couple is living separate or force is used); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (married does not include spouses who are living apart
and decision for divorce has been granted); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op.
2002) (person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct in first or second degree if victim
is the legal spouse unless couple is living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 (West
2002) (spousal rape requires the defendant to be armed with a weapon, cause serious
bodily injury, or living apart and one has filed for separate maintenance or divorce); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.2-67.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be
found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration unless, at time of
alleged offense, spouses were living separate and apart); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.010 (West 2002) (married does not include a person who is living separate from
spouse and who has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage).
84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a70b (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender
uses force or the threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband
can only be prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force
or violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating,
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); MD.
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree,
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The first criterion is a stringent reporting requirement.
In
California, wife rape must be reported within one year of the date of
the incident, unless the wife’s allegation is corroborated by
86
independent, admissible evidence. Other rape victims in California
87
have no similar reporting requirement. Illinois bars the prosecution
of a spouse for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, criminal sexual abuse, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse if
the incident is not reported to law enforcement officials within 30
88
Other rape victims in Illinois face no similar reporting
days.

rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living
separately); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of alleged victim may be
found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration
without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv.
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses
force or threat of force); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by (2002
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal
sexual battery requires aggravated force, defined as “use or the threat of use of a weapon
or the use or threat of use of physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated
nature); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires
defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living
separately and filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B), § 18.267.2(B) (West 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy, or object
sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, the parties were living separately or
defendant caused bodily injury to spouse by use of force or violence).
85. Reporting requirements are not statutes of limitations. Reporting requirements
indicate the time within which a complainant must inform the authorities of an offense. If
a complainant fails to report the offense within that time, the offense is not legally
cognizable. The statute of limitations is the time within which a prosecutor must charge an
offender. If the prosecutor fails to charge an offender within that prescribed amount of
time, the claim is presumed to be stale and so should no longer be pursued legally. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (providing statute of limitations is six years after date of the
commission of offense for offenses punishable by imprisonment for eight years). Section
800 applies to spousal rape. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b). “However, no prosecution shall
be commenced under [section 262 rape of a spouse] unless the violation was reported to
medical personnel, a member of the clergy, an attorney, a shelter representative, a
counselor, a judicial officer, a rape crisis agency, a prosecuting agency, a law enforcement
officer, or a firefighter within one year after the date of the violation.” Id.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (rape of spouse must be reported within one
year after date of violation; reporting requirement shall not apply if victim’s allegation of
offense is corroborated by independent evidence).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2002).
88. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720 § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) (prosecution of a spouse is
barred for criminal sexual assault (§ 5/12-13), aggravated criminal sexual assault (§ 5/1214), criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-15), and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (§ 5/12-17), if
not reported to law enforcement within 30 days after offense was committed).
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89

requirement.
Similarly, in South Carolina, the crime of spousal
sexual battery must be reported to officials within 30 days in order to
90
Other criminal sexual conduct victims in South
be prosecuted.
91
Carolina, by contrast, face no such reporting requirement.
The second criterion is the requirement of separation or divorce.
Thirteen states—Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode
Island, Washington, and Virginia—require that a couple be separated
or divorced at the time of the assault before certain sexual offense
92
prosecutions may proceed. In Minnesota, Tennessee, Washington,
and Rhode Island, the parties must be living apart and have filed for
93
legal divorce or separation. In Maryland, there must be a limited
94
divorce decree between the parties to avoid marital immunity. In
Alaska and Kansas, one party must have filed for legal separation,
95
divorce, or dissolution of the marriage to avoid marital immunity. In
Hawaii, Mississippi, Ohio, Virginia, Kansas, and South Carolina,
96
marital immunity does not apply to spouses who are living apart. In
89. Id.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (crime of spousal sexual
battery must be reported within thirty days).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 §§ 16-3-652, 16-3-653, 16-3-654 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
92. See supra note 83. This requirement is not imposed, however, if the spouse uses
force to accomplish the act.
93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv.
Ch. 381 (S.F. 2433) (West) (term legal spouse does not include when couple is living apart
and one has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956
§ 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (married does not include spouses who are living apart and decision
for divorce has been granted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal
sexual battery requires defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury,
or parties must be living separately and filed for divorce); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9a.44.010 (West 2002) (married does not include a person who is living separate from
spouse and who has filed for legal separation or dissolution of marriage).
94. MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West 2002) (spouses are exempt from prosecution unless
at time of crime spouses have lived apart under decree of limited divorce).
95. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a) (Michie 2001) (person not considered married if
either party has filed for separation or divorce); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501(3) (2001)
(person is not considered spouse if couple is living apart or either spouse has filed for
separation or divorce or for relief under protection from abuse act).
96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560)
(West 2002) (married does not include spouses living apart); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501
(2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple is living apart or either spouse has filed
for separation or divorce or for relief under protection from abuse act); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-99 (2002) (person is not guilty of sexual battery if alleged victim is that person’s
legal spouse and at time of alleged offense such person and alleged victim are not
separated and living apart unless force is used); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West
2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (spouse cannot
be charged with rape unless parties are living separate and apart); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976
§ 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct if
victim is spouse unless they are living apart); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.1, § 18.2-67.2
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Kansas, filing for relief under a protection from abuse order will
97
In Louisiana, a legal judgment of
avoid marital immunity.
separation or separation plus a restraining order must have already
98
been rendered to avoid marital immunity.
The third criterion is an extra requirement of force. Eleven
states—Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—do not
recognize spousal rape or spousal sexual assault unless the offender
99
uses force, violence, duress, or threats of great bodily harm.
Additionally, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have an
implied requirement of force because these states exempt spouses
100
from every non-forcible sexual crime. These states require physical
(West 2002) (exemption from forcible sodomy and object penetration if spouses are living
apart).
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501 (2001) (person is not considered spouse if couple is
living apart or either spouse has filed for separation or divorce or for relief under
protection from abuse act).
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West 2002) (person not considered spouse if judgment
of separation exists or if parties are living apart and offender knows that temporary
restraining order has been issued).
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01(A) (West 2002) (“A person commits sexual
assault of a spouse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral
sexual contact with a spouse without consent of the spouse by the immediate or
threatened use of force against the spouse or another.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a70b (West 2002) (spouses or cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault unless offender
uses force or the threat of force); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (husband
can only be prosecuted for rape where wife “resists but her resistance is overcome by force
or violence” or “[w]here she is prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and
great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or by any intoxicating,
narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of the accused”); MD.
CRIM. LAW § 3-316 (West 2002) (spouses can only be prosecuted for rape in first degree,
rape in second degree, or sexual offense in third degree if force is used or couple is living
separately); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2002) (legal spouse of alleged victim may be
found guilty of sexual battery if legal spouse engaged in forcible sexual penetration
without consent of alleged victim); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2002) (marriage is no
defense to charge of sexual assault if assault was committed by force or by threat of force);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv.
File 156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses
force or threat of force); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by (2002
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West) (rape of spouse must be accompanied by
actual or threatened force or violence, along with apparent power of execution against
victim or third person); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (spousal
sexual battery requires aggravated force, defined as “use or the threat of use of a weapon
or the use or threat of use of physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated
nature); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (West 2002) (spousal sexual battery requires
defendant to be armed with weapon, inflict serious bodily injury, or parties must be living
separately and filed for divorce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (West 2002) (rape), § 18.267.1 (forcible sodomy), § 18.2-67.2 (object sexual penetration).
100. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in third degree only offense
with marital immunity for non-force part of provision); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43 (West
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force rather than other forms of coercion that would suffice for the
rape of a stranger. For example, in Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho,
Nevada, Oklahoma, and Virginia, the use or threatened use of force is
required, whereas nonconsent or inability to consent would suffice if
101
the parties were not married.
In some states, this force requirement is not satisfied by the kind
of coercion that would suffice if the parties were strangers. It is only
102
satisfied by serious physical force resulting in substantial injuries. In
South Carolina, for example, spousal sexual battery requires
aggravated force, defined as the use or threatened use of a weapon or
the use of or threatened use of physical force or physical violence of a
high and aggravated nature, yet criminal sexual conduct for non103
spouses includes coercion without these aggravating circumstances.
Moreover, the punishment for spousal sexual battery (not more than
ten years), which requires aggravated violence, is identical to criminal
sexual conduct for non-spouses in the third degree (not more than ten
104
years), which requires no aggravated violence.
In Tennessee, a man cannot be prosecuted for sexual battery
against his wife unless he is armed with a weapon or inflicted serious
105
Even with the requirement of a weapon or
bodily injury on her.
bodily injury, Tennessee still prosecutes spousal sexual battery only as
106
a Class D felony, while aggravated sexual battery, with the same
107
aggravating circumstances, is a Class B felony.
C.

Modern Justifications

Although the marital rape exemption has been subjected to
widespread academic criticism in the past three decades, a number of
contemporary legal scholars continue to defend the doctrine. The

2002) (simple rape has marital immunity and does not include force); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West)
(exempts spouses from prosecution for offenses other than forcible offenses); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (implied requirement of force because spousal immunity
from rest of sexual assault provision).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-70b (West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.373 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 22 (H.B. 2924) (West); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2002).
102. “Indications exist that marital rapes often must be substantially more physically
assaultive than comparable acts by strangers in order to produce prosecution or
conviction.” MACKINNON, supra note 13, at 863.
103. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-615 (Law. Co-op. 2002) with S.C. CODE
ANN. 1976 § 16-3-654 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
104. Id.
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2002).
106. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d)(2)(A) (West 2002).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-504(b) (West 2002).
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three categories in which marital immunity persists—marital
immunity for certain sexual offenses, separate marital sexual offense
statutes, and extra requirements for marital sexual offenses—rest on
three controversial assumptions about why marital sexual offenses
should be treated differently. First and foremost, the requirement of
separation or divorce in thirteen states before certain sexual offenses
are legally cognizable rests on the classic assumption of ongoing
consent in a marriage. Without separation or divorce, there is no
nonconsent associated with the sexual interaction and, hence, no
crime. Second, the marital exemption for mentally incapacitated
rape, unconscious rape, and sexual offenses without extra force in
more than twenty states rests on the assumption that, because of the
“implied authorization” granted by marriage, spousal sexual offenses
that do not involve serious physical force are not important enough or
108
Third, the
harmful enough for the justice system to criminalize.
downgrading of spousal offenses across the board in seven states, the
application of lesser penalties to spousal sexual offenses, and the
refusal to prosecute spousal sexual offenses without prompt
complaint rests on the assumption that spousal sexual offenses in
general are not important enough or harmful enough for the justice
system to criminalize. This justification, too, stems from the ongoing
consent ideology. I will address each of these notions in turn.
First, the requirement of separation or divorce before certain
sexual offenses are legally cognizable in thirteen states flows directly
from Hale’s theory of ongoing consent. A number of scholars have
argued that a woman who has previously consented to sexual
intercourse with a man should be assumed to have given her ongoing
consent to future sexual acts. The 1962 Commentary to the Model
Penal Code’s comprehensive marital rape exemption, for example,
mirrors Hale’s analysis on ongoing consent:
[M]arriage . . . while not amounting to a legal waiver of the
woman’s right to say “no,” does imply a kind of generalized consent
that distinguishes some versions of the crime of rape from parallel
behavior by a husband.
The relationship itself creates a
presumption of consent, valid until revoked.109

More than three decades later, some scholars continue to
advance a similar argument. For example, when advancing a position
to increase convictions of acquaintance rapists, John Ingram argues
that a man who has a sexual relationship with a woman may presume
that he has consent to future sex with her:
Parents habitually kiss their young children at bedtime; business
friends shake hands when they see each other; relatives exchange

108. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment (ALI 1985) (emphasis added).
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hugs at holiday time. The parties involved in such conduct assume
it will continue. It would be cumbersome and ludicrous to
reestablish consent to such physical contact on each occasion. If
there has been consent in the past, and no present words or actions
indicate a change in attitude, it is reasonable to presume that
consent continues.
I believe the same should be true in sexual
110
relationships.

Ingram, therefore, advocates that the law harbor a “rebuttable
presumption” of consent to whatever prior sexual intimacies the
111
Although this “rebuttable
parties had previously engaged in.
presumption” may be overcome without dissolution of the
112
marriage, it continues to assume that consent may be ongoing,
extending through time unless there are changed circumstances.
Second, marital exemptions for mentally incapacitated rape and
unconscious rape in twenty states derive from a belief that nonforcible spousal sexual offenses are not harmful enough for the justice
system to criminalize because of ongoing consent. Some scholars
have argued that the previously discussed presumption of ongoing
consent should extend to circumstances in which a woman cannot
consent to sexual acts because she is incapacitated or unconscious.
For example, the Commentary to the marital immunity provision in
the Model Penal Code explains:
At a minimum . . . husbands must be exempt from those categories
of liability based not on force or coercion but on a presumed

110. John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It’s Time for “No” to Really Mean “No,” 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 3, 26 (1993). Ingram argued that the solution to increasing convictions of
nonviolent nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a voluntary social companion was to
label it “sexual assault” instead of “rape.” Id. at 26. “Studies show that when such sexual
conduct is labeled ‘sexual assault’ or some similar term, usually punishable less severely
than rape, there is a much greater likelihood of conviction, especially in a jury trial.” Id.
(footnotes omitted). In turn, Ingram speculated that an increase in convictions for
nonstranger assaults might encourage victims to report their attacks, and ultimately result
in less frequent assaults. Id. Ingram even found merit to a proposal that a woman, after
being sexually assaulted, should pursue an indecent exposure charge instead of a rape
count. Id. at 27. Doing so, he argued, would eliminate many problems that women face
when accusing someone of rape. “Among the advantages of this approach are: (1) police
do not have any respect for men who expose themselves to women, and will not show any
boys-will-be-boys deference for the accused; (2) the police will not treat the victim as a
whore; (3) the woman will not be embarrassed and mistrusted by police, prosecutors,
friends, and relatives; (4) the assaulter will be humiliated and treated as a “weirdo” by his
friends and relatives and (hopefully) his fellow inmates; and (5) it is very unlikely that a
consent defense will succeed.” Id. Ingram recognized that the penalty for an indecent
exposure conviction would be less than for a rape charge, but he insisted that it will
“arguably” lead to “increased prosecution and conviction of sexual assaulters, which may
help in eventually reducing the number of sexual assaults.” Id.
111. Id. at 30.
112. Id. at 31 (“even when a presumption can be said to exist, sexual partners should
require very little to rebut or negate it”).
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incapacity of the woman to consent. For example, a man who has
intercourse with his unconscious wife should scarcely be
condemned to felony liability on the ground that the woman in such
circumstances is incapable of consenting to sex with her own
husband, at least unless there are aggravating circumstances. The
same holds true for intercourse with a wife who for some reason
other than unconsciousness is not aware that a sexual act is
committed upon her.113

Michael Hilf argues that this kind of marital immunity is justified
by the lesser expectation of personal autonomy that women have
when they enter marriage:
While an act of non-consensual intercourse is an interference with
personal autonomy, a married person’s general expectation of
autonomy is less than a single person’s. . . . It is obvious that some
personal autonomy is sacrificed when one enters into a marital
relation in order to allow for some degree of marital autonomy. A
married person has, to some extent, a lesser expectation of personal
autonomy; therefore, the affront to one’s autonomy is less in the
case of spousal rape than in the case of ordinary rape. . . . While a
married person’s interest in bodily integrity is not inconsiderable, a
balance must be struck between the individual’s interest in114private
autonomy and the public policy favoring spousal immunity.

Hilf suggests the circumstances in which “the public policy
favoring spousal immunity” outweighed the wife’s “interest in private
115
He asks, “Do we quite seriously want to subject to
autonomy.”
criminal liability a husband who begins to engage in sexual contact
with his sleeping or intoxicated wife? To ask the question is to
116
answer it.”
In an influential article in the Columbia Law Review, Donald
Dripps crystallizes a theory about sexual intercourse under these
117
circumstances with his notion of “implied authorization” for sex.
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment (ALI 1985).
114. Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 41
(1980).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800. Dripps uses the term “sexual expropriation” to
describe nonconsensual, nonviolent sex. He claims that expropriation should be criminal,
but to a lesser degree than forced sex involving violence. Id. at 1799–1800. Dripps also
argued that legislatures should replace rape statutes with graded statutory offenses based
on the amount of force used, punishing acts of violence more harshly than “nonviolent
pressures.” Id. at 1800. Dripps argued, “[p]hysical violence in general does far more harm
to the victim’s welfare than an unwanted sex act.” Id. He continued, “[p]eople
generally . . . would rather be subjected to unwanted sex than be shot, slashed or beaten
with a tire iron.” Panel Discussion: Donald Dripps, Linda Fairstein, Robin West,
Panelists, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM. L. REV. 125, 141 (1994) (hereinafter
Panel Discussion). In comparing a serial stranger rape, where violence was threatened
during the crime, to a college acquaintance rape, Dripps believed that although the
acquaintance rape victim suffered, she suffered less than the victim of the stranger rape.
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He poses a hypothetical set of facts: A married couple returns home
from a party very drunk. After his wife passes out “unconscious on
118
the bed,” the man “engages in coitus with her.” Dripps argues that,
although the wife never consented to the sexual act, he enjoyed
119
“implied authorization” to penetrate her without her consent.
According to Dripps, the man’s “implied authorization” to have sex
derives from the fact that the woman has, “while sober and over a
long course of dealing, approved of a complex relationship in which
120
Dripps’s argument for “implied
sex plays a prominent role.”
authorization” for unconscious, nonconsensual sexual relations is one
modern manifestation of the ongoing consent ideology.
Third, the wholesale downgrading of spousal offenses, the
application of lesser penalties to these offenses, and the refusal to
prosecute them without a prompt complaint in seven states suggest
that some scholars and legislators believe that spousal sexual offenses
in general are not important enough or harmful enough for the justice
system to criminalize. Many people believe that there is no harm in
sexual intercourse without consent when a man has been previously
intimate with a woman. Media images tend to depict wife rape as a
“petty conflict” or “trivial event” stirred by an excess of male sexual
121
passion and resulting in little authentic suffering for women.
Consequently, people tend to believe that wife rape is a less
Id. Robin West responded that Dripps trivializes the effects of unwanted sex on a victim:
“From the victim’s perspective, unwanted sexual penetration involves unwanted force, and
unwanted force is violent. . . . Dripps omits this central feature of the experience.” Robin
L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1442, 1448 (1993). For his part, Dripps referred to West’s argument as an “insistence on
equating ardor with violence,” one that gives “an inadequate account of the evil of sexual
assault.” Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and
Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1460, 1461 (1993).
118. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 14–15. See also HELEN BENEDICT,
VIRGIN OR VAMP: HOW THE PRESS COVERS SEX CRIMES 25–87 (1992) (discussing one of
first marital rape trials in country, Rideout trial). In covering a trial involving accusations
of rape by Greta Rideout against her husband, John, reporters gave significant attention
to the defense attorney’s allegations and arguments. Id. at 57 (noting “the slant against
Greta in the printed stories . . . was so unmistakable”). The reporters were caught up in
the sensationalism and national intrigue surrounding the trial. Id. at 52. The interest was
generated merely by the fact that a wife accused her husband of rape, and had little to do
with the suffering and trauma that results from marital rape. Id. When the couple
reconciled after John’s acquittal for rape, Greta was portrayed as a wife “crying rape for
revenge and attention,” and was no longer seen “as a victim.” Id. at 69. Media coverage
failed to acknowledge that “rape by an intimate is often more traumatic for the victim
than by a stranger.” Id. at 71. Rather than recognizing Greta as a battered wife who was
financially dependent on her husband, the media trivialized her allegations of rape as
“incited by feminists” in order to “cry rape for revenge.” Id. at 60.
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traumatizing experience to victims than is stranger rape.
For
example, in a 1981 statement in front of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton evaluated “whether
the anguish caused by intercourse forced by a husband is equivalent
to that inflicted by intercourse forced by someone else” and
concluded that the “character of the voluntary association of a
husband and wife . . . could be thought to mitigate the nature of the
123
Hilf likewise
harm resulting from the unwanted intercourse.”
argues, “the harm caused by spousal rape would seem to be less
124
severe than the harm caused by non-spousal rape.”
In short, each of the modern justifications for the current marital
immunities have at their core the belief that marriage extends to men
some kind of ongoing consent for sexual acts. The notion that there
should be a “rebuttable presumption” of consent to sexual acts, the
notion of “implied authorization” to mentally incapacitated and
unconscious sexual acts, and the notion that there is less harm from
spousal sexual assault because of the “character of the voluntary
association of a husband and wife,” each derive from Hale’s ongoing
125
consent ideology.

II. Formal Neutrality on Marital Status in Sexual Offenses
The doctrine of ongoing consent underlying both the past and
current marital immunities in sexual offense statutes contradicts
circumstances in the real world at an intolerable cost to married
women. As a result, states must abolish their current marital
immunities to achieve formal neutrality on the marital status of the
parties, affording no status preference to men who sexually abuse
their wives. Upon examination, each of the intertwined modern
justifications for continued marital immunities in sexual offense
statutes is ultimately unpersuasive. I will address each in turn.
122. COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE: FEMINIST & SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 74 (1995).
123. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137. In 1985, Lord Justice Mill in England
concurred: “The rape of a former wife or mistress may have exceptional features which
make it a less serious offence than otherwise it would be. . . . [I]n some instances the
violation of the person and defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a
woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had
previously had a long-standing sexual relationship.” R. v. Cox, 7 Crim. App. R. (S.) 422 (6
Dec. 1985). See also Comment, Rape and Battery, supra note 3, at 723–24 (“In the
ordinary marriage relationship the classical form of forcible rape is not probable.
Presumably the parties have at times been very intimate, and the possibilities of serious
social, physical, or mental harm from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace are rather
small.”).
124. Hilf, supra note 114, at 41.
125. See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137; Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801;
Ingram, supra note 110, at 30–31.
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First, a number of scholars have argued that a woman who has
previously consented to sexual intercourse with a man should be
presumed to have given her ongoing consent to future sexual acts.
Because marriage implies a wife’s “generalized consent,” as the
Model Penal Code terms it, there is a requirement of separation or
divorce before certain spousal sexual offenses will be considered
criminal in twelve states. Without separation or divorce, there is
consent that prevents those sexual acts from being criminal.
In the real world, however, many women who experience rape in
marriage are battered and remain with their abusers for complicated
reasons other than “generalized consent” to sexual relations in the
126
127
Battered women are especially vulnerable to wife rape.
future.
Studies indicate that between one-third and one-half of battered
128
A
women have been raped one or more times by their batterers.
woman who is raped by her husband may stay with him because she
129
has nowhere to go, she may want to provide stability for her young
130
children, or she may feel love for her husband, despite his sexual

126. LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 42–45 (1989).
127. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 22 (“Battered women are at especially high
risk of sexual assault. Studies of battered women regularly show that anywhere from a
third to a half of them are victims of marital sexual assault.”). See also Raquel Kennedy
Bergen, Marital Rape, Violence Against Women Online Resources (1999), at
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/finaldocuments/Vawnet/mrape.htm [hereinafter Bergen, Marital
Rape]. Surprisingly, then, there is no section on marital rape in casebook of over 1000
pages. CLAIRE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW
(2001).
128. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 96 (“21 percent of
the 644 women who had ever married reported being subjected to physical violence by a
husband at some time in their lives. This figure may be lower than the true incidence of
violence in marriage for a number of reasons. First, it was left to respondents to define
what they thought constituted physical violence. They were simply asked the question:
Was your husband (or ex-husband) ever physically violent with you? If they said no, there
was no further probing.”) (emphasis added).
In one study, 40% of the 1,200 battered women in Denver shelters had been subjected
to at least one sexual assault by a boyfriend or husband; one-third of those women had
been sexually assaulted at least once a month. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxi, xxviii . That
said, some women have been raped in marriage but not battered. FINKELHOR & YLLO,
supra note 14, at 45 (40% of marital rape victims were not routinely beaten by their
husbands and “these women had not been subjected to the frequent and frightening
outbursts that the victims of battering had”); Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“Four
percent of women in [Russell’s] sample who had ever been married had been raped by
their partners but not battered. In what Finkelhor and Yllo (1985) have called ‘force-only
rape,’ husbands use only the amount of force necessary to coerce their wives; battering
may not be characteristic of these relationships. Forty percent of Finkelhor and Yllo’s
sample of women were victims of ‘force-only rape.’”).
129. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 222.
130. Id. at 220.
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abuse. Many victims of wife rape are financially unable to leave.
A number of victims are told by family, friends, religious leaders, or
133
Many rapists tell their
health professionals that they should stay.
134
wives that they will murder them if they leave. In fact, sexual abuse
as well as other physical abuse frequently increases when women do
135
declare their intention to leave or actually leave their spouses.
131. Patricia Mahoney et al., Violence Against Women by Intimate Relationship
Partners, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 143, 147 (Claire M. Renzetti
et al. eds., 2001) (“In particular, a woman’s opportunities to leave an abusive relationship
can be affected in a variety of ways by sharing her life with her perpetrator. For example,
the perpetrator may control all aspects of family finances; this can keep a woman from
having enough financial resources to leave, but it may also serve to keep her ignorant of
the skills she would need to support herself on her own.”).
132. See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 220 (“For 90 percent of the women who stayed, their
husbands provided the money they lived on at the time of the survey, as compared with 24
percent of the wives who were no longer married to the men who raped them.”); see also
id. (“Most significant of all is that all nineteen of the wives (100 percent) who were the
sole providers of the household income at the time of the first wife rape were no longer
married to the men who raped them. This is powerful evidence that economic resources
play a key role in why raped wives stay.”)
133. State v. Morrison, 426 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1981) (counselors at mental health institution
told wife rape victim that they could do nothing for her and that she should go home with
rapist). See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 27 (“One night he knocked her
out completely with a punch in the mouth. Another time he threw a knife at her. That
same evening, in front of his parents, he threw her to the ground and kicked her in the
head. He burned her with a cigarette. He locked her in their shed for an evening. His
mother warned her to leave: ‘He’s gonna kill you.’ Then, when she did so, the mother
begged her to go back to him, because he was so distraught she thought he would commit
suicide.”). See also id. at 32 (obviously violently raped woman asked her doctor what was
wrong with her husband and he responded, “The only thing wrong with him is that he is a
sex maniac. He needs to have his sexual satisfaction”); id. at 127 (marital rape victim
“stayed with her husband for years on the advice of her fundamentalist pastor”).
Women also experience doctors who treat the effects of obvious sexual violence but
do nothing to help. See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 32 (“He would put his
whole hand inside her vagina and try to pull [the vagina] inside out. Once when he did
this he began to hurt her so badly that she kicked him away with her feet. As he pulled
away, his fist ripped her vagina, and she started to bleed ‘like somebody had turned the
water on.’ Four blood transfusions later, she recovered, but the doctor told her she had
been very, very lucky. Unfortunately, the doctor neither asked about the cause of the
injury nor reported it to the police.”).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 74 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Ark. 2002) (victim testified that Jones
told her “that if I wanted out of the marriage by divorce I wouldn’t get it because the only
way to get out of our marriage was like our wedding vows is through death and I would
have to die.”); Hernandez v. State, 804 S.W.2d 168, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (victim did
not file for divorce because Hernandez “threatened to kill her”); State v. Morrison, 426
A.2d 47 (N.J. 1981) (estranged husband taped photo of gravesite to victim’s door,
indicating that their marriage would only end in death).
135. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 25 (“A wife’s leaving or threatening to
leave her marriage frequently provokes a marital rape. Irene Frieze, in fact, found that
among the group of battered women she studied, leaving or threatening to leave was the
factor that was most often associated with a sexual assault. In our study, over two-thirds
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Many, perhaps most, women who are raped by their spouses do
136
not leave the relationship after the first instance of rape. In a 1998
Pennsylvania case, for example, the victim testified that her husband,
Richter, had on a previous occasion raped her and then penetrated
137
her with a brush dipped in plumber’s glue. After being taken to the
hospital and treated for serious internal injuries, she reported the
138
Richter pled guilty to aggravated assault and
rape to authorities.
was sentenced to probation and a stay-away order. Nevertheless, six
139
weeks later, Richter moved in with his wife again. After some time,
they divorced. Three years after the first rape, Richter went to his exwife’s house, beat her in the face, broke her tooth, and then forced
140
sex on her. She was again hospitalized from his attack. A few years
later, Richter again raped her. The first time Richter sexually
assaulted his wife was no less a rape simply because the parties were
still married.
One cannot assume that Richter’s wife gave
“generalized consent” to sex with him based on their marriage.
Like Richter’s wife, battered wives who are raped are at the
141
greatest risk of sustaining serious injury from their husbands.
of the women in our sample were raped in the waning days of a relationship, either after
previous separations or when they were making plans to get out.”). See also BERGEN,
WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 21 (“[W]omen are particularly at risk of being raped when
they are separated or divorced, because despite the dissolution of the marital bond, this
sense of entitlement and the belief that their (ex) wives are their property live on.”).
In one case, for example, Blevins violated a protective order and broke into his family
home, armed with a pistol, woke his wife, and told her he wanted to have sex with her.
She resisted. Blevins v. State, 18 S.W.3d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). He then held
her at gunpoint, threatened to kill her, gagged her, forcibly injected her with a syringe of
methamphetamine, and then had sex with her. Id. at 267–68.
136. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 34, at 25–26 (“The vast majority of women in
this sample did not leave the relationship after the first incident but instead tried to
manage the violence. After the first incident, all of the women reported feeling a similar
sense of shock that the assault was happening to them and a general feeling of disbelief
that someone they loved was responsible for their pain.”). For example, in a 1994 Virginia
case, a wife testified that her husband (who was a police officer and a tenth degree black
belt in karate) had subjected her to eight to twelve instances of sexual violence over the
course of their marriage. Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 145 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
137. Pennsylvania v. Richter, 711 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1998).
138. Richter, 711 A.2d at 466.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. “[V]ictims of wife rape are at greater risk of being murdered by their husbands, or
of murdering them, than battered women who are not also sexually violated.” RUSSELL,
supra note 6, at xxviii. “[B]attered women who were raped by their male partners were
significantly more likely to have been beaten during pregnancy than those who had not
been raped.” Id. at xxix. See, e.g., State v. Randle, 647 N.W.2d 324 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(Randle kidnapped his estranged wife, grabbed her when she attempted to escape, put her
in a headlock, punched her several times in the head, choked her, and then forced sex on
her). See also Temple v. State, 517 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (Temple kicked down
his estranged wife’s door, choked her, slapped her, beat her with gun, held gun to her head
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Having been raped is associated with “significantly more serious
physical violence in terms of the severity and frequency of the
142
aggression as well as the severity of the resulting injuries.” Without
separation or divorce, battered wives who are raped are harmed
physically as well as psychologically by sexual assaults. For these
reasons, there should be no requirement of separation or divorce
before a sexual offense in marriage is legally cognizable.
Second, a number of scholars have argued that the “generalized
consent” that marriage grants a husband should extend to
circumstances in which the wife is mentally incapacitated or
unconscious and cannot consent.
The related notion is that
incapacitated or unconscious rape by a spouse is not harmful enough
for the justice system to recognize. In a number of states, men even
enjoy immunity when they themselves drug their wives, rendering
143
them unable to consent.
and threatened to kill her, sexually assaulted her with gun, and beat her until she lost
consciousness).
142. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxviii. “They found that battered women who were also
raped had significantly lower self-esteem than women who had only been battered.
Campbell also reports that women in her study who were raped and battered by their male
partners had significantly lower self-esteem than those who had not been raped, ‘even if it
happened only once or early in the relationship.’” Id. See also Lisa A. Goodman et al.,
Violence Against Women: Physical and Mental Health Effects, in APP. & PREVENTIVE
PSYCH. 79, 84 (1993) (“[B]attered women who are raped by their partners are likely to
experience more severe nonsexual attacks than other battered women.”). It is also
associated with increased anxiety and paranoid ideation as well as damaged body image
and numerous physical ailments for the victim. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at xxix.
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65 (5) (West 2002) (definition of mentally incapacitated
is when “person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such
person’s conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance
administered . . . without such person’s consent”) (emphasis added); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-700 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (mentally
incapacitated defined as person who is “rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or
controlling the person’s conduct owing to the influence of a substance administered to the
person without the person’s consent”) (emphasis added); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-301 (West
2002) (mentally incapacitated defined as “an individual who, because of the influence of a
drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance, or because of an act committed on the individual
without the individual’s consent . . . is rendered substantially incapable of appraising the
nature of the individual’s conduct”) (emphasis added); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first
through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally
incapable or mentally incapacitated); § 750.520a (definition of mentally incapacitated is
when “person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to
that person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-341
(West 2002), amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West)
(mentally incapacitated defined as “person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic,
anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person’s
agreement”) (emphasis added); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97 (2002) (mentally
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As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that drugging a
wife to have sex with her is not an uncommon weapon in a batterer’s
144
arsenal. In one case, for example, a man laced his wife’s food with
145
half a bottle of anti-depressants, rendering her unconscious. While
she was unconscious, he orally and digitally penetrated her as he
146
videotaped the episode. The use of drugs is analogous to the use of
physical force to render a woman incapacitated. Some men beat or

incapacitated defined as “one rendered incapable of knowing or controlling his or her
conduct, or incapable of resisting due to the influence of any drug, narcotic, anesthetic, or
other substance administered to that person without his or her consent”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(a) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File 156 (H.B. 485)
(West) (rape includes when “for the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender
substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control by administering any drug,
intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of
force, or deception”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002) (“Rape is an act of
sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal penetration accomplished with a male or
female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator” where the victim is “incapable through
mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind; where the victim is intoxicated by a
narcotic or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the accused as a means
of forcing the victim to submit; or where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature
of the act.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-1 (1953–2001) (mentally incapacitated defined
as a “person who is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her
conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance administered to
that person without his or her consent”) (emphasis added); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652
(Law. Co-op. 2002) (criminal sexual conduct in first degree includes when “the actor
causes the victim, without the victim’s consent, to become mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless by administering, distributing, dispensing, delivering . . . a controlled
substance”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501 (West 2002) (mentally incapacitated defined
as “person [who is] rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling the
person’s conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic or other substance
administered to that person without the person’s consent”) (emphasis added).
Louisiana’s rape statute does not include marital immunity “when the victim is
incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or
abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic agent or other
controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and without the knowledge
of the victim.” However, there is marital immunity when someone other than the offender
administers the substance. La. R.S. 14:43 (A)(1)–(2).
143. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-652 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (sexual conduct in first
degree includes when actor causes victim to become physically helpless, defined as
unconscious, asleep or “for any other reason physically unable to communicate
unwillingness to an act”).
144. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. See also The Wife Rape Information Page,
at http://www.wellesley.edu/WCW/mrape.html (last visited June 7, 2003) (discussing how
sex may be accomplished without woman’s consent if she is under influence of alcohol or
drugs, is unconscious or asleep, or permanently or temporarily disabled).
145. See Trigg v. State, 759 So. 2d 448 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant engaged in
sexual acts with unconscious wife after drugging her).
146. See id. at 450.
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choke their wives to render them unconscious before raping them.
As one victim in a study on wife rape described:

147

[My husband] would try to choke me, and then I would pass out.
Then he would rape me. He would put me to sleep and then rape
me. Sometimes when we were out somewhere, and he didn’t like
something I did, he would say, “You wanna go to sleep?” and laugh
like it was real funny. It was like a punishment.148

Although most states would recognize the choking here as force
that makes the sexual offense rape, too many states would not
recognize drugging a wife for the identical purpose as force that
makes the sexual offense rape.
Distinct from the issue of deliberate drugging on the part of the
husband, in twenty states men enjoy immunity when they simply take
advantage of their wives’ mental incapacity or unconsciousness to
149
Some scholars roundly
have sex with them without their consent.
dismiss the potential harm of this kind of invasion. Dripps argues
that it should not be criminal for a man to penetrate his wife when she
150
is passed out. The problems with this position are both principled
and practical.
As a matter of principle, the argument in favor of the marital
exemption for mental incapacitation or unconscious rape ignores or
greatly undervalues a married woman’s sexual autonomy—her
151
freedom to decide whether and when to engage in intercourse. A
woman has the right to reserve her body for her own ends and not to
152
Affording married
be used as an object for someone else’s ends.
147. See State v. Beliveau, No. 01AP-211, 2001 WL 1286495, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(defendant threw his girlfriend down and raped her while she was unconscious). Although
this case involved a man and his girlfriend, the factual situation is relevant to demonstrate
how a person can rape their partner, whether married or not, after knocking them
unconscious. Beyond intimate relationships, there are many cases where acquaintances
have taken advantage of women and girls who have passed out or become semi-conscious
due to intoxication or drugs. See, e.g., State v. Farnum, 554 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996) (victim awoke from an unconscious state to find defendant had already
penetrated her vagina).
148. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 19. See also Charlotte Watts & Cathy
Zimmerman, Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude, 359 LANCET 1232
(2002) (surveying women around globe for instances of intimate partner violence). The
authors noted that research carried out in Zimbabwe showed that 26% of married women
had been subjected to forced sex by their partners, and that of those women, 12%
reported being forced while they were asleep. See id.
149. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
151. For a general discussion of sexual autonomy in other rape contexts, see STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE
OF LAW at ix–x (1998).
152. Although a woman passed out cold is not dead, she is, perhaps, as close as one
could get. Laws that allow men to penetrate women who are unconscious treat women’s
bodies as lifeless receptacles.
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women this right is crucial to their dignity and equality under the law.
153
It is this right that rape laws should be designed to protect.
Hilf argues, however, “A married person has, to some extent, a
lesser expectation of personal autonomy; therefore, the affront to
one’s autonomy is less in the case if spousal rape than in the case of
154
While married individuals may have lesser
ordinary rape.”
expectations of certain kinds of autonomy, it does not follow that in
the sexual realm, a woman’s autonomy must bow to the demands of
her husband’s interest in obtaining sex. A man’s desire for an orgasm
simply does not outweigh his wife’s interest in avoiding the invasion
of unwanted intercourse. A married woman’s expectation of sexual
autonomy should be no less than a single person’s.
As a practical matter, the argument that incapacitated and
unconscious rape are not harmful reveals ignorance about the perils
of sexual penetration for a woman. A man who penetrates a woman
when she is unconscious denies her the power to negotiate the use of
contraceptives and other protection to prevent pregnancy and
disease. In the 1921 Alabama case, for example, when the wife
withdrew from sexual relations in order to stop having children, her
155
husband proceeded to force her to have sex against her will. If she
had been drugged and he had taken advantage of her unconscious
state and made her pregnant as a result, the primary injury she sought
to avoid—unwanted pregnancy—would have been the same.
Unwanted pregnancy and disease are serious injuries for both
unmarried and married women.
Even if the man does not make his unconscious wife pregnant
against her will or give her a sexually transmitted disease, he has
profoundly degraded her bodily integrity. Women’s dry orifices are
not permeable. To penetrate them takes force that may bruise, tear,
156
and otherwise damage tissue. Physical and psychological pain will
likely greet the woman when she regains consciousness. These
injuries and this suffering matter. Sexual injury and suffering are
what rape laws should be designed to prevent. Because incapacitated
and unconscious rape denies sexual autonomy and causes harm, the

153. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 151, at 99–113.
154. See Hilf, supra note 114, at 41.
155. Anonymous, 89 So. 462 (Ala. 1921).
156. Despite this potential, most victims do not have this kind of corroborating physical
evidence of rape. The vast majority of rape victims suffer little or no physical injury in
addition to the rape itself. Susan B. Sorenson & Judith M. Siegel, Gender, Ethnicity, and
Sexual Assault: Findings from a Los Angeles Study, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 93, 97 (1992). About
10% of rape victims suffer extrinsic physical injury. Id. Only 5% suffer serious, extrinsic
injury. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
12 (1997).
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twenty states that currently provide immunity for it should abolish
that immunity.
Third, a number of scholars have argued that spousal sexual
offenses in general are not harmful enough for the justice system to
criminalize.
It is this argument that underlies the general
downgrading of spousal sexual offenses, subjecting them to lesser
penalties and requiring prompt complaints in seven states.
Interestingly, it is the ongoing consent in marriage that supposedly
makes spousal sexual assaults less harmful. As previously mentioned,
Senator Denton argued that the “character of the voluntary
association of a husband and wife . . . could be thought to mitigate the
157
nature of the harm resulting from the unwanted intercourse.” The
implicit position is that stranger sexual offenses are injurious to
victims, but, because of ongoing consent, spousal sexual offenses are
not.
The research, however, indicates that wife rape is as harmful to
victims as stranger rape. Marital sexual attacks are more likely than
stranger sexual attacks to end in completed rapes rather than
158
attempted rapes. Wife rape victims are more likely than victims of
159
acquaintances or strangers to be raped orally and anally. Contrary

157. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 137. In 1985, Lord Justice Mill in England
concurred: “The rape of a former wife or mistress may have exceptional features which
make it a less serious offence than otherwise it would be. . . . [I]n some instances the
violation of the person and defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a
woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had
previously had a long-standing sexual relationship.” R. v. Cox, 7 Crim. App. 422 (1985)
(concurrence). See also Comment, Rape and Battery, supra note 3, at 724 (“In the
ordinary marriage relationship the classical form of forcible rape is not probable.
Presumably the parties have at times been very intimate, and the possibilities of serious
social, physical or mental harm from a familiar, if unwanted, conjugal embrace are rather
small.”).
158. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 64 (“It is evident that the more intimate the
relationship, the more likely the attempts at rape will succeed; thus the number of
attempted rapes for husbands, lovers, and boyfriends are all very low in comparison to the
number of attempted rapes by non-intimates.”).
159. See Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. In one study of marital rape victims that
did not specifically ask about these experiences, one-third of the raped wives mentioned
having been subjected to forced anal intercourse and a fifth of them mentioned forced oral
sex. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 30 (“Nearly a quarter said they had been
subjected to sex in the presence of others—usually their children. These incidents are not
disagreements over sexual positions; they are sexual humiliations inflicted on women.”).
In a study of wife rape victims, “40% of the women reported at least one incident of anal
rape, and 33% had been forced to perform oral sex on their partners.” BERGEN, WIFE
RAPE, supra note 23, at 19. Both oral and anal rape can have serious psychological
consequences; moreover, anal rape results in serious physical damage to the victim and
oral rape can threaten to choke and kill her. See, e.g., FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14,
at 35 (“Clare said that for weeks afterward she had to defecate standing up, and that the
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to popular opinion, wife rapes tend to be more violent than stranger
160
rapes. Men have raped their wives with wooden batons, fists, dogs,
161
and loaded firearms. The physical consequences of wife rape can,
therefore, be painful and dangerous:
The physical effects of marital rape may include injuries to the
vaginal and anal areas, lacerations, soreness, bruising, torn muscles,
fatigue and vomiting. Women who have been battered and raped
by their husbands may suffer other physical consequences including
broken bones, black eyes, bloody noses, and knife wounds that
occur during the sexual violence. [Researchers] report that one
half of the marital rape survivors in their sample were kicked, hit or
burned during sex. Specific gynecological consequences of marital
rape include vaginal stretching, miscarriages, stillbirths, bladder
infections, infertility and the potential contraction of sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV.162

Despite the serious physical consequences of wife rape, the
163
Shortpsychological consequences are usually more devastating.
injury took five years to heal fully. Another woman said that repeated anal rapes left her
rectum torn and bleeding.”).
160. Patricia Rozee, Stranger Rape, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION:
A HANDBOOK 97 (Michele Antoinette Paludi ed., 1999). For a discussion of the kinds of
force used in marital rape, see RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 112.
161. See, e.g., Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 776 (Wyo. 1987) (defendant battered and
raped his wife with a wooden baton); Temple v. State, 517 S.E.2d 850, 851 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999) (Temple kicked down estranged wife’s door, choked her, slapped her, beat her with
gun, held gun to her head, threatened to kill her, sexually assaulted her with gun, and beat
her until she lost consciousness); People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(defendant raped victim with his fist repeatedly, ripping her vagina and causing internal
damage, after which victim suffered from long-term urinary incontinence); State v.
Dominy, 6 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Tenn. 1999) (Dominy repeatedly raped wife with dog). For
other victim’s stories see, e.g., BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 16 (“I was cooking,
and he came out and started to hassle me, and I burned the eggs and then he started
beating me because I had burned them. So he beat me up for a half hour, I guess, and
then he said, ‘OK, bitch, get back upstairs,’ and I knew he wanted sex just by the way he
said it. I said, ‘I can’t do that now because I’m really upset and I can’t make love to
someone who beat me up’ . . . and he said ‘now,’ and he turned off the stove and ripped off
my pajamas and started punching me . . . and I got into the corner and was all curled up
and he picked me up and threw me on the bed and did his thing. It was disgusting, and
afterward I got up and threw up.”); id. at 17 (“Sometimes we would go to bed, and he
would push my legs aside and force sex on me. Or he would grab my head and force me
[to give him oral sex]. . . . Other times he would beat the crap out of me in bed or hold a
gun to my head to force me.”).
162. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note
23, at 59.
163. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 15, at 126 (“The destruction of the ability to trust
was the most common long-term effect of rape in marriage that our interviewees
mentioned. Marital rape constituted for them not only a sexual assault, but a violation of
trust and intimacy. The shock experienced by a woman who was sexually brutalized by
the man she had loved and trusted above all others did not wane quickly. More than a
third of our interviewees felt that their ability to trust and develop intimate relationships
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term psychological effects of wife rape may include “anxiety, shock,
intense fear, depression, suicidal ideation, and post-traumatic stress
164
Long-term psychological effects may include
disorder.”
“disordered eating, sleep problems, depression, problems establishing
trusting relationships, and increased negative feelings about
themselves” as well as “flash-backs, sexual dysfunction, and
165
emotional pain for years after the violence.” In one study of raped
wives, “[m]ore than half of the women mentioned considering or
166
attempting suicide at some point.”
One reason that wife rapes are so traumatic is that victims are
less likely to tell family members, rape crisis counselors, or police
officers about their experiences, and they are less likely to receive
167
support when they do. In her groundbreaking study on wife rape,
Diana Russell concluded:

with men had been impaired, the impairment ranging from wanting to withdraw from
contact with men altogether to feeling great caution in relations with men; from an
underlying disdain to an outright hatred.”). See also Mark A. Whatley, For Better or
Worse: The Case of Marital Rape, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 29, 33 (1993) (“Women who
are victims of marital rape have a hard time trusting men; an increased phobia of intimacy
and sex, and a lasting fear of being sexually assaulted again.”).
164. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. In Diana Russell’s ground breaking study
of marital rape, 56% of the victims she studied were “extremely upset” by having been
raped, 21% were “very upset” and 18% were somewhat upset. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at
191.
165. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note
14, at 126 (“In addition to the immediate trauma of marital rape, the victims we talked to
reported serious long-term effects. Some were still experiencing them five or ten years
after they had divorced their husbands. They talked about an inability to trust. They
talked about lingering fear and emotional pain. They talked about terrifying flashbacks
and nightmares. They talked about apprehensions about men and sexual dysfunctions—
problems that kept them from having a social life, or that interfered with subsequent
marriages.”); BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 60 (“Like other survivors of sexual
assault, many of the women in this sample commonly experienced flashbacks and ongoing
nightmares about their assaults.”). See also Lee Bidwell & Priscilla White, The Family
Context of Rape, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 277, 283 (1986) (“The depersonalization and
devaluation that accompany the act of rape must be especially devasting [sic] when the
rapist is your husband.”).
Again, contrary to popular opinion, wife rape victims may experience more anger and
depression than do stranger rape victims. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. But see
Rozee, supra note 160, at 107 (“Some studies have found that stranger rape seems to be
related to greater depression and fear (Ellis, Atkeson, & Calhoun, 1981), while others
have found no difference in mental health outcomes among date, stranger, and marital
rape survivors (Resick, 1993).”).
166. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 59. See also Whatley, supra note 163, at 33
(“[V]ictims of marital rape turn to drugs and alcohol, [and] attempt suicide.”)
167. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127. Stranger rape survivors are more likely
than acquaintance rape survivors to reach out for social support and are more likely to
report the attack to authorities. Rozee, supra note 160, at 97.
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[W]ife rape can be as terrifying and life threatening to the victim as
stranger rape. In addition, it often evokes a powerful sense of
betrayal, deep disillusionment, and total isolation. Women often
receive very poor treatment by friends, relatives, and professional
services when they are raped by strangers. This isolation can be
even more extreme for victims of wife rape. And just as they are
more likely to be blamed, they are more likely to blame
themselves.168

In addition to feeling betrayed, isolated, and blamed, victims of
wife rape are also more likely than victims of stranger rape to endure
multiple offenses from their attackers and to suffer from persistent
169
In their follow-up study on marital rape, David Finkelhor
terror.
and Kersti Yllo reported that fifty percent of the women in their
168. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 198; Charlene Muehlenhard & Barry Highby, Coercive
Sex, in SEXUALITY IN AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING OUR SEXUAL VALUES AND
BEHAVIOR 172, 178 (Robert Francoeur et al. eds., 1998) (hereinafter SEXUALITY IN
AMERICA) (“Victims of acquaintance rape are as likely as victims of stranger rape to
experience depression, anxiety, problems with relationships, problems with sex, and
thoughts of suicide. Women who are raped by acquaintances they had trusted may doubt
their ability to evaluate the character of others and may be reluctant to trust others.
Women raped by acquaintances are less likely than women raped by strangers to be
believed and supported by others.”).
169. Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“Marital rape may be even more traumatic
than rape by a stranger because a wife lives with her assailant and she may live in constant
terror of another assault whether she is awake or asleep.”). See also id. (“Women who are
raped by their husbands are likely to be raped many times—often 20 times or more before
they are able to end the violence.”); FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 23 (“For most
marital-rape victims, rape is a chronic and constant threat, not an isolated problem. The
battered women, of course, were the most vulnerable of all to such repeated sexual abuse.
Twice as many battered women suffered from chronic rapes (twenty times or more) as the
other raped women.”); Muehlenhard & Highby, supra note 168, at 179 (“Whereas stranger
rape is typically a one-time occurrence, the rape of wives and other partners is likely to
occur repeatedly and may last for years. The more frequently women are raped by their
husbands or partners, the more likely they are to suffer from grave long-term
consequences.”); Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 147 (“When a woman lives with her
perpetrator, one of the ways her situation is different from the woman attacked by a
stranger is that she has no safe haven, no place where she can feel safe and secure from
another attack. Even women who do not live with their intimate partners may not feel, as
dates and ex-partners often know how best to break into a woman’s home; they know
which doors and windows have no locks and when a woman may be most vulnerable.”);
Kersti Yllo, Wife Rape: A Social Problem for the 21st Century, 5 VIOL. AG. WOMEN 1059,
1060 (1999) (“When you are raped by a stranger, you live with a frightening memory, but
when you are raped by your husband, you live with your rapist.”).
For a victim’s perspective, see BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 43 (“It was
very clear to me. He raped me. He ripped off my pajamas, he beat me up. I mean, some
scumbag down the street would do that to me. So to me it wasn’t any different because I
was married to him, it was rape—real clear what it was. It emotionally hurt worse [than
stranger rape]. I mean you can compartmentalize it as stranger rape—you were at the
wrong place at the wrong time. You can manage to get over it differently. But here
you’re at home with your husband, and you don’t expect that. I was under constant terror
[from then on] even if he didn’t do it.”).
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study had been sexually assaulted twenty times or more.
The
negative physical and mental consequences of such repeated sexual
171
Given the serious
attacks include chronic injury and trauma.
physical and psychological harm of wife rape, the seven states that
currently maintain such unfair requirements should not downgrade it,
subject it to lesser penalties, or refuse to prosecute it without a
prompt complaint.
At a bare minimum, twenty-six states must abolish the remaining
marital immunity for sexual offenses. They need to treat marital and
non-marital sexual assault the same and repeal the laws that require
separation or divorce, extra force, or prompt complaint, as well as the
provisions that downgrade spousal sexual offenses or exempt
incapacitated or unconscious rape from legal condemnation.
Formal neutrality as to the marital status of the parties in sexual
offense statutes is, at this point, long overdue. Although legal
scholars have not until now specifically analyzed and challenged the
provisions that remain in statutes today, some have argued generally
172
for the deletion of marital exemptions or for new provisions that
173
By eliminating the
authorize the prosecution of wife rape.
provisions that evince bias against married women and favoritism
toward sexually abusive men, these proposals would achieve formal
170. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 23. They continued, “And for the majority
of the women we talked to, rape was a repeated occurrence. For some, assaults were so
common they could not remember how often.” Id. See also BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra
note 23, at 19 (reporting that “most women (55%) were raped frequently—more than 20
times during the course of their relationships”).
171. Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 146. She continued, “Intimate violence victims
experience this multiple victimization by the same perpetrator over time, and the
perpetrator is likely to employ a variety of types of violence. For example, the person who
threatens a woman with a knife is the same person who has beaten her in the past. Each
violent episode builds on past violent episodes and threats.” Id.
172. See, e.g., Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing a rape statute that would be
silent on relationship between perpetrator and victim and would grade offenses based on
amount of violence used); Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800 (proposing that legislatures
replace marital and other rape statutes with graded offenses based on the amount of force
used); Sitton, supra note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete abolition of all laws distinguishing among
rape and sexual assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is required in
order for women to achieve equal protection under the law.”).
173. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 705 (rape statute should first “set[] forth a
definition of rape that neither affirmatively includes nor excludes spouses as potential
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to
rape.”). Although I prefer non-gender neutral terms because rape within marriage is
overwhelmingly a crime that men commit on women, I use the term spouse because the
statutes are gender neutral. See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 9 (“The term ‘wife rape’ is
preferred over ‘marital rape’ or ‘spousal rape’ because it is not gender neutral. The term
‘spousal rape’ in particular seems to convey the notion that rape is something that wives
do to husbands, if not as readily as husbands do it to wives, at least sufficiently often that a
gender neutral term should be used.”).
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neutrality on the question of the marital status of the parties in sexual
offense statutes.

III. Development of the Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates
As much as formal neutrality on marital status in sexual offense
statutes is needed, it is not enough. Even the complete abolition of
marital immunity in some jurisdictions has done little for raped wives
who face police, prosecutors, judges, and juries who infer that, absent
extraordinary violence, the wives’ prior consent to sexual intercourse
174
It has also done
implied ongoing consent to the alleged rape.
nothing for those women raped by former lovers, boyfriends, and
cohabitants who face the same legal actors who make the same
improper inference of ongoing consent. The ongoing consent
ideology, applicable to all forms of intimate rape, is perhaps the most
difficult and enduring problem produced by the marital rape
exemption.
When analyzing marital rape, few legal scholars have linked
175
marital rape to rape by other intimates. By focusing on the formal
contours of marital immunity in forcible rape statutes, most legal

174. Following the battle against marital immunity for forcible rape, reformers have
shown little political will to tackle marital immunities for other sexual offenses. RUSSELL,
supra note 6, at xxi. After the marital exemption for rape was defeated, the battle wound
down, observed Martin Schwartz in 1989. Id. “There is only one problem,” he continued,
“[n]othing has changed” because reformers “have not created the political climate to allow
the police to arrest and the prosecutors to prosecute.” Id. See also id. at xx (“Only three
cases of wife rape were reported in Colorado one year after rape in marriage had been
criminalized. Byrne no doubt knew that most wives are reluctant to report because of the
humiliating aspects of the trial and the lack of public sympathy for their plight.”). See also
Bergen, Marital Rape, supra note 127 (“There is a large body of research that addresses
the inadequate response of the police to the problem of wife abuse. . . . [I]nterviews with
marital rape survivors reveal that when police officers learn that the assailant is the
woman’s husband, they may fail to respond to a call from a victim of marital rape, refuse
to allow a woman to file a complaint, and/or refuse to accompany her to the hospital to
collect medical evidence.”).
175. Robin West stands as one exception. West, supra note 3, at 78. In the concluding
paragraph of her influential article on the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption,
she stated:
[T]he foundational and permanent recognition of women’s rights to be free from
forced marital sex . . . may be a prerequisite to further progress on a range of
related issues regarding women’s physical and sexual security. Date rape and
acquaintance rape, for example, unlike marital rape, clearly are criminal, but
they may be insulated from legal prosecution and public condemnation in many
states at least in part because of their shadow resemblance to marital rape.
Id. West saw the formal abolition of the marital rape exemption as a possible precondition
to ameliorating the legal system’s harsh treatment of date rape victims. Id. To treat
marital rape and date rape as two separate battles, however, may have undermined the
fight against both.
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scholars failed to notice the larger problem of the ongoing consent
ideology that the marital rape exemption originally caused.
Unlike legal scholars, social scientists when analyzing marital
rape have often included all intimates in their analysis, regardless of
176
the legal status those intimates share. As Raquel Kennedy Bergen
explained in her 1996 book, Wife Rape, “I do this to acknowledge that
one need not be legally married to suffer the trauma and
177
consequences of being raped by one’s intimate partner.” The harm
marital rape causes is not unique to the marital relationship. It arises
when intimates cohabitate or date, regardless of the legal status they
178
There are many important similarities between rape by
share.
intimates and marital rape. In her book Rape in Marriage, Diana
Russell detailed those similarities in this way:
First, in both situations there is frequently a lack of recognition by
both parties that forced intercourse, or intercourse because of
threat of force or inability to consent, is rape. Second, the rape
often occurs more than once; frequently it occurs many times.
Third, the woman is often unwilling to employ all her resources,
particularly her capacity to be violent, when trying to fend off the
rapist. Fourth, there is often more of a sense of disillusionment and
betrayal as a consequence of rape by intimates than when a woman
is raped by an acquaintance or stranger. Fifth, the police and public
at large are often even more skeptical, unsympathetic, and
unhelpful than in cases of rape by non-intimates. Sixth, as with a
husband, the woman often has a hard time getting rid of an
unwanted male lover when she wants to. The male lover frequently
seems to feel his masculine role threatened if it is not he who
decides on any major changes in the relationship, particularly the
ending of the sexual side of it. Even when the relationship is over,
she may have a hard time getting rid of an ex-lover or ex-husband.
And seventh, the perception of the woman as an unequal partner
with unequal rights, indeed, as the property of the man, is also
evident in both types of relationships.179

176. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8. See also Mahoney et al., supra note 131,
at 143–44 (“Because we are focusing on intimate violence against women, the perpetrators
of this type of violence can include current and former husbands, current and former
boyfriends, and current and former girlfriends (i.e., lesbian relationship partners). It
includes people who are dating while living apart as well as those who are cohabiting or
married; people who share children, as well as those who do not; young people dating for
the first time and older people who are divorced.”).
177. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8. See also id. (Furthermore. . . ‘a
marriage license probably does not change the dynamics of sexual abuse within an
ongoing intimate relationship, except to make it legal in some states.’ Thus, my sample
includes legally married women, those who have cohabited with their partners for more
than a year, and those in partnerships who share a child.).
178. For example, one study found that cohabitating intimates had twice the level of
violence of non-cohabiting intimates. Mahoney et al., supra note 131, at 161.
179. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 269.
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Russell concluded, “another thing that many lover relationships
have in common with marriage is that once a woman has voluntarily
consented to intercourse, many men believe she has given up her
180
On many levels, then,
right to refuse them on future occasions.”
rape by non-spouse intimates is the functional equivalent of spousal
rape.
The question remains whether intimate rape is the legal
equivalent of marital rape and how the ongoing consent ideology
manifests itself as a result. Revisiting the legal history of the marital
rape exemption sheds light on this question.
The next section details that history and argues that the driving
force behind the marital rape exemption has been not marital status
but intimate sexual relations. Notably, as society began to decriminalize sexual relations outside of marriage, the sexual offense
immunities provided by statute began to include cohabitants and
voluntary social companions. Additionally, rape shield laws routinely
admitted evidence of the prior sexual history between the defendant
and the complainant.
These legal changes are two modern
manifestations of the traditional ongoing consent ideology.
A. History of the Marital Rape Exemption Revisited

After noting that sexual intercourse between husband and wife is
always lawful, Rollin Perkins pointed out in his treatise that “all other
181
Perkins’s second point is crucial.
sexual intercourse is unlawful.”
Under English common law when Hale formulated the marital rape
exemption, marriage was the only context in which people were
legally allowed to be sexually active. For most of the history of
English common law, legitimate sexual activity was confined to
182
Extra-marital sexual acts—whether consensual or
marriage.
nonconsensual—were proscribed by laws on adultery and
183
It is important to incorporate the criminalization of
fornication.
these other sexual acts into the analysis. As Anne Coughlin recently
argued, “we cannot understand rape law unless we study the doctrine,
not in isolation, but in conjunction with the fornication and adultery
prohibitions with which it formerly resided and, perhaps, continues to
184
reside.” Coughlin warned:

180. Id. at 261.
181. Id.
182. See generally HALE, supra note 1, at 629 (discussing rationale for marital rape
exemption).
183. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
184. See id. Couglin continued, “By unearthing our ancestors’ belief that all nonmarital
intercourse should be criminalized, we may begin to understand, even as we reject, the
inclination of courts to approach rape complaints with deep suspicion.” Id. at 8.
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If our critique [of modern rape jurisprudence] is inattentive to the
sexual proscriptions with which rape formerly coexisted, we may
fail to articulate the precise forms that sexism previously assumed
and thus be unable to respond directly to the illiberal and/or antifeminist ways of thinking about sexuality presumably still indulged
by those opposed to rape reform.185

Attention to the proscriptions on fornication and adultery with
which rape law formerly coexisted clarifies the precise ways that the
ongoing consent ideology continues today.
When viewing the marital rape exemption in light of the broader
proscription against fornication and adultery, the doctrine’s shape
shifts. In a jurisdiction in which all non-marital sexual activity was
illegal, the rape immunity prohibited women from bringing charges
against the only men with whom they could have been legally sexually
186
active. The rape immunity, therefore, was not centrally about the
formal status of marriage between husband and wife per se (except to
the extent that marriage conferred legal authority for sexual activity).
It was fundamentally about the sexual activity between the parties
itself.
The most famous justification for the marital rape exemption—
Hale’s ongoing consent theory—lends support to this view. As earlier
noted, Hale declared, “[t]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in
187
Hale’s
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”
analysis reveals the centrality of sexual relations to the immunity.
When Hale said, “the wife hath given herself up in this kind unto her
husband,” he was referring to giving “her body to her husband,” as he
188
Hale believed that marriage afforded
stated two sentences later.
men contractual consent to sexual activity with their wives over
189
time. Once she “gave her body to her husband,” a wife necessarily
190
also gave him ongoing consent to sexual intercourse in the future.
Coupled with proscriptions against fornication and adultery, the
marital rape exemption dictated which men could be charged with
191
Men who had not previously gained legal sexual access to
rape.
women (through marriage, which was the only legal form of sexual
access at the time) could be charged with raping them. Men who had
previously gained legal sexual access to women, by contrast, could not

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 10.
PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115.
HALE, supra note 1, at 629.
Id. at 628.
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 163–64.
Id.
PERKINS, supra note 18, at 115.
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be charged with raping them. The law, therefore, protected men from
being charged with sexually assaulting the only women with whom
192
The marital rape immunity
they could be legally sexually active.
was a polite trope for the notion that women could not bring sexual
offense charges against men with whom they were (legally) sexually
active. Therefore, when the marital rape exemption developed, there
were no legal intimate relationships besides those in marriage.
Marital sexual relations comprised the whole category of legal
intimate relations.
The English common law’s prohibition on fornication and
adultery shaped the developing legal systems in the colonies of the
New World. Non-marital sexual intercourse was one of the first
193
offenses proscribed by lawmakers in this country. In their definitive
history of sexuality in America, John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman
found that colonial statutes outlawed both fornication and adultery,
“prescribing corporeal or capital punishment, fines, and, in some
194
cases, banishment for sexual transgressors.” In fact, fornication was
195
the most common legal charge against women in New England.
D’Emilio and Freedman described its punishment:
Fornication carried heavy penalties, including fines, whipping, or
both. In Maryland, where laws were less likely to be enforced,
unmarried couples who had sex could receive up to twenty lashes
and be fined as much as five hundred pounds of tobacco. In
Plymouth Colony, civil penalties for fornication included a tenpound fine—reduced only to fifty shillings for a betrothed
couples—several lashes on the back, or both. Throughout New
England, a fine of nine lashes awaited both parents of a child born
too soon after marriage.196
192. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
193. Coughlin, supra note 182, at 26.
194. JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA xvii, 18 (2d ed. 1988). See also David Weis, Basic Sexological
Premises, in SEXUALITY IN AMERICA, supra note 168 at 11; Merril D. Smith, Regulating
Sex and Sexuality in Colonial New England, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA
87 (Merril D. Smith ed., 1998) (“Just as sexual activity prior to marriage threatened the
stability of colonial New England society, so did the absence of marital sexual activity.”).
Puritans viewed marriage as a spiritual union. Sex was expected and was a duty to be
fulfilled. Weis, supra, at 11.
195. Else L. Hambleton, The Regulation of Sex in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts,
in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA, supra note 194, at 89, 97. “Although
adultery, fornication, and bastardy involved couples, women in both northern and
southern colonies were more likely than men to be prosecuted and convicted for these
sexual offenses.” D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 293, at 28. Pregnancy was the
reason for this disparity. Id.
196. D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 22. See also Hambleton, supra note
194, at 89 (“Women who bore illegitimate children, their sexual partners, and couples
whose first child arrived within eight months of marriage were prosecuted for fornication
in the Quarterly Courts of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.”).
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For adultery, most colonial laws authorized the death penalty.
However, in practice, “New England courts usually imposed fines of
ten to twenty pounds, along with public whipping, and the wearing of
198
In
the letters AD on a garment or burned onto the forehead.”
colonial America, these sexual regulations reflected “a consensus
about the primacy of familial reproductive sexuality” in society; those
who violated this consensus “could expect severe, often public,
199
punishment and the pressure to repent.”
The criminalization of fornication and adultery remained in
effect in this country until well into the twentieth century, although
200
By the
societal conceptions of sexuality and the family evolved.
nineteenth century, “the sexualization of love” replaced the primacy
201
of the familial reproductive sexuality. Marriage came to be known
less as an institutional arrangement with reciprocal duties and more
202
as a personal relationship between spouses based on love. By the
twentieth century, the dominant view became that sexuality was a
peak experience of marriage, which “served to legitimate the erotic
203
As this view came to the fore, it was
aspects of sexuality itself.”
only a matter of time before people began to question why sexuality
204
should be confined to marital relations.
Early twentieth-century American society began to embrace the
idea that sex was a significant and legitimate experience, independent
197. D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 28.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. In the eighteenth century, although fornication and adultery remained illegal,
southern colonies did not prosecute white men who raped female servants and slaves.
Merril D. Smith, Race, Sex, and Social Control in the Chesapeake and Caribbean in the
Eighteenth Century, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA, supra note 194, at 133.
See also D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 101 (“By legal definition, a slave
could not be raped, since she was the property of her master”). White owners operated
under the assumption that the women they enslaved were “sexually available to them.”
See id. at 86–87. This hypocrisy and cruelty did not undermine the general proscription on
fornication and adultery within white society. The sexual availability of enslaved women
supported white supremacy. See id. at 87. White society did not condemn these sexual
relations. See id. at 95–96 (referencing belief of societal supporters that ability of white
men to engage in extramarital sexual relations with women they enslaved “provided a
safety valve that protected the virtue of white women”). “Greater regulation of women’s
sexuality was matched by greater sexual privilege for white men. Slavery provided
abundant opportunity for white men to exercise sexual license.” Id. White women faced
punishment for engaging in extramarital sexual relations including “personal disgrace,
violent physical punishment by her husband, divorce, and the loss of her children.” Id. at
95.
201. Weis, supra note 193, at 14.
202. Id. When love failed, divorce became an alternative, but divorce was only
available for cause, such as adultery, desertion, and cruelty. Hasday, supra note 3, at 1465.
203. Weis, supra note 193, at 14.
204. Id. at 14–15.
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of its relationship to marriage.
As time passed, sexual expression
outside of marriage began occurring more frequently and with more
206
American society began to embrace “sexual
tacit social support.
liberalism—an overlapping set of beliefs that detached sexual activity
207
from the instrumental goal of procreation.” Although the amount
of acceptable sexual expression fluctuated during the Depression and
World War II, by the mid-1960s, sexual liberalism was rooted firmly
208
in United States society.
As a result of this sexual revolution, extra-marital sex was no
longer generally criminalized, and marriage was no longer the only
209
Legitimate
place that people could engage in legal sexual acts.
210
sexual activity began to occur in many different relationships.
Although fornication and adultery statutes continued to be invoked
in civil suits, direct enforcement of fornication and adultery laws by
211
states faded.
In the past, women were either unmarried or married and
212
assumed to be sexually inactive or active, respectively. By the late
twentieth-century, marriage no longer represented a meaningful
distinction between those women who had sex and those who did not.
As legitimate sexual activity moved outside the marital relationship,
the ongoing consent ideology founded on the marital rape exemption
moved outside the marital relationship as well.
Two major changes in rape law occurred as a result of these
transformed attitudes toward non-marital sex.
First, marital
immunities in some states began to include sexual offenses against
cohabitants and voluntary social companions. Second, states passed
rape shield laws that admitted evidence of the sexual history of the
defendant and the complainant, regardless of the legal status they
shared.

205. Id. at 16. Examples of such trends are the rising percentage of premarital sexual
experiences among young people, the “expansion of marital sexuality, including increases
in frequency, satisfaction, and variation in behavior,” and greater equality between
genders. Id. at 17.
206. See, e.g., D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 193, at 241.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 240–41.
209. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1746.
210. Id.
211. Coughlin, supra note 182, at 23–26. As of 1998, seventeen states and the District of
Columbia continued to outlaw fornication and 24 states and the District of Columbia
continued to outlaw adultery. Id. at 21–22.
212. See supra notes 181–22 and accompanying text.
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Cohabitants and Voluntary Social Companions

As a result of the societal transformation that legitimized sex
outside of marriage, a number of states adjusted the focus of their
marital exemptions from formal marital status to the substantive
matter of sexual relations. In 1962, the Model Penal Code, for
example, supplemented its comprehensive marital rape immunity
with a provision that included cohabitants. It said: “Whenever in this
article the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse, the
exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and
213
This
wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.”
provision thereby expanded the common law marital rape immunity
214
to unmarried individuals who were living together.
Some states went further than cohabitation in their sexual
offense codes to create provisions applying to “voluntary social
companions.” The Model Penal Code itself downgraded first-degree
rape to second-degree if the victim was “a voluntary social companion
of the actor upon the occasion of the crime” who had “previously
215
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, North
permitted him sexual liberties.”
Dakota, and West Virginia enacted similar statutes that gave partial
immunity to men who sexually assaulted women who had previously
216
If a man had previous consensual
permitted them sexual contact.
217
For
sex with a woman, he could not be convicted of raping her.
example, from 1986 to 1998, Delaware’s criminal code on first-degree
rape provided:
A person is guilty of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree
when the person intentionally engages in sexual intercourse . . .
without the victim’s consent and the defendant was not the victim’s
voluntary social companion on the occasion of the crime and had
not permitted the defendant sexual intercourse within the previous
12 months.218

213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (2001).
214. Id.
215. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(d) (2001).
216. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 149.
217. Id.
218. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 775 (1986), was stricken in its entirety on June 11, 1998
and replaced with § 773, first-degree rape. Today, the statute is formally neutral. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment, unclassified
misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class A
misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G felony);
§ 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770 (silent on
rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree, Class B
felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on rape in
first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony).
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If a victim had “permitted the defendant sexual intercourse
within the previous 12 months,” regardless of the marital status of the
219
parties, the defendant could not be convicted of first-degree rape.
In their study, Finkelhor and Yllo analyzed the effect of adding
voluntary social companion provisions to sexual offense statutes:
These voluntary-social-companion laws may work to vitiate the
effect of abolishing the marital exemption. For example, when
Delaware eliminated the spousal exemption as it applied to firstand second-degree rape, it also enacted a law to prohibit the
prosecution of voluntary social companions for the crime of firstdegree rape. If “voluntary social companions” are interpreted to
include husbands and cohabiting boyfriends, the marital-rape
exemption may still be in effect for that first-degree charge.220

As they went on to explain, “the extension of the exemption to
voluntary social companions appears to imply that by merely allowing
sexual intimacy once, a woman grants a form of permanent
221
Finkelhor and Yllo thereby explained how Hale’s
consent.”
ongoing consent theory behind the marital rape exemption evolved
into an inference of ongoing consent based solely on the existence of
a prior intimate relationship, without marriage.
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Minnesota currently extend their
222
In Connecticut, for
spousal immunities to cohabiting partners.
example, cohabitation is a complete defense to sexual assault when
the victim is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless and to
223
The
sexual assault involving sexual contact without consent.
relevant provision states, “it shall be an affirmative defense that the
defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged
offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of
219. Id.
220. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 14, at 149.
221. Id. at 150.
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700
(2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv.
Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West).
223. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2002) (“A person is guilty of sexual
assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person intentionally subjects another person to
sexual contact who is (A) under fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C)
physically helpless . . . ; or (2) Such person subjects another person to sexual contact
without such other person’s consent”). Section 53a-65 (Sexual contact is defined as
“contact with the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of
sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such
person”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002). The Commission Comment
from 1971 states, “Parties not legally married to each other but living together as man and
wife are treated the same as married persons. The rationale is that the same elements of
privacy, consent, and intimacy of relationship are likely to be present here as in the
marriage situation. This is in accord with the position taken by the Model Penal Code. . . .
It is meant to convey a continuing status of cohabitation as man and wife.”
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cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.”
Hawaii’s statute indicates that “married” includes “a male and female
225
living together as husband and wife regardless of their legal status.”
Hawaii’s commentary to this provision explains that the “definition of
married was amended to recognize the prevalence of many male and
226
female couples living together although not legally married.”
Under a section entitled “voluntary relationships,” Minnesota’s code
clarifies that its marital immunity applies “if the actor and
complainant were adults cohabitating in an ongoing voluntary sexual
227
relationship at the time of the alleged offense.”
Notably, modern scholars who argue for the marital rape
exemption treat rape by non-spouse intimates as the equivalent of
spousal rape. In defending the modern marital immunities in sexual
offenses, they rarely stop at marital status. The Commentary to the
Model Penal Code’s comprehensive marital rape exemption, for
example, applies it to all those intimates in “equivalent” relationships:
marriage or an equivalent relationship, while not amounting to a
legal waiver of the woman’s right to say “no,” does imply a kind of
generalized consent that distinguishes some versions of the crime of
rape from parallel behavior by a husband. The relationship itself
creates a presumption of consent, valid until revoked.228

Likewise, Ingram offers an expansive range of relationships to
229
He
which his “rebuttable presumption” of consent should apply.
argues, “[t]he same presumptions [of consent] should also arguably be
recognized with unmarried cohabitants, and probably with regular,
frequent social companions, regardless of their level of sexual
230
activity.”
Dripps agrees with this view. After claiming that sex with an
unconscious wife is legitimated by the man’s “implied authorization”
to proceed without consent, Dripps clarifies that the couple’s
231
He points out, such “implied
marriage itself is not essential.
authorization” would exist for those engaged in an ongoing
cohabiting or dating relationship as well—indeed, whenever “a longstanding sexual relationship connects the defendant with the
224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002).
225. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (2001).
226. 14 HAW. REV. STAT. § § 37-38, commentary on chapters 701–853 (1993) at 169.
227. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv.
Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West).
228. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, cmt. (1985) (emphasis added).
229. Ingram, supra note 110, at 30.
230. Id. at 31. Even with such a presumption of consent, however, “very little” was
necessary to “rebut or negate it.” Id. “Any words or action suggesting lack of consent
should prompt the other person to inquire and be sure that sexual activity is wanted by
both.” Id.
231. See Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801.
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victim.”
The modern scholars who support marital immunity
therefore seek to include prior intimate relationships within their
reach under the theory that “a long-standing sexual relationship”
233
implies ongoing consent to future sexual acts.
C.

Evidence of the Sexual History between the
Defendant and the Complainant

The extension of marital immunity to cohabitants and voluntary
social companions in some states was not the only manifestation of
the broad reach of the ongoing consent ideology.
Another
manifestation came from an unlikely source: another area of feminist
reform in rape laws. In the late 1970s and 1980s, legislatures passed
234
rape shield laws. These laws were part of a feminist effort to ensure
235
Rape
that the rape defendant, not the rape victim, was on trial.
shield laws were designed to protect rape victims from embarrassing
236
questions about their private sexual lives when they testified.
In
general, they forbade the admission of evidence of a complainant’s
237
Forty-eight states and the
prior sexual history at a rape trial.
238
These
District of Columbia passed some form of rape shield law.
laws, by statute or by judicial decree, contained one nearly universal
exception: prior sexual behavior between the complainant and the
239
By this exception, the law
defendant himself would be admitted.
declared that evidence of the prior sexual behavior between a rape
defendant and a complainant was relevant and admissible when he
240
claimed the defense of consent.
Given the widely varied forms of rape shield laws across the
country, this uniform exception was striking. It communicated a
shared assumption about sexual relations: once a woman “hath given
her body” to a man, she was assumed to continue to consent to sexual
241
intercourse. Coupled with the traditional norm of ongoing consent
derived from the marital rape exemption, this universal exception
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 3 (“In the late 1970s, in response to such calls, feminists around the country
began to mount legal and political efforts to remove the marital-rape exemption from the
law books. Bills to criminalize rape in marriage were introduced in many state legislatures
and after intensive lobbying efforts, they were successful in California, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, as well as other states.”). Anderson, supra note 23, at 1732–37.
235. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1737–36.
236. Id. In that Article, I critiqued the use of privacy as a basis for rape shield laws. See
Id. at 1747–46.
237. Id. at 1705–07.
238. Id. at 1733.
239. Id. at 1771–75.
240. Id. at 1775.
241. HALE, supra note 1, at 629.
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facilitated the improper modern inference of consent based solely on
the existence of an intimate relationship.
In states that have abolished the marital rape exemption, a man
who rapes a woman with whom he has been previously intimate does
not enjoy formal immunity from prosecution. However, he does have
the benefit of presenting evidence of their sexual history to prove his
242
This benefit is great indeed. It often deters
defense of consent.
women who are raped by prior intimates from reporting that they
243
When these women do report a
have been raped to the police.
rape, it often discourages police from founding the complaints and
244
Police frequently have been
taking their reports seriously.
unresponsive or hostile to women who report having been raped by
245
Some women have had to lie to police to
their intimate partners.
242. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1771–84.
243. See, e.g., JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE
MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 96 (1993). The authors note that somewhere between 10 and
14% of wives are raped by their husbands, and the rape of a spouse can be among the
most brutal of rapes. Despite its prevalence, however, victims of spousal rape often
remain silent. See Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer:
Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 936 (2001).
244. See, e.g., Charles R. Jeffords, Prosecutorial Discretion in Cases of Marital Rape, 9
VICTIMOLOGY 415 (1984). In a mail survey of 113 prosecutors in the 11 states in which no
legal distinction existed between marital and non-marital rapes, responses to hypothetical
rape cases containing corroborative evidence indicated that prosecutors were significantly
less likely to believe that maximum charges would be filed in marital rape cases,
particularly where no serious injury occurred. Many prosecutors choose not to prosecute
these cases even if the victim was willing. It was noted that the prosecutor must convince
the jury that the perpetrator deserves to be convicted. See also Kersti Yllo & David
Finkelhor, Marital Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 156
(Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1985). “The criminal justice system in the United States has
reinforced the fact that the marriage license is essentially a raping license. Laws make
prosecution of marital rape impossible and reinforce the assumption that marriage implies
unquestionable consent by wives to all sexual advances by husbands.” Id.
245. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 55 (“Most commonly, women felt that the
police were unresponsive to them because the abusers were their husbands. Erica
‘couldn’t believe it. They [the police] were no help at all because we were married.’ Pam
told me, ‘I called the cops one day, and they came and said, ‘You gotta go’ and made me
leave. And I said, ‘I called you, and you’re taking his side.’ They were his friends, and
they didn’t care that he beat me up. It was my fault.’”). See also id. at 56 (“The police
wouldn’t come out, and when they did, they didn’t even take the knife [that her husband
had used to assault her], and they didn’t want me to press charges. I wanted to have a
rape kit done and asked for a woman, and they said there was no woman. There was no
one to speak to me.”); id. (“Wanda met with a similar response: ‘The police wouldn’t let
me do a rape kit, and they said we don’t know about that law [against wife rape].’ Because
of the police reaction, Wanda did not pursue filing charges. In fact only eight women in
my study saw their husbands charged with rape in the criminal justice system.”); id. (“Of
those women who did file reports with the police, only two found police officers
supportive. Most had experiences similar to Sally’s: ‘I had to go to the state police, and
then I had to go through three detectives and explain everything and be totally
embarrassed, and I had to talk about penises and how he ejaculated and how he did
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get them to respond to rapes by intimates.
Some police have
247
Police
encouraged raped women to remain with their husbands.
behavior has put some women at greater risk for serious injury from
248
When police do take reports of marital rape
their abusers.
seriously, the potential admission of evidence of the sexual history
between the defendant and the complainant often dissuades
249
When prosecutors do
prosecutors from pursuing the charges.
pursue charges, evidence of the sexual history between the defendant
and the complainant can dissuade a panel of appellate judges from
250
The fact that
upholding an intimate rape conviction on appeal.
newly enacted rape shield laws admitted the prior sexual history of
the defendant and the complainant, regardless of their marital status,
was consistent with the concurrent expansion of the marital
immunity’s rationale of ongoing consent to non-marital intimate
relationships.
The transformation of doctrinal rape law from one that focused
on marital status to one that included non-marital intimate
relationships confirms that the sexual relationship, rather than
marriage per se, was at the heart of the marital rape exemption. The
fact that rape shield laws make no distinction between spouses and
non-spouses in terms of the blanket exceptions they provide for the
admission of sexual history between the defendant and the
certain things. I had to do it with the [tape] recorder on, and they kept saying, ‘Could you
say that again miss, speak up, miss, and call it this and that, miss.’ And ‘what kind of
underwear were you wearing, miss? Were you wearing fancy negligees?’ They were like
his [her husband’s] buddies, and they were busting my balls. They should have been more
qualified to handle this case, and they should have a woman in that situation.”).
246. Id. at 57 (“In one case, Karen was finally able to successfully obtain the help of the
police when she cleverly disguised the nature of the problem. Karen had called the police
on numerous occasions and said it normally took them 45 minutes to respond to her calls.
With her past experiences in mind, on the day she left her abuser, Karen ‘called the cops
and said some guy was beating up some lady in front of the house with a gun. They first
asked me if the guy was married to the woman—like that makes a big difference. I said no
and they showed up in 15 minutes.”).
247. Id. at 55 (“When Donna called the police for assistance, they encouraged her to
‘work it out and get marital counseling.’ Donna never called the police again.”).
248. Id. at 57 (“‘I saw the cops walking up the walkway, but they never came in. I know
today that I should have sued the police department, because I could have been lying
there almost near death, and I saw two officers walk up and then turn around and leave
and then I was like, I knew I was dead. He [her husband] was going to kill me for calling
the police, and he was very violent all that day, and I stayed in the bedroom all day
petrified.’ Natalie also called the police repeatedly but eventually stopped because the
police routinely ‘did nothing’ and her partner would beat her unmercifully to punish her
for her ‘betrayal.’”).
249. See, e.g., Jeffords, supra note 243, at 415 (noting that prosecutors often take on
only those cases that are very violent, and many choose not to prosecute even if the victim
is willing).
250. See infra cases discussed at notes 260–87 and accompanying text.
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complainant means that the ongoing consent ideology has affected a
new area of the law.
As a result, it is not enough to have formal neutrality in sexual
offenses statutes that simply allow for the prosecution of spouses for
sexual assault. States need to reject the ongoing consent ideology
that now affects both marital and other intimate rape.

IV. Formal Neutrality on Marital Status in
Sexual Offenses Revisited
Two main proposals for reform of the marital rape exemption
have emerged over the past thirty years: the argument that states
should simply abolish the marital immunities in their sexual offense
statutes and the argument that states should add an explicit provision
on marital status in their sexual offense statutes declaring that men
may be prosecuted for raping their wives. Twenty-four states and the
District of Columbia have no immunities for sexual crimes based on
251
the formal relationship of the parties. The statutes in these states
are either silent as to marital rape, or they contain an explicit
252
provision clarifying that marriage is no defense to sexual assault.
An examination of how these state statutes work in practice reveals
their inadequacies in terms of eliminating the ongoing consent
ideology that affects marital and other intimate rape.
A. Silence on Marital Status in Sexual Offenses

A number of scholars have called for states to delete all
253
provisions in rape laws that refer to the marital status of the parties.
These scholars argue that silence on the issue of marital status in a
rape statute would allow a state to criminalize marital and non254
These rape statutes would
marital sexual assault in equal ways.

251. See supra note 8 for a complete list of state statutes.
252. See infra notes 252–97 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 5, at 1800 (proposing that legislatures replace rape
statutes with graded statutory offenses based on the amount of force used); Sitton, supra
note 3, at 264 (“[C]omplete abolition of all laws distinguishing among rape and sexual
assault victims based on their relationship to their assailant is required in order for women
to achieve equal protection under the law.”).
254. Bearrows, supra note 3, at 222–26 (proposing silent rape statute on relationship
between perpetrator and victim and proposing grading offenses based on amount of
violence used). He proposed that statutes remain silent on the issue of the relationship
between the defendant and the complainant and grade sexual offenses based on the
amount of violence the defendant employed. For example, Sexual Battery in the First
Degree was when the actor caused another person serious injury or displayed a deadly
weapon in a threatening manner. Bearrows, supra note 3, at 224. Second degree involved
the use of or a threat to use force which did not create a substantial risk of death or serious
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allow “a married woman to withdraw her consent to sexual relations
255
Depending on the type of force used, a
when she so desired.”
husband could be found guilty of first or second-degree sexual
256
This proposal seems appealing because it removes from
assault.
statutes the specific provisions that prevented prosecutors from
charging men for sexual offenses against their wives.
Seventeen states currently have sexual offense laws that are
257
silent on the question of the marital status between the parties.
injury, third degree required the use of or threat to use force, and fourth degree was sexual
contact perpetrated without the victim’s consent. Id.
255. Id. at 222. Because his statute was silent as to relationship status, Bearrows
intended for the statute to cover stranger rapes and spousal rapes, as well as
nonconsensual sodomy. Id. at 226. “The model statute prohibits several different types of
sexual invasions which a husband could commit upon his wife.” Id.
256. In a footnote, however, he admitted that the reality of such violence was doubtful:
“It seems extremely unlikely that husbands will commit rape using deadly weapons or
causing serious injury to their wives. Instead a husband may indulge in nonconsensual
sexual contact, constituting sexual battery in the third or fourth degree.” Id. at 226, n.167.
257. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987–2001) (silent on rape, Class Y felony);
§ 5-14-124 (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class A felony); § 5-14-125 (silent on
sexual assault in second degree, Class B felony); § 5-14-126 (silent on sexual assault in
third degree, Class C felony); § 5-14-127 (silent on sexual assault in fourth degree, Class A
misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1975–2001) (silent on sexual harassment,
unclassified misdemeanor); § 767 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in third degree, Class
A misdemeanor); § 768 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in second degree, Class G
felony); § 769 (silent on unlawful sexual contact in first degree; Class F felony); § 770
(silent on rape in fourth degree; Class C felony); § 771 (silent on rape in third degree,
Class B felony); § 772 (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony); § 773 (silent on
rape in first degree, Class A felony); § 776 (silent on sexual extortion, Class E felony);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2002) amended by 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2002211 (H.B. 1399) (West) (silent on sexual battery); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West
2002) (silent on rape, Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-2 (silent on criminal deviate conduct,
Class A or B felony); § 35-42-4-8 (silent on sexual battery, Class C or D felony); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Michie 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Acts Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent
on rape in first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on
rape in third degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on
sodomy in second degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent
on sodomy in fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120
(silent on sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third
degree); § 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 253 (West
2002) (silent on gross sexual assault, Class A, B or C crime); § 255 (silent on unlawful
sexual contact, Class C, D, or E crime); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (West 2002)
(silent on rape); § 34 (silent on crime against nature); § 35 (silent on unnatural and
lascivious acts); § 3 (silent on drugging persons for sexual intercourse); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 566.030 (2002) (silent on rape); § 566.040 (silent on sexual assault); § 566.060 (silent on
forcible sodomy); § 566.070 (silent on deviate sexual assault); § 566.090 (silent on sexual
misconduct in first degree); § 566.100 (silent on sexual abuse); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5502 (2001) (silent on sexual assault); § 45-5-503 (silent on sexual intercourse without
consent); § 45-5-505 (silent on deviate sexual conduct); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001)
(silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class II felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault
in second or third degree, Class III felony and Class I misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN.
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They delineate various sexual offenses in their statutes but do not
mention whether a spouse may or may not be prosecuted for these
crimes. These states reveal how silence in sexual offense statutes
tends to work in practice. An examination of the cases in these states
discloses that silence in sexual offense statutes as to the marital status
of the parties is an inadequate solution to the ongoing consent
258
ideology derived in the marital rape exemption.
Despite the ability to bring suits against spouses for various
sexual offenses in these seventeen states, there is a paucity of written
appellate dispositions involving spousal rape or spousal sexual
259
The lack of criminal appeals suggests that the belief in
abuse.
ongoing consent in marital relationships may continue to discourage
prosecutors from pursuing these cases and being able to obtain
260
convictions.

§ 30-9-11 (Michie 1978–2001) (silent on criminal sexual penetration); § 30-9-12 (silent on
criminal sexual contact); § 30-9-14.3 (silent on aggravated indecent exposure); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1999–2001) (silent on gross sexual imposition, Class A or B felony);
§ 12.1-20-04 (silent on sexual imposition, Class B felony); § 12.1-20-07 (silent on sexual
assault, Class C felony or Class A misdemeanor); § 12.1-20-12 (silent on deviate sexual act,
Class A misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.355 (2001) (silent on rape in the third
degree, Class C felony); § 163.365 (2001) (silent on rape in second degree, Class B felony);
§ 163.375 (silent on rape in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.385 (silent on sodomy in
third degree, Class C felony); § 163.395 (silent on sodomy in second degree, Class B
felony); § 163.405 (silent on sodomy in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.408 (silent on
unlawful sexual penetration in second degree, Class B felony); § 163.411 (silent on
unlawful sexual penetration in first degree, Class A felony); § 163.415 (silent on sexual
abuse in third degree, Class A misdemeanor); § 163.425 (silent on sexual abuse in second
degree, Class C felony); § 163.427 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree, Class B felony);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 2002) (silent on rape); § 3123 (silent on
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse); § 3124.1 (silent on sexual assault); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011, § 22.021 (Vernon 2002) (silent on sexual assault or aggravated sexual
assault); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent on sexual assault), § 3253 (silent on
aggravated sexual assault); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1966–2002) (silent on sexual assault
in first degree, felony); § 61-8B-4 (silent on sexual assault in second degree, felony); § 618B-5 (silent on sexual assault in third degree, felony); § 61-8B-7 (silent on sexual abuse in
first degree, felony); § 61-8B-8 (silent on sexual abuse in second degree, misdemeanor);
§ 61-8B-9 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree, misdemeanor).
258. See infra notes 258-87 and accompanying text.
259. Westlaw research has revealed a scarcity of appellate level cases involving
convictions for marital rape or sexual abuse committed by a spouse in the seventeen states
that have statutes silent as to the marital status of the parties. The following is a list of the
number of appellate cases that were located in each of these seventeen states that involved
convictions for rape or sexual abuse by a spouse or estranged spouse under the statutes
silent as to marital status: Arkansas (2), Delaware (1), Florida (6), Indiana (2), Kentucky
(1), Maine (3), Massachusetts (1), Pennsylvania (3), Missouri (2), Montana (1), Nebraska
(2), New Mexico (1), North Dakota (0), Oregon (2), Texas (8), Vermont (2), and West
Virginia (4).
260. It may, of course, also, deter wives from reporting sexual abuse by their spouses
and dissuade juries from convicting.
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There is also very little applicable case law involving rape by
intimates who are not legally married but simply cohabitate. Where it
appears, one can detect the improper inference of ongoing consent
261
based on intimate relationships. In Vermont v. Gonyaw, for
example, the complainant and Gonyaw had a relationship that began
six years before an alleged sexual assault. Although not married, they
262
At trial,
cohabitated for the first three years of that relationship.
Gonyaw wanted to testify in front of the jury as to the sexual
263
At a
relationship they had prior to the alleged sexual assault.
hearing in front of the judge on the matter, the complainant testified
that they had not engaged in consensual sexual intercourse for more
264
than a year before the assault. Gonyaw, by contrast, testified that
265
they had consensual sex four days prior to the alleged assault. The
trial court decided to prohibit Gonyaw’s testimony and the jury
266
convicted.
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed. It stated, “[a] jury
hearing evidence, even though contradicted, of consensual sexual acts
after their separation, one which allegedly occurred four days before
267
the act complained of, might well have” acquitted Gonyaw. It held,
“[c]onsensual sexual activity over a period of years, coupled with a
claimed consensual act reasonably contemporaneous with the act
268
The
complained of, is clearly material on the issue of consent.”
court limited its holding to circumstances in which the prior sexual
activity was “reasonably contemporaneous, and the relationship
between the parties must support a reasonable belief that there was
269
consent to renewed sexual activity.” The court thus concluded that
the complainant’s “consent to renewed sexual activity” with Gonyaw
could reasonably be inferred if she had engaged in a sexual act with
270
him four days prior to the alleged assault.
Vermont’s criminal code does not have a marital rape exemption
271
Although prosecutors can bring
and is silent as to its abolition.
charges against Gonyaw for sexually assaulting the complainant,
Vermont’s silent statute does not otherwise help to curb the improper
261. 507 A.2d 944, 946 (Vt. 1985).
262. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d at 945.
263. Id. at 946.
264. Id.
265. He also testified that the complainant would often “initially refuse to participate in
sexual intercourse but would then consent.” Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 947.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2001) (silent as to marital exemption on sexual
assault), § 3253 (silent as to marital exemption on aggravated sexual assault).
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inference jurors and judges will likely make based on the intimate
relationship of the parties. The complainant is subjected to the
inference that sex four days prior to the alleged assault can support a
reasonable belief in renewed, ongoing consent to sexual activity with
the defendant.
Improper inferences of ongoing consent based on intimate
relationships also emerge in cases involving intimates who are not
legally married and have never cohabitated. Take, for example, the
272
At trial, the
recent Nebraska case of State v. Sanchez-Lahora.
complainant testified that Sanchez-Lahora asked her to sell drugs for
273
him, and when she agreed, he insisted on sex. After she declined,
he went to the kitchen, retrieved a gun, and asked her if she wanted
274
to die. Each time she refused his advances, Sanchez-Lahora asked
275
if she wanted to die. He then pressed the gun to her forehead and
stated, “[o]ne bullet for you,” and had oral, vaginal, and anal sex with
276
her.
277
After the complainant left, she went to a neighbor’s house.
The neighbor testified that she arrived at his house pale, shaking,
278
crying, and breathing as if she might hyperventilate. She told him
279
what had happened and cried throughout her visit.
Sanchez-Lahora himself took the stand and testified that he and
the complainant had a secret relationship and had previously met five
280
or six times at a club. He admitted that on the night in question he
281
had sex with her, but claimed that the sex was consensual. He also
sought to introduce testimony that he and the complainant “had been
engaging in a sexual relationship for several months prior to that
date,” estimating that they had had sexual intercourse 11 to 14
282
The trial court denied Sanchez-Lahora’s motion to present
times.
this evidence under Nebraska’s rape shield law, which required the
defendant to “(1) show a relation between the past conduct and the
conduct involved in the case and (2) establish a pattern of conduct of
283
behavior by the victim which is relevant to the issue of consent.”

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

616 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d at 816.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 818.
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The Nebraska appellate court reversed. It cited approvingly an
evidentiary syllogism it found implicit within Nebraska’s rape shield
law:
Major [premise]: The victim’s past sexual behavior with the
defendant was consensual behavior. Minor [premise]: The victim’s
behavior in the present prosecution is the type of activity in which
the victim participated with the defendant in the past. Conclusion:
Therefore, the victim’s behavior in the present prosecution was
consensual.284

As to the disputed evidence, then, the appellate court concluded,
“[w]e believe the evidence of the alleged prior sexual conduct
between the defendant and the victim does tend to establish a pattern
of conduct relevant to the issue of consent,” and, thus, the jury should
285
have heard it.
In abolishing its marital rape exemption, the state of Nebraska
decided to remain silent in its rape statute on the marital status of the
286
Nebraska’s silent statute does not help the woman who
parties.
complained of Sanchez-Lahora’s behavior. She is subjected to the
assumption that her prior consent to sex with Sanchez-Lahora
implied ongoing consent to sex with him. The court’s syllogistic
reasoning is clear: prior consent to similar sexual acts means consent
287
to the sexual acts in question. Again, the prior intimate relationship
288
itself creates an improper inference of ongoing consent.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 820.
286. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (2001) (silent on sexual assault in first degree, Class II
felony); § 28-320 (silent on sexual assault in second or third degree, Class III felony and
Class I misdemeanor).
287. Lahora, 616 N.W.2d at 818.
288. The ongoing consent ideology can even appear in cases in which the alleged prior
sexual intercourse occurred not 11 to 14 times, but one time. In Bixler v. Kentucky, 712
S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), for example, Bixler and Bean were tried for having
raped a female acquaintance. Bixler sought to testify that he had engaged in consensual
sexual intercourse with the complainant once some 18 months earlier. Id. at 368. The trial
judge excluded that evidence, stating, “I can’t see how sexual intercourse 18 months
before the incident can be contemporaneous with or under [the rape shield] statute be
appropriate for evidence of this action.” Id. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed.
It held, “Evidence of such prior sexual habits or conduct between the victim and Bixler
was crucial” because Bixler’s defense was consent and because “Bean’s defense hinged in
part on the fact that he knew the victim had a prior sexual relationship with Bixler and,
therefore, he expected to have a similar relationship with her.” Id.
In abolishing its marital rape immunity, the state of Kentucky decided to remain
silent in its rape statute on the marital status of the parties. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.040 (West 2002) updated 2002 Kentucky Acts Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (silent on rape in
first degree); § 510.040 (silent on rape in second degree); § 510.060 (silent on rape in third
degree); § 510.070 (silent on sodomy in first degree); § 510.080 (silent on sodomy in second
degree); § 510.090 (silent on sodomy in third degree); § 510.100 (silent on sodomy in
fourth degree); § 510.110 (silent on sexual abuse in first degree); § 510.120 (silent on
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Statutory silence on marital status and intimate relationships
between the parties is inadequate. Silence does nothing for those
women, married or not, who have had sexual relationships with
defendants when the defendants claim that such sexual relationships
entitle them to assume consent to the sexual acts alleged to have been
rapes. The next section turns to explicit provisions in sexual offense
statutes authorizing the prosecution of spouses for marital rape to see
if they provide a better solution to the improper inference of ongoing
consent based on intimate relationships.
B.

Explicit Provisions in Sexual Offenses Authorizing
Prosecution of Spouses

A number of scholars have argued that states should do more
than remain silent; they should insert new provisions into their sexual
289
offense statutes that explicitly authorize the prosecution of spouses.
A statutory framework might criminalize marital rape by defining
rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person
290
including the spouse of a perpetrator.” This provision seems to do
more than the mere silence on the marital status of the parties. It
would remove the marital exemptions in sexual offense laws by
clarifying that marriage itself is not an impediment to prosecution.
Jurisdictions have enacted two kinds of analogous statutes:
prosecutorial “allowance” codes and “no defense” codes.
The “allowance” codes explicitly authorize the prosecution of
men who rape their wives. The codes of the District of Columbia,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
291
Wisconsin contain such specific provisions. North Carolina’s code,
sexual abuse in second degree); § 510.130 (silent on sexual abuse in third degree);
§ 510.140 (silent on sexual misconduct). Kentucky’s silent statute does not help the
woman who reported having been raped by Bixler and Bean. She is subjected to an
assumption that her prior consent to sex on one occasion with Bixler may imply
subsequent consent to sex with him (and even consent to sex with Bean).
289. See, e.g., Eskow, supra note 3, at 704–05 (ideal rape statute would first “set[] forth
a definition of rape that neither affirmatively include nor exclude spouses as potential
victims, while the second paragraph [would] clarif[y] that marriage is no defense to
rape.”).
290. Id. Eskow believed Utah’s rape statute to be the best example of her strategy.
Utah’s rape statute reads:
(1) A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another
person without the victim’s consent.
(2) This section applies whether or not the actor is married to the victim.
(3) Rape is a felony of the first degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1994). See also Eskow, supra note 3, at 705.
291. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-419 (2002) (“No actor is immune from prosecution under
any section of this subchapter because of marriage or cohabitation with the victim;
provided, however, that marriage of the parties may be asserted as an affirmative defense
in a prosecution under this subchapter where it is expressly so provided.”); MICH. COMP.
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for example, states that prosecution for sexual crimes is not
dependent upon the relationship between the offender and the victim:
“A person may be prosecuted under this Article whether or not the
victim is the person’s legal spouse at the time of the commission of
292
Codes in New Jersey,
the alleged rape or sexual offense.”
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia state that a husband “shall
not be presumed to be incapable of violating” a sexual offense
293
provision.
The “no defense” codes are slightly different. The codes of
Alaska, Colorado, and Georgia not only allow prosecutors to charge
men with sexual offenses against their wives, but they also clarify that
the marital status of the parties “shall not be a defense” to a charge of
294
Of the two types, the “no defense” provisions goes further
rape.
than the “allowance” provisions. Not only may a husband be
prosecuted for violating the rape statute, but he also may not use the
295
marriage itself as a defense at trial.
Hybrid states also exist; these states’ provisions do not fall neatly
into the “allowance” or “no defense” categories because they also
296
Idaho and Utah, for example, state that
include silent provisions.
LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (“A person may be charged and convicted . . . even
though the victim is his or her legal spouse.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (2002)
(“An actor commits a crime under this chapter [sexual offenses] even though the victim is
the actor’s legal spouse.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002) (“No actor shall be
presumed to be incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of age or
impotency or marriage to the victim.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002) (“A person may
be prosecuted under this Article whether or not the victim is the person’s legal spouse at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense.”). WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(6) (West 2002) (“A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating
this section because of marriage to the complainant.”).
292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2002).
293. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3019; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2002); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West 2002).
294. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (a) of this
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant.”); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital relationship, whether established
statutorily, putatively, or by common law, between an actor and a victim shall not be a
defense to any offense under this part 4 unless such defense is specifically set forth in the
applicable statutory section by having the elements of the offense specifically exclude a
spouse;” spouses exempt only from statutory rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison
1982–2001) (“The fact that the person allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall
not be a defense to a charge of rape”); § 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly
sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of aggravated
sodomy”).
295. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
296. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002) (“Rape of a spouse”) with § 243.4
(silent on sexual battery), § 266c (silent on unlawful sexual intercourse), § 286 (silent on
sodomy), § 288 (silent on lewd or lascivious acts), and § 289 (silent on forcible acts of
sexual penetration); compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The
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fact that the person allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a
charge of rape.”) and § 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse
of a defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy”) with § 16-6-22.1
(silent on sexual battery) and § 16-6-22.2 (silent on aggravated sexual battery); compare
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Sess. Laws 36 (H.B. 2560) (West
2002) (partial marital immunity for sexual assault in third degree) and § 707-733 (marital
immunity for sexual assault in the fourth degree) with § 707-730 (silent on sexual assault in
first degree) and § 707-731 (silent on sexual assault in second degree); compare IDAHO
CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person shall be convicted of rape for any act or
acts with that person’s spouse, except under the circumstances cited in paragraphs 3
[force] and 4 [threats of harm or use of intoxicating substance] of section 18-6101”) with
§ 18-6608 (silent on forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object); compare KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3508 (2001) (marriage is defense to lewd and lascivious behavior, a Class
B nonperson misdemeanor or Level 9 person felony) and § 21-3517 (2001) (marriage is
defense to sexual battery, Class A person misdemeanor) with § 21-3505 (silent on criminal
sodomy), § 21-3506 (silent on aggravated criminal sodomy), and § 21-3508 (silent on rape);
compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43 (West 2002) (marital immunity for simple rape)
and § 43.1 (marital immunity for sexual battery) with § 14:41 (silent on rape), § 14:42
(silent on aggravated rape), § 14:42.1 (silent on forcible rape), and § 14:43.2 (silent on
aggravated sexual battery); compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 2002) (spouses
are partially immune from sexual misconduct, Class A misdemeanor), § 130.40 (marital
immunity for sodomy in third degree, Class E felony), § 130.45 (marital immunity for
sodomy in second degree, Class D felony), § 130.50 (marital immunity for sodomy in first
degree, Class B felony), § 130.55 (marital immunity for sexual abuse in third degree, Class
B misdemeanor), § 130.60 (marital immunity for sexual abuse in second degree), and
§ 130.65 (marital immunity for sexual abuse in first degree, Class D felony) with § 130.25
(silent on rape in third degree), § 130.30 (silent on rape in second degree), § 130.35 (silent
on rape in first degree), § 130.65-a (silent on aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth
degree), § 130.66 (silent on aggravated sexual abuse in third degree), § 130.67 (silent on
aggravated sexual abuse in second degree), and § 130.70 (silent on aggravated sexual
abuse in first degree); compare R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (marital
immunity for first degree sexual assault when victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally
disabled, or physically helpless; silent on other provisions) with § 11-37-4 (silent on second
degree sexual assault); compare S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (Michie 1968–2002)
(spouses exempt from sexual contact without consent with person who is capable of
consenting, Class 1 misdemeanor) with § 22-22-1 (silent on rape); compare UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-402(2) (1953–2001) (“This section [rape] applies whether or not the actor is
married to the victim”) and § 76-5-405 (aggravated sexual assault; includes definition of
rape in statute which applies “whether or not the actor is married to the victim.”) with
§ 76-5-402.2 (silent on object rape), § 76-5-403 (silent on forcible sodomy), and § 76-5-404
(silent on forcible sexual abuse); compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(B), § 18.2-67.1(B),
and § 18.2-67.2(B) (Michie 2002) (no person shall be found guilty of rape, forcible sodomy,
or object sexual penetration unless, at time of alleged offense, spouses were living separate
and apart) with § 18.2-67.3 (silent on aggravated sexual battery) and § 18.2-67.4 (silent on
sexual battery); compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2002) (marital
immunity for rape in third degree, Class C felony) and § 9A.44.100 (marital immunity for
indecent liberties, Class A or B felony) with § 9A.44.040 (silent on rape in first degree)
and § 9A.44.050 (silent on rape in second degree).
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marriage is not a defense to first-degree rape, but they remain silent
297
on other sexual assault provisions such as sexual battery. A number
of other states specifically delineate certain crimes for which marriage
298
is a defense and certain crimes for which marriage is not a defense.
States with explicit provisions in sexual offense statutes
authorizing the prosecution of men for raping of their wives reveal
how these provisions tend to work in practice. An examination of the
cases in these states discloses that even these explicit provisions are
an inadequate solution to the ongoing consent ideology embedded
within the traditional marital rape immunity.
The assumption that marriage provides men with their wives’
ongoing consent to sexual relations may continue to exist in states
297. IDAHO CODE § 18-6107; § 18-6608 (Michie 1948–2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5402(2), § 76-5-405, § 76-5-402.2, § 76-5-403, § 76-5-404 (1953–2001); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-1(2), § 16-6-2, § 16-6-22.1, § 16-6-22.2 (Harrison 1982–2001).
298. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.432(b) (Michie 2002) (“Except as provided in (a) of this
section, in a prosecution under AS 11.41.410 or 11.41.420, it is not a defense that the victim
was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant.”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (“In any prosecution for an offense under this part,
except an offense under section 53a-70 [sexual assault in first degree], 53a-70a [aggravated
sexual assault in first degree], 53a-70b [sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting
relationship], 53a-71 [sexual assault in second degree], 53a-72a [sexual assault in third
degree] or 53a-72b [sexual assault in third degree with firearm], it shall be an affirmative
defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense,
living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal
status of their relationship”); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Michie 1948–2002) (“No person
shall be convicted of rape for any act or acts with that person’s spouse, except under the
circumstances cited in paragraphs 3 [force] and 4 [threats of harm or intoxicating
substance] of section 18-6101”); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. § 3-318 (West 2002) (spouses can
only be prosecuted for rape in first degree, rape in second degree, or sexual offense in
third degree if force is used or couple is living separately); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual conduct in first
through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age 16, mentally
incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 2002) amended
by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does not commit
criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason to know that
complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (West 2002) amended by 2002 Ohio Sess. Law. Serv. File
156 (H.B. 485) (West) (marriage or cohabitation is no defense to rape if offender uses
force or threat of force); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (“A person
cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct under Sections 16-3-651 through 16-3-659.1 if
the victim is the legal spouse unless the couple is living apart and the offending spouse’s
conduct constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first degree or second degree as defined
by Sections 16-3-652 and 16-3-533”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(d) (2002) (A person
does not commit an offense under sexual offenses if the victim is the legal spouse of the
perpetrator unless defendant is armed with weapon, inflicts serious bodily injury, or
parties are living separately and have filed for divorce); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307
(Michie 1977–2001) (“The fact that the actor and the victim are married to each other is
not by itself a defense to a violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) or 6-5-303(a)(i), (ii),
(iii) or (vi)”).
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299

with explicit statutes.
One case indicates that states may lack a
coherent theory about what the evidence of sexual relations grants
defendants in terms of consent in marital rape cases. Adair was
charged with two counts of sexually assaulting his wife a few days
300
after serving her with divorce papers. At a hearing in front of the
judge on the admissibility of evidence of the prior sexual history
between the parties, the wife admitted that, during a brief
reconciliation, she had engaged in consensual sexual relations with
301
Adair a few times after that alleged sexual assault. The trial court
302
An
decided to admit evidence of those subsequent sexual acts.
interlocutory appeal on the matter went to the Michigan Supreme
Court, which remanded the issue and directed the trial court to reweigh the evidence’s probative value to determine its admissibility:
On a common-sense level, a trial court could find that the closer
in time to the alleged sexual assault that the complainant engaged in
subsequent consensual sexual relations with her alleged assailant, the
stronger the argument would be that if indeed she had been sexually
assaulted, she would not have consented to sexual relations with him
in the immediate aftermath of sexual assault. Accordingly, the
evidence may be probative. Conversely, the greater the time interval,
the less probative force the evidence may have, depending on
303
circumstances.
The court offered factors that would make the subsequent sexual
acts more or less probative of the wife’s consent on the instance in
304
question. However, the court did not articulate a theory about what
prior or subsequent consensual sexual acts standing alone reveal in
terms of consent on the instance in question.
Michigan’s rape statute explicitly provides that husbands “may
be charged and convicted” of criminal sexual conduct “even though
305
the victim is his or her legal spouse.” Although the provision allows

299. There are apparently very few marital rape cases in these jurisdictions as well.
Westlaw research has revealed few appeals for criminal convictions of rape or sexual
assault of a spouse in each of the “allowance” and “no defense” states. The number of
appeals found in each of the states are as follows: Alaska (3), Colorado (2), District of
Columbia (0), Georgia (7), Michigan (5), New Hampshire (3), New Jersey (2), North
Carolina (0), and Wisconsin (6).
300. Michigan v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996).
301. Adair, 550 N.W.2d at 508.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 512. The court also directed the trial court to weigh the nature of the
relationship. Id.
304. Id.
305. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (“person may be charged and
convicted [for first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct] even though the victim
is his or her legal spouse;” however, spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual
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Adair to be prosecuted, it does not prevent Adair’s wife from being
subjected to an improper inference that her subsequent consent to sex
with Adair itself implied consent to sexual intercourse with him on
the instance in question.
Ongoing sexual consent analysis emerges in cases involving
intimates who are not legally married. In the recent Alaska case of
Napoka v. State, the complainant, fourteen-year-old N.A., made a
report to a state trooper after he gave a presentation at her school
306
about sexual abuse. She stated that Napoka had raped her nine or
307
Upon investigation, Napoka
ten times over the past few years.
admitted to the trooper that he had engaged in non-consensual sex
with N.A. on three previous occasions, so he was indicted for those
308
three instances. At trial, the state moved to exclude evidence of the
309
other sexual acts between Napoka and N.A. The trial court granted
310
the motion, but on appeal, this decision was reversed. The court of
appeals stated:
N.A.’s prior sexual conduct with Napoka was clearly relevant to the
two issues confronting the jury: (1) whether, as a factual matter,
N.A. consented to have sex with Napoka on the three occasions
identified in the indictment, and (2) whether, even if N.A. did not
consent, Napoka nevertheless reasonably believed that she did
consent. . . . The disputed evidence was relevant, not because it
showed that N.A. had engaged in sexual activity before, but rather
because it showed that N.A. had engaged in sex with Napoka
before. If, as the defense claimed in its offer of proof, Napoka and
N.A. had a long history of consensual sex, this fact would obviously
be important to the jury’s proper decision of these two things.311

conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on spouse being under age 16,
mentally incapable, or mentally incapacitated).
306. 996 P.2d 106, 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
307. Id. at 107.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 108.
311. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original). The court continued:
The evidence is important, not because of what it reveals about N.A.’s
willingness to engage in sexual activity in general, but because of what it reveals
about N.A.’s relationship with Napoka—specifically her willingness to engage in
sexual activity with Napoka—and how this might have influenced Napoka’s
perception of whether N.A. consented to the sexual activity during the three
incidents charged in the indictment. Id. Similarly, in the recent case of Nickoli v.
State, Nos. A-7129, 4285, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 1471558 (Oct. 4, 2000), the
appellate court issued a memorandum disposition, indicating that the outcome of
the case was controlled by the precedent of Napoka and its holding broke no new
legal ground. Nevertheless, the court’s analysis in Nickoli is instructive. Nickoli
was charged with first-degree sexual assault; his defense was consent. A.S.
testified that he had taken her to a remote spot along the Yukon River and raped
her. At trial, she offered that she had previously engaged in consensual sexual
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According to this court, then, the prior sex was crucial to the
jury’s consideration of N.A.’s consent on the instance in question and,
even if she did not consent, Napoka’s reasonable belief that N.A.
312
consented on the instance in question.
Alaska’s marital statute includes an explicit provision regarding
forcible and nonconsensual marital rape such as the kind that N.A.
313
allegedly suffered. The court in Napoka, however, declared that the
evidence of prior sexual activity between Napoka and N.A. revealed
her “willingness to engage in sexual activity with Napoka” on the
314
instance in question. Alaska’s explicit “no defense” provision does
nothing for N.A.; the court still found that her prior relationship with
Napoka implied ongoing consent.
Explicit provisions regarding marital status do not attack Hale’s
understanding of sexual relations: that a woman who “hath given her
body” to a man continues to consent to sexual intercourse with him
315
through time. To reach the heart of this improper inference, society
needs a new law on sexual offenses by intimates.

intercourse with Nickoli one month before the sexual assault. The trial judge
restricted Nickoli’s ability to question A.S. about a prior sexual relationship that
spanned several years. Nickoli appealed the judge’s decision on this matter and
the court of appeals reversed. It analyzed the disputed evidence this way:
Nickoli’s prior sexual relationship with A.S was critical to his defense. The
fact that A.S. had engaged in a single act of sexual intercourse
approximately one month before the alleged rape was certainly substantial
evidence which supported Nickoli’s defense. But the fact that A.S. and
Nickoli engaged in sexual intercourse over a long period of time on several
occasions, both before and after A.S. was married, significantly strengthens
Nickoli’s claim. The fact that A.S. had been involved in a long-term
relationship with Nickoli supports the inference that she might have been
willing to engage in consensual intercourse with Nickoli, or that Nickoli
might have reasonably concluded that she was willing at the time of the
alleged rape. A jury might find these inferences stronger with evidence of a
long-term relationship than with evidence that Nickoli had engaged in a
single recent act of consensual sex with A.S. Nickoli was entitled to present
this evidence to the jury.
Id. at *7–*8. A “long-term relationship” implied ongoing consent.
312. Id.
313. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (1) of this
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant”).
Alaska’s marital rape immunity extends to sexual offenses in which the victim is mentally
incapable or incapacitated—circumstances that would include Dripps’ hypothetical
unconscious wife. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (it is defense to sexual assault
when victim is incapable of consenting that offender is married to person and neither party
has filed with the court for separation).
314. Napoka, 996 P.2d at 110.
315. HALE, supra note 1, at 629.
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V. New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates
As a preliminary matter, this Part begins by analyzing two
possible responses to the ongoing consent ideology that continues to
dominate rape cases involving intimates: (1) reforming rape shield
laws and (2) admitting expert testimony on intimate rape. After
exploring the limitations of these two responses, Section A sets out a
proposal for a new law on sexual offenses by intimates, and argues
that its manifold advantages outweigh its potential disadvantages.
Section B applies the new law on sexual offenses by intimates to the
cases discussed in Part IV. It concludes that such a law would
mitigate the harm of the ongoing consent ideology and improve the
law in useful and equitable ways.
One obvious place to begin reforming the law regarding sexual
offenses by intimates is with rape shield laws, which admit evidence of
the sexual history between the defendant and the complainant. In an
earlier Article, I argued that routinely admitting this evidence
316
It
befuddles the jury’s ability to discern truth from a set of facts.
prejudices the truth-seeking process primarily by reinforcing the
antiquated notion that, once a woman consents to sexual intercourse
with a man, he is entitled to assume that she consents to future sexual
317
To limit the admission of evidence of the sexual history
acts.
between the complainant and the defendant, I proposed the following
rape shield statute:
Evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct and sexual
communication with the defendant on the instance in question is
admissible. Direct or opinion evidence of the complainant’s sexual
conduct and sexual communication prior or subsequent to the
instance in question is inadmissible, subject to the following three
exceptions:
(1) Evidence of an alternate source for the semen, pregnancy,
disease, or injury that the complainant suffered.
(2) Evidence of negotiations between the complainant and the
defendant to convey consent in a specific way or to engage
in a specific sexual act at issue.
(3) Evidence of the complainant’s bias or motive to fabricate
the charge of rape.318

This statute would prohibit the admission of much of the specific
evidence of prior sexual history between the defendant and the
complainant. In brief, the only routinely admissible evidence of the
sexual history between the complainant and the defendant would be
“[e]vidence of negotiations between the complainant and the
316. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1771–84.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1802.
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defendant to convey consent in a specific way or to engage in a
specific sexual act at issue.” Negotiations “to convey consent in a
specific way” might entail, for example, a discussion that a person
likes to have sex while saying “no” but wants her partner to stop if
she says “red.” Negotiations “to engage in a specific sexual act”
might entail, for example, a discussion about the sexual acts that the
parties planned to do to each other on their next date, provided that
those acts were at issue. Most other evidence of specific sexual acts
between the parties would be inadmissible.
Although I do not expect to convince the reader of the merits of
the statute here (for a full discussion of it, please refer to my earlier
Article), what I do hope to do is to show that even a restrictive rape
shield statute such as the one I previously proposed would not
dismantle the ongoing consent ideology that tends to affect intimate
319
Despite its restrictions on admissible evidence, the
rape cases.
statute would still admit evidence of the fact that the parties had been
previously intimate. As I argued:
Although prior sexual history between the complainant and the
defendant should not be a categorical exception to rape shield laws,
complaints of rape should not want for meaningful context. A
complainant who has been intimate with the defendant cannot
pretend to be a stranger to him when she lodges a complaint that he
raped her. For the sake of background and perspective, it is
appropriate to allow the defendant to discuss general information
about the nature of the parties’ relationship, such as the fact that
the parties were married or lived together, or dated previously.
This general information is not covered by rape shield laws and is
not the sort of evidence that would be excluded by them.
Descriptions of the level of sexual intimacy previously attained or
of specific prior sexual acts, however, befuddle the truth-seeking
process, so they should ordinarily be inadmissible.320

In a footnote, I explored briefly the potential bias that might flow
from the admission of even general information about the nature of
the parties’ relationship:
Admittedly, even general statements about the prior intimate
relationship between the complainant and the defendant may also
befuddle the truth-seeking process. However, defendants have the
right to provide some context for the instance in question, and the
state should not be allowed to leave the misimpression with
the jury
321
that the complainant and the defendant were strangers.

Given that general information about the nature of the parties’
relationship would be admitted after the passage of such a law, there
remains the very real problem that jurors and judges will invest this
319. For a fuller discussion of the merits of the statute, see id. at 1802–08.
320. Id. at 1784.
321. Id. at 1784, note 490.
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general evidence with probative value that it simply does not contain.
Therefore, some other reform measure is needed to blunt potential
bias against women who are sexually assaulted by their intimates.
One might propose that experts on intimate rape be allowed to
testify in intimate rape cases. Experts could testify, for example, that
a complainant’s prior consent to sexual intercourse does not imply
322
Experts could testify that
later consent to sexual intercourse.
women are harmed by intimate rape and that they do not intend to
give ongoing consent to sexual activities to men once they have had
sex with them. I support the proposal for expert testimony in these
cases; however, it would require, of course, prosecutors to obtain
experts. Often, local prosecutors do not have the resources or the
desire to do so. There is no reason to leave a much-needed legal
change to the constraints imposed by local prosecutors’ possibly
limited resources or imaginations. Changes should be made at a
statewide level in a way that imposes no new burdens on
prosecutorial budgets.
Additionally, expert testimony can be disputed. A defense
attorney could present its own expert to testify that a woman’s past
consent does imply consent to future sexual acts. The question at
issue, however, is not actually one of expert opinion. The question is
whether the law will allow defendants and jurors to infer that past
consent to sexual acts itself means consent to future sexual acts.
Either defendants and jurors may infer a complainant’s consent to
sexual intercourse on the instance in question based solely on her
prior consent or they may not. If the law does not allow such an
improper inference to be made, a new provision should be adopted
that simply states that such an inference is incorrect as a matter of
law.

322. Another way to eliminate juror bias in date rape trials proposed by Steve
Friedland was to screen jurors “more carefully during voir dire to allow the attorney to
exclude those jurors who are indelibly tainted by the culture of acceptance.” See
Friedland, supra note 16, at 520. Once the jury selection process was completed, the
selected jurors would be educated about the dangers of the culture of acceptance. Id.
Friedland views this as a two-pronged prevention and educational attack on the culture of
acceptance. Id. at 523. Because determining which jurors would be more influenced by
the culture of acceptance would be difficult, Friedland sees this educational process to be
an intricate element to his proposal.
A number of district attorneys have acknowledged the need to educate jurors through
experts about domestic violence and marital rape in order to “contextualize rape in
marriage and debunk myths about implied consent.” See Eskow, supra note 3, at 699-702.
One prosecutor believed that the key to removing this stigma was through domestic
violence classes in high schools and colleges, which would educate potential jurors earlier.
Id. at 701–02.
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A. Analysis of the New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates

States must directly address the question of what impact a prior
sexual relationship between the defendant and the complainant has
on a claim of consent. I propose that states abolish provisions in their
sexual offense codes that deal exclusively with the marital status of
the defendant and the complainant. I propose, instead, that each
state’s sexual offense statute include the following provision:
A prior or subsequent sexual relationship between the defendant
and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other
circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense and shall
not affect the grading of a sexual offense. The sole fact that the
complainant consented to the same or different acts with the
defendant on other occasions shall not be a sufficient basis for
inferring consent on the instance in question. The mere existence
of such a sexual relationship shall not be a sufficient basis for the
defendant to claim a mistake of fact as to consent defense.

These three sentences would significantly change the way that
the legal system weighs evidence of a sexual relationship between the
complainant and the defendant. I will analyze each sentence in turn.
“A prior or subsequent sexual relationship between the defendant
and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other
circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense and shall not
affect the grading of a sexual offense.”
This first sentence would address rape by intimates as a whole
and not single out marital rape victims for special treatment.
Collective treatment of rape by intimates is appropriate because
victims who have been previously intimate with their assailants suffer
323
similar harm to marital rape victims. As we have seen, “one need
not be legally married to suffer the trauma and consequences of being
324
More importantly, from a
raped by one’s intimate partner.”
fairness standpoint, victims who have been previously intimate with
their assailants are often subject to the improper inference of ongoing
consent regardless of the formal legal status the parties share. As a
result, the sexual relationship between the parties itself is the
centerpiece of the proposed provision; whether that relationship
occurred “in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or other circumstances”
is immaterial because the provision covers each circumstance.
The first sentence also clarifies that such a prior sexual
relationship “shall not be a defense to a sexual offense.” In that
323. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text.
324. BERGEN, WIFE RAPE, supra note 23, at 8 (“Furthermore . . . ’a marriage license
probably does not change the dynamics of sexual abuse within an ongoing intimate
relationship, except to make it legal in some states.’ Thus, my sample includes legally
married women, those who have cohabited with their partners for more than a year, and
those in partnerships who share a child.”).
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sense, it is similar to the “no defense” provisions of Alaska, Colorado,
and Georgia, which state that the marital status of the parties “shall
325
not be a defense” to a charged sexual offense. The new law on rape
by intimates is different, however, because it focuses on what drives
the traditional marital rape exemption: the prior sexual relationship
between the parties itself. For that reason, the new law says that the
prior sexual relationship itself (rather than technical marital status)
“shall not be a defense.”
In addition to addressing a prior sexual relationship between the
parties, the first sentence addresses a subsequent sexual relationship
between the parties. Many battered women stay with their abusers
even after they have been assaulted repeatedly. The fact that they
stayed after the abuse does not mean that they consented to being
battered or that the battering was not a crime. Likewise, many raped
women continue to have relationships with their abusers,
326
relationships that may include subsequent sexual relations. As we
have seen, the fact that they stayed after the rapes does not mean that
they consented to being raped or that the rapes were not crimes.
Finally, the first sentence clarifies that a sexual relationship
between the parties “shall not affect the grading of a sexual offense.”
At least four states allow the mere fact that the parties were married
or cohabitating to affect the grading of the offense and, as a
consequence, how seriously the police, prosecutors, courts, and juries
take these offenses. In basic fairness to women, this explicit
statement that a previous sexual relationship shall not affect the
grading of the offense should be included in the statute as a matter of
legislative intent.
“The sole fact that the complainant consented to the same or
different acts with the defendant on other occasions shall not be a
sufficient basis for inferring consent on the instance in question.”

325. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Michie 2001) (“Except as provided in (a) of this
section [when victim is mentally incapable or incapacitated] it is not a defense that the
victim was, at the time of the alleged offense, the legal spouse of the defendant”); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any marital relationship shall not be defense
unless such defense is specifically set forth in statute;” spouses exempt only from statutory
rape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person
allegedly raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to a charge of rape”);
§ 16-6-2 (“The fact that the person allegedly sodomized is the spouse of a defendant shall
not be a defense to a charge of aggravated sodomy”).
326. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 54 M.J. 700, 705 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (victim
testified to having sexual relations with defendant after two alleged rapes of victim by
defendant); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 473 (N.C. 1984) (discussing defendant and
complainant’s sexual relations after complaint made to police about alleged rape);
Commonwealth v. Richter, 711 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1998) (victim allowed defendant to
move back in with her after alleged rape).
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This second sentence of the new law on sexual offenses by
intimates means that that one cannot conclude that the complainant
consented on the instance in question simply by virtue of her consent
to the same act with the defendant on a different occasion. Simply
because a woman previously agreed to have oral sex with a man
before does not mean that she consented to oral sex with him on the
instance in question. The prior act, alone, provides no basis for
making that inference. Combined with other evidence, such as how
the complainant acted on the instance in question in light of her prior
behavior in the relationship, the prior act may be a factor upon which
one might infer consent, but as a lone bit of evidence, it is not
sufficient for one to infer consent. The provision therefore states that
the complainant’s consent on the instance in question may not be
inferred solely based on her consent to the same act with the
defendant on other occasions.
The second sentence also addresses prior consent to sexual acts
that are different than the one charged. It likewise clarifies that one
cannot infer consent simply by virtue of the complainant’s consent to
a different act with the defendant on a different occasion. Simply
because a woman had consensual vaginal sex with a man previously
does not mean that she consented to oral sex with him on the instance
in question. The provision therefore states that the complainant’s
consent on the instance in question may not be inferred solely based
on her consent to a different act with the defendant on other
occasions.
Finally, the second sentence of the new law on sexual offenses by
intimates abolishes the defendant’s ability to claim that he enjoyed
“implied authorization” to proceed with sex with the complainant
without her consent whenever “a long-standing sexual relationship
327
Such “implied
connects the defendant with the victim.”
authorization,” Dripps argues, derives from the fact that the woman
had, “while sober and over a long course of dealing, approved of a
328
The
complex relationship in which sex plays a prominent role.”
new law on sexual offenses by intimates nips this analysis in the bud:
The complainant’s consent on the instance in question may not be
inferred solely from her consent to the same or different acts with the
defendant on other occasions. No “implied authorization” for future
sex follows “a complex relationship in which sex plays a prominent
329
role.”

327. Dripps, supra note 5, at 1801.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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“The mere existence of such a sexual relationship shall not be a
sufficient basis for the defendant to claim a mistake of fact as to
consent defense.”
The third sentence of the new law addresses the specific defense
of mistake of fact as to consent that a prior sexual relationship
between the parties helps provide defendants. It clarifies that a
defendant may not assume he has consent solely by virtue of the fact
that he has been sexually active with a woman before. There may be
any number of reasons a man harbors a legitimate mistake of fact as
to a woman’s consent, but the mere fact that he has been sexually
active with her before should not provide him with the opportunity to
make such a claim. This provision prevents the defendant from
relying on a particularly unreasonable mistaken belief: that once a
woman consents to sex with him, she has given him ongoing consent
to future sexual acts. The new law declares that, because it is
unreasonable to make an assumption of consent based solely on the
fact that one has been sexually active with someone before, it is
legally untenable. Combined with other evidence of what occurred
on the instance in question in light of past practices between the
parties, the fact that a man has been sexually active with a woman
before may be a factor upon which he may conclude, reasonably but
mistakenly, that she consented on the instance in question. But the
mere existence of a relationship itself cannot provide him with a
reasonable mistake. Prior consent alone provides the defendant with
no reasonable basis upon which to assume consent on the instance in
question.
In proposing this new law on sexual offenses by intimates, I am
advancing a particular normative vision of consent to sexual
330
I believe that consent to sexual intercourse is
intercourse.
temporally constrained permission that is specific as to act and non331
transferable to others. Examples illustrate each of these principles.
Consent is temporally constrained: A woman may choose to end a
passionate affair in order to become a celibate Buddhist nun. Just
because she consented to sex with her lover in the past does not mean
she consents in the future. Consent is specific as to act: A wife may
choose to have vaginal intercourse with her husband, but refuse his
requests for anal sex. Just because she consented to vaginal
intercourse does not mean she consents to anal sex. Consent is nontransferable to other people: A woman may exchange oral sex for
money with seven men in one night to pay her rent, but refuse the
eighth. Just because she consented to sex with seven men, does not
330. I advanced the same normative vision of consent in an earlier article on rape shield
laws. See Anderson, supra note 23, at 1796–1802.
331. Id. at 1707–08.
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mean she consents to sex with the eighth. Sexual consent is
permission that must be negotiated each time.
332
Rape law has not evinced this normative vision of consent.
Historically, rape law portrayed consent to sexual intercourse as
temporally unconstrained permission that could be imprecise as to act
333
and even indiscriminate as to person. Marital immunity for sexual
offenses enshrined two of these objectionable aspects of this distorted
normative vision into rape law.
First, it established sexual consent as temporally unconstrained
permission. As Vivian Berger noted in her influential Columbia Law
Review article on the marital rape exemption, marital immunity
derived from the “fictional notion that marriage implies continuing
334
As we have seen, ongoing sexual
consent to sexual relations.”
consent to her husband was imagined to be a “term” of the marriage
“contract,” something that continued for the duration of the
335
marriage.
Second, marital immunity established sexual consent as
permission that was imprecise as to sexual act. Once a woman
professed a nuptial “I do,” she could not assert a conjugal “I don’t do
336
that.” Her husband could force her to engage in any sexual act that
337
pleased him, and the law provided her no refuge.
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates abandons this
retrograde normative vision of consent in favor of a more egalitarian
view. This new law would help to temporally constrain sexual
332. Id. at 1703–04.
333. Id.
334. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Women’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977).
335. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. 1981) (noting most prevalent justification for
marital exemption is “that upon entering the marriage contract a wife consents to sexual
intercourse with her husband”). “If a wife can exercise a legal right to separate from her
husband and eventually terminate the marriage ‘contract,’ may she not also revoke a
‘term’ of that contract, namely, consent to intercourse?” Id. See also Weishaupt v.
Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 854 (Va. 1984) (“[I]f a woman can unilaterally secure a
divorce, thereby revoking the marriage contract in its entirety, then it is illogical to
conclude that she cannot, by her own act, revoke a term of that contract.”); Kizer v.
Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 291, 293 (Va. 1984) (“[T]he prosecution . . . must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the wife unilaterally had revoked her implied consent to
marital intercourse.”).
336. See HALE, supra note 1, at 629 (stating women give matrimonial consent which
may not be withdrawn). Hale provided justification for the marital rape exemption by
saying, “the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.” See id. (emphasis added). See also
Hasday, supra note 3, at 1399 (emphasizing how Hale had formulated a “legal rule
conclusively inferring consent from her initial agreement to marry”).
337. See Hasday, supra note 3, at 1400. Marriage provided a man “a right of sexual
access to his wife.” Id. Likewise, it “bestowed an obligation on the wife to submit.” Id.
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consent and make it precise as to act. Consent would be temporally
constrained because a prior or subsequent sexual relationship would
not itself be a defense to a rape charge. The mere existence of
consensual sex on another occasion would not be sufficient to infer
consent on the instance in question. Consent would also be specific
as to act because neither the defendant nor the jury would be
permitted to infer that the complainant consented to the sexual act in
question simply by virtue of the complainant’s prior consent to the
same or a different sexual act.
Defendants charged with sexual offenses in jurisdictions in which
this new law on sexual offenses by intimates has been adopted could
338
still claim consent as a defense, of course. These defendants would
not, however, be able to argue that, simply by having had sex with the
complainant before, they could assume consent to the sexual acts in
question. Under the new law on sexual offenses by intimates, a
defendant’s prior sexual relationship with a complainant would not be
a defense, nor would it provide a defendant with an inference of
ongoing consent.
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates I propose may
339
break new ground in rape law, but it travels a well-worn path. As
we have seen, three states have enacted “no defense” provisions in
their rape codes that clarify that marital status is no defense to a
340
The new law on sexual offenses by
charged sexual offense.
intimates is not a great leap from those provisions; it simply re338. A defendant could advance a defense of consent primarily by producing evidence
of the complainant’s words or actions on the instance in question. If a complainant and a
defendant previously negotiated a unique method of communicating consent to sex,
evidence of that negotiation would certainly be admissible to reveal what the defendant
reasonably believed about the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse on the instance
in question. If a complainant and a defendant previously negotiated future consent to
specific acts, again, evidence of that negotiation would be admissible to reveal what the
defendant reasonably believed about the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse on
the instance in question. Notice, however, that in both circumstances, the mere existence
of a previous sexual relationship would not be a defense to a charge of rape, nor would it
provide the defendant with an automatic presumption of consent to future sexual
relations. Anderson, supra note 23, at 1804–07.
339. Steven Friedland argued for specialized jury instructions that would warn jurors
against assuming a woman’s consent to sexual acts simply because they disapprove of her
nonverbal actions before those acts. See Friedland, supra note 16, at 524. Friedland
argued, “[t]he instructions could inform juries explicitly that nonverbal cues such as dress
and body language do not impliedly support a finding of consent unless there is a
reasonable, unbiased ground for that inference.” Id. at 525. One district attorney in
northern California surveyed for a student note in the Stanford Law Review argued for
creating specialized jury instructions that read, “[a]ll spouses have the right to control their
bodies. Spousal status [is] no defense to rape.” This provision would be similar to the new
law on sexual offenses by intimates that I propose herein. Eskow, supra note 3, at 702.
340. For a further discussion of statutes providing that marital status is “no defense” to
rape, see supra note 293-294 and accompanying text.
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focuses the law on the impact of the prior sexual relationship rather
than the technical marital status. In addition, the states of California
and Colorado have interesting, analogous provisions regarding the
substantive issue of consent in their sexual offense codes. Both the
California and Colorado codes on consent state, “[a] current or
previous dating relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute
341
California courts have interpreted
consent” for a sexual offense.
this provision to mean, “consent, to be a defense, must be current; the
fact that a victim has previously engaged in sexual activities with the
342
attacker does not constitute consent in perpetuo.” In other words,
consent to prior sexual acts does not extend in perpetuity to other
sexual acts: consent is not ongoing. This analysis is a central rationale
behind the new law on sexual offenses by intimates.
This new law on sexual offenses by intimates would authorize
prosecutors to obtain jury instructions that would limit the jury’s
ability to infer consent from a prior sexual relationship between the
parties. Three states with arguably the best statutes on marital
immunity each have statutes that provide that marriage is not a
343
However, these three states lack
defense to a charge of rape.
344
The
patterned jury instructions to take advantage of the statutes.
progressive language in these laws, declaring that marriage is not a
defense to rape, is ineffectual without an accompanying jury
instruction cautioning the jury not to make an improper inference of
consent based solely on the marital relationship.
Appropriate jury instructions based on the new law on sexual
offenses by intimates would depend on whether, in the applicable
jurisdiction, nonconsent is a material element of the crime of rape and
so must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or consent
341. People v. Gonzalez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778 (C.A. 2d Dist. 1995). It goes on to say,
“[n]othing in this section shall affect the admissibility of evidence or the burden of proof
on the issue of consent.” Id. at 780. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401 (West 2002).
342. In re Keith S., No. E027838, 2002 WL 220630 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.) (unpublished
disposition).
343. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (Mitchie 2001) (“[I]t is not a defense that the victim [of
sexual assault in the first or second degree] was, at the time of the alleged offense, the
legal spouse of the defendant.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (West 2002) (“Any
marital relationship, whether established statutorily, putatively, or by common law,
between an actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any offense under this part); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(2) (Harrison 1982–2001) (“The fact that the person allegedly
raped is the wife of the defendant shall not be a defense to the charge of rape.”).
344. See generally ALASKA SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) (1980) (amended
1988); COLO. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS , COLO.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1993); COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA.,
SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES, vol. II (1991) (amended
2002).
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is an affirmative defense for which the defendant has the burden of
persuasion. In most jurisdictions, nonconsent is a material element of
the crime of rape. One potential jury instruction based on the new
law on sexual offenses by intimates in these jurisdictions would,
therefore, be:
In this case, the defendant claims that the complainant consented to
the conduct alleged to have been rape. You have heard evidence
that the parties _____________ [were involved in a prior sexual
relationship] or [were involved in a subsequent sexual relationship]
or [engaged in the same sexual act on another occasion] or
[engaged in a different sexual act on another occasion]. This fact,
in and of itself, is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
consent. This fact, weighed with other evidence, may raise a
reasonable doubt as to consent.

If the defendant offers other evidence of consent besides the
prior sexual relationship itself, the risk remains that jurors will invest
the relationship with probative value that it does not warrant.
Therefore, even if the defendant offers other evidence of consent, the
prosecution should be entitled to obtain this instruction when a
defendant in an intimate sexual offense case claims the defense of
consent.
On the question of mistake of fact as to consent, a jury
instruction might read:
In this case, the defendant claims that he had a reasonable but
mistaken belief that the complainant consented to the conduct
alleged to have been rape. You have heard evidence that the
parties _____________ [were involved in a prior sexual relationship]
or [engaged in the same sexual act on another occasion] or
[engaged in a different sexual act on another occasion]. This fact,
alone, is not a reasonable basis upon which the defendant can make
a mistake as to the complainant’s consent. If you find that this fact
is the sole basis upon which the defendant believed that the
complainant consented, you must find that his belief was
unreasonable. If, however, you find that the defendant relied on
other evidence as well, you may weigh this fact with that other
evidence when evaluating whether his mistake was reasonable.

By these instructions, juries would be cautioned that a sexual
relationship between the parties is not itself a defense and that the
defendant may not assume ongoing consent or “implied
authorization” to sexual intercourse simply by virtue of a prior or
subsequent sexual relationship. Such instructions would help to
curtail juror bias against victims who have had prior sexual
relationships with their assailants. These instructions would also
undermine the legal legacy of the marital rape exemption: the
substantive notion of ongoing consent based solely on an intimate
relationship, regardless of the marital status of that relationship.
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Application of the New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates

If the victims in Gonyaw, Sanchez-Lahora, Adair, and Napoka
had lived in jurisdictions in which the new law on sexual offenses by
intimates had been in effect, the appellate courts evaluating those
cases would have had to acknowledge that a prior sexual relationship
between the defendant and the complainant did not itself afford the
defendant an inference of consent. Moreover, on retrial, the juries in
those cases would be properly cautioned about how to weigh that
evidence and their ability to make an improper inference of ongoing
consent would be appropriately constrained.
In Gonyaw, the complainant and the defendant had cohabitated
345
The Vermont Supreme Court stated that
for three years.
consensual sex between them four days prior to the alleged sexual
assault could “support a reasonable belief that there was consent to
346
renewed sexual activity.” Under the new law on sexual offense by
intimates, the defendant could not reasonably believe in consent to
“renewed sexual activity” based solely on a recent consensual act of
347
Consent to “renewed sexual activity” as a concept would be
sex.
improper because prior sexual acts, in and of themselves, do not
imply consent to subsequent sexual acts, even if those prior acts were
348
At
“reasonably contemporaneous” with the instance in question.
retrial, after hearing evidence of their three-year cohabitation and a
disputed act of sex four days earlier, the jury would be properly
instructed that the existence of such a sexual relationship “alone, is
not a reasonable basis upon which the defendant can make a mistake
as to the complainant’s consent.”
If the new law on sexual offenses by intimates were in effect in
Nebraska at the time, the appellate court in Sanchez-Lahora could
not have endorsed the faulty syllogism it believed it found in the
state’s rape shield law. In that case, Sanchez-Lahora wanted to testify
349
that he had had sex with the complainant 11–14 times before. When
analyzing this potential evidence the appellate court said:
Major [premise]: The victim’s past sexual behavior with the
defendant was consensual behavior. Minor [premise]: The victim’s
behavior in the present prosecution is the type of activity in which
345. Vermont v. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d 944, 947 (Vt. 1985).
346. Id.
347. Id. Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex four
days prior to the alleged assault would likely be excluded, but evidence of the fact that the
parties had previously cohabitated would not be excluded. See supra notes 316–20 and
accompanying text. For this reason, the new law on sexual offenses by intimates and the
jury instruction it allows would be appropriate even if Vermont had passed my rape shield
law.
348. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d at 947.
349. State v. Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
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the victim participated with the defendant in the past. Conclusion:
Therefore, the victim’s behavior in the present prosecution was
consensual.350

The new law on sexual offenses by intimates rejects the notion
that consent to sex on the instance in question ineluctably follows
from consent to similar acts before. On the contrary, it clarifies that,
as a logical matter, one may not infer consent on the instance in
question based on the mere fact that the complainant’s past sexual
351
behavior with the defendant was similar and consensual. At retrial,
the jury would be properly instructed that the sole fact that the
complainant consented to the same act with the defendant before “is
not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to consent.”
In Adair, the Michigan Supreme Court would not have had to
struggle for a way to interpret the sexual acts that occurred after the
alleged sexual assault during a brief reconciliation between the Adair
352
The new law on sexual offenses by intimates would
and his wife.
instruct the jury plainly that a “subsequent sexual relationship”
between the defendant and the complainant, in and of itself, “is not
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to consent.”
Likewise, in Napoka, the “long history of consensual sex” alleged
by Napoka with the minor would not imply authorization for sex with
353
In Napoka, the Alaska
her on the three instances in question.
appellate court said that the sexual history of sex between a
complainant and a defendant was important to two material issues:
(1) the actual consent of the minor to the sex alleged to have been
rape and (2), if there was no actual consent, the defendant’s
354
The new law on sexual
reasonable belief that she consented.
355
Actual
offenses by intimates addresses both material issues.
350. Id. at 818.
351. Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex 11–14
times prior to the alleged assault would likely be excluded, but evidence of SanchezLahora’s allegation that the parties had previously been involved in some kind of romantic
relationship would not be excluded. See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. For
this reason, the new law on sexual offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows
would be appropriate even if Nebraska had passed my rape shield law.
352. Michigan v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Mich. 1996). Under the rape shield law I
proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of sex after the alleged assault would likely be
excluded, but evidence of the fact that the parties were married would not be excluded.
See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. For this reason, the new law on sexual
offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows would be appropriate even if
Michigan had passed my rape shield law.
353. Napoka v. Alaska, 996 P.2d 106, 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
354. Id. at 110.
355. Under the rape shield law I proposed in an earlier Article, evidence of allegedly
consensual sex between Napoka and the minor prior to the alleged assault would likely be
excluded, but evidence of the fact that Napoka claimed some romantic relationship would
not be excluded. See supra notes 316–20 and accompanying text. For this reason, the new
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consent to sexual intercourse may not be inferred solely based on a
history of consensual sex. Because, legally, jurors and defendants
may not infer consent on the instance in question based solely on
prior consensual sexual behavior, the defendant himself may not
construct a defense of reasonable belief in consent based on that
evidence alone. Prior consent in and of itself provides the defendant
with no reasonable basis to assume consent on the instance in
question. At retrial, the jury would be properly instructed that the
mere existence of such a sexual relationship “is not sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt as to consent” and “is not a reasonable basis upon
which the defendant can make a mistake as to the complainant’s
consent.” Having such an instruction is superior to the status quo
because it allows the jury to make conclusions based on the evidence
surrounding the disputed sexual act itself rather than on a biased
inference of ongoing consent based solely on prior acts.
Critics might worry that the new law on sexual offenses by
intimates would engender unfair results in cases in which the issue of
consent is a particularly close one. They need not fret. Assume, for
example, a situation in which a woman voices no affirmative consent
to sexual intercourse, nor does she verbally or physically object to it.
What happens when her husband penetrates her but she remains
passive and silent? As a practical matter, of course, no prosecutor
would bring such a weak case to the jury. Even if the parties were not
married, this case could not result in a conviction under current law in
356
the vast majority of jurisdictions. The new law on sexual offenses
would not change that fact.
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the application of the new law
on sexual offenses in a hypothetical prosecution based on these facts
would not make the case more troubling. Should the husband be able
to argue that his wife consented on the instance in question based
solely on the existence of his prior relationship with her? No. His
defense of consent should be based on evidence surrounding the
disputed sexual act itself: that his wife was passive and silent on the
instance in question. Coupled with this evidence, he would also be
able to point to past sexual practices between them to argue consent.
Whether he would prevail would depend on the substantive definition

law on sexual offenses by intimates and the jury instruction it allows would be appropriate
even if Alaska had passed my rape shield law.
356. Most jurisdictions do not criminalize this behavior. Only in jurisdictions such as
New Jersey, in which consent requires affirmative, freely given permission, would this
situation be potentially criminal. State of New Jersey in the interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d
1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (consent defined as “affirmative and freely-given permission of the
victim to the specific act of penetration”).
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of consent in the jurisdiction, rather than on the new law on sexual
357
offenses by intimates that I have proposed.

Conclusion
Legally declaring that “a prior sexual relationship between the
defendant and the complainant—in marriage, cohabitation, dating, or
other circumstances—shall not be a defense to a sexual offense” will
358
not end the occurrence of sexual offenses by intimates, of course. It
will, however, end the marriage between an intimate relationship and
the improper inference of ongoing consent to sexual intercourse.
Because the ideology of ongoing consent has bullied the legal
interpretation of intimate relationships in rape cases for generations,
such a divorce is long overdue.

357. See, e.g., id.
358. As Diana Russell has pointed out: “Clearly, though legal reform is a crucial step in
dealing with wife rape, it is not enough. Our survey data have shown that many women
who are economically dependent on their husbands do not feel able to leave the husbands
who rape them. Hence, the struggle against wife rape and other wife abuse is connected
with the struggle for women to obtain greater economic independence, in their marriages
and outside of them. Ultimately it is not possible to eradicate wife rape as long as women
are subordinate to men in the family and in society. Hence, the struggle for equal power,
which means more for women and less for men, is part of the struggle against wife rape.”
RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 360.
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Introduction to the Appendix of State Sexual Offense
Statutes with Marital Immunity
The following appendix details only those twenty-six states that
contain some form of marital immunity in their sexual offense
statutes. It does not include states that have abolished marital
immunity.
State statutes regarding sexual offenses vary widely. Many states
criminalize sexual transgressions in unique ways. Even as I have tried
to be comprehensive in this compilation of states’ sexual offense
statutes with marital immunity, I have cut certain provisions to focus
on the most pertinent aspects of the doctrine for forcible and
nonconsensual sexual offenses. For this reason, I have omitted
provisions that criminalize sexual intercourse based on age of the
victim, commonly called statutory rape laws.
These almost
359
I have also omitted
universally provide for marital immunity.
provisions that criminalize sexual intercourse based on the
developmental disability or other cognitive limitation of the victim;
360
statutes often refer to these victims as “mentally defective.” These
359. Statutes that exempt spouses from crimes classified as statutory rape are beyond
the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. Additionally, nearly every state has a
provision providing immunity for spousal statutory rape. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3252 (2001) (sexual assault: “The other person is under the age of 16, except where the
persons are married to each other and the sexual act is consensual”); W.VA. CODE § 618B-3 (1966–2002) (sexual assault in first degree: “The person, being fourteen years old or
more, engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person who is eleven
years old or less and is not married to that person”). Marital immunity for statutory rape
will not be discussed in this paper. I have also omitted provisions regarding incest because
they do not involve spouses.
360. Several states provide marital immunity for sexual offenses if one spouse suffers
from mental retardation or a mental defect that renders her incapable of providing
consent. ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-6-62(a)(2) (2002) (marital immunity for rape in second
degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a victim who is incapable of
consent by reason of being mentally defective); § 13A-6-64 (marital immunity for sodomy
in the second degree when person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a person who
is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410
(Michie 2001) (marital immunity for sexual assault in the first degree when the offender
“engages in sexual penetration with another person who the offender knows is mentally
incapable”); §11.41.420 (marriage is defense to second degree sexual assault if the victim is
mentally incapable); §11.41.420 (marriage is a defense to third degree sexual assault if the
victim is mentally incapable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2002) (spouses or
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in fourth degree, which occurs when person
intentionally subjects another to sexual contact who is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless); § 53a-71 (spouses and cohabitants are immune from
sexual assault in second degree when the victim is mentally defective); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-732(d) (2001) note in 2002 Haw. Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (spouses and
cohabitants are exempt from sexual assault in third degree, Class C felony, if victim is
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101
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provisions, too, routinely provide for marital immunity. I have
omitted the rare provisions regarding rapes that involve an abuse of
authority (which frequently provide for marital immunity), such as
those in which the victim is a prisoner in a correctional facility in
which the offender is a guard. I have also omitted those very rare
provisions regarding rapes that involve an abuse of trust (which are
silent as to marital immunity), such as those that involve perpetrators
who are members of the clergy or attending psychotherapists.
Occasionally, a state explicitly criminalizes attempted sexual offenses;
I have omitted those provisions. I have also omitted indecent
361
exposure statutes (which routinely provide for marital immunity).
(Michie 1948–2002) (marital immunity where the victim is incapable, through any
unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.4(A)(2)(a) (West 2002) (marriage is defense to sexual abuse in third
degree if victim is suffering from mental defect or incapacity which precludes giving
consent; Class C felony); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (West 2002) updated 2002
Kentucky Laws Ch. 259 (S.B. 25) (marriage is a defense to sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, or sexual contact if the spouse is mentally retarded); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (West 2002) (spouse cannot be prosecuted for criminal sexual
conduct in first through fourth degrees based solely on his or her spouse being under age
16, mentally incapable or mentally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West
2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (spouse does
not commit criminal sexual conduct in third or fourth degree if actor knows or has reason
to know that complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (2002) (spouses are exempt from
prosecution under aggravated felonious sexual assault if victim is “mentally defective and
the actor knows or has reason to know that the victim is mentally defective”); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2 (1953–2001) (spouses exempt from first degree sexual assault if
victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (Michie 1968–2002) (spouses exempt from sexual contact when person is
incapable of consenting, Class 4 felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(c) (West
2002) (marital immunity for rape in the second degree “when the victim is
developmentally disabled and the perpetrator is a person who is not married to the victim
and who has supervisory authority over the victim”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(iv)
(Michie 1977–2001) (marital immunity from sexual assault in the first degree when the
actor “knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental
deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim’s
conduct”).
Surprisingly, the Rhode Island statute for first degree sexual assault provides a partial
marital rape immunity if the victim is mentally incapable or physically helpless, and
therefore unable to give consent, yet the statutes for second and third degree sexual
assault provide no such immunity. R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-37-2, § 11-37-4, § 11-37-6
(1953–2001).
361. Some states criminalize indecent exposure as a sexual offense. I have excluded
references to indecent exposure statutes in the appendix, however, because that issue is
beyond the scope of this article. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-734 (2001) note in 2002 Haw.
Laws Act 36 (H.B. 2560) (West 2002) (“A person commits the offense of indecent
exposure if, the person intentionally exposes the person’s genitals to a person to whom the
person is not married under circumstances in which the actor’s conduct is likely to cause
affront.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-504 (2001) (“A person commits the offense of
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Appendix of State Sexual Offense
Statutes with Marital Immunity
Statute

Relevant Statutory Provisions

Interpretation

ALABAMA
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “any
act of sexual gratification between persons
not married to each other involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another.” Sexual contact is defined as “any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of a person not married to the actor.”
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with
13A-6-63:
another person by forcible
Sodomy
in 1st degree compulsion; . . . [OR] . . . with a person who is
incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless or mentally incapacitated.”
Being a male and engaging “in sexual
13A-6-65:
intercourse with a female without her consent,
Sexual
under circumstances other than those covered
misconduct
[by 1st degree rape]; or with her consent
where consent was obtained by the use of any
fraud or artifice; or being a female [and
engaging] in sexual intercourse with a male
without his consent; [OR being male or
female and] engag[ing] in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person under
circumstances other than [1st degree sodomy].
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact
13A-6-66:
Sexual abuse by forcible compulsion; [OR] . . . who is
in 1st degree incapable of consent by reason of being
physically helpless or mentally incapacitated.”
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact
13A-6-67:
Sexual abuse who is incapable of consent by reason of some
in 2nd degree factor other than being less than 16 years
old.”
13A-6-60:
Definitions

Marital immunity from
sodomy in 1st degree and
Sexual misconduct when
engaging in deviate sexual
intercourse because deviate
sexual intercourse is defined
as only between “persons not
married to each other.” See
13A-6-60.

Marital immunity from sexual
abuse in 1st and 2nd degree
because sexual contact can
only occur by the touching of
“intimate parts of a person not
married to the actor.”

Rape in 1st degree is silent as to marital immunity.

indecent exposure if the person knowingly or purposely exposes the person’s genitals
under circumstances in which the person knows the conduct is likely to cause affront or
alarm in order to (a) abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade another; or (b) arouse or gratify
the person’s own sexual response or desire or the sexual response or desire of any
person.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.100 (West 2002) (spouses exempt from
indecent liberties, Class A or B felony).
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ALASKA
11.41.432(a):
Defenses

“It is a defense to [2nd degree sexual assault
when the offender knows that the victim is
incapacitated; or unaware that a sexual act is
being committed and 3rd degree sexual
assault] that the offender is . . . married to
the person and neither party has filed with
the court for a separation, divorce or
dissolution of the marriage.

11.41.432(b):
Defenses

“Except as provided in (a) of this section, in
a prosecution [of 1st or 2nd degree sexual
assault], it is not a defense that the victim
was, at the time of the alleged offense, the
legal spouse of the defendant.”

Marital immunity from 3rd
degree sexual assault (sexual
contact) and 2nd degree
sexual assault (sexual
penetration) when the
offender knows that the victim
is “ . . . incapacitated; or
unaware that a sexual act is
being committed.”
No marital immunity from 1st
or 2nd degree sexual assault.

ARIZONA
13-1401:
Definitions
13-1404:
Sexual abuse

13-1406:
Sexual assault

13-1406.01:
Sexual assault
of a spouse

13-1407:
Defenses

Spouse is defined as “a person who is legally
married and cohabiting.”
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual contact with any person fifteen or
more years of age without consent of that
person . . . .”
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact
with any person without consent of such
person.” Punished as class 2 felony.
“Intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact
with a spouse without consent of the spouse
by the immediate or threatened use of force
against the spouse or another.” Punished as
class 6 felony; judge has “discretion for
conviction of a class 1 misdemeanor with
mandatory counseling.”
It is a defense to a prosecution of sexual
abuse “that the person was the spouse of the
other person at the time of commission of
the act. It is not a defense to a prosecution
[of sexual assault of a spouse] that the
defendant was the spouse of the victim at the
time of commission of the act.”

Marital immunity because
marital defense is allowed.
See 13-407.
Spousal sexual assault is
punished more lenient than
sexual assault, shown by the
lesser class felony and the
judge’s ability to reduce the
sentence even further at his or
her discretion. Sexual assault
of a spouse also requires the
use of force, while sexual
assault does not.
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CALIFORNIA
261.6:
Consent

262:
Rape of a
spouse

A current or previous dating or marital
relationship shall not be sufficient to
constitute consent where it is at issue in
prosecution of a rape, rape of a spouse,
sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, or forcible
acts of sexual penetration
“Rape of a person who is the spouse of the
perpetrator is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished . . . [by] force, violence, . . .
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
. . .; where a person is prevented from
resisting by any
intoxicating . . . substance . . .; [OR] where a
person is at the time unconscious of the
nature of the act . . . .” Violation must be
reported within one year of the violation,
unless the allegation can be corroborated by
independent, admissible evidence. Sexual
battery, rape, sodomy, lewd or lascivious
acts and forcible sexual penetration are
silent as to marital immunity

The reporting requirements
required under the spousal
rape charge do not exist for
rape.

CONNECTICUT
Definitions for sexual intercourse and sexual
contact are limited to “persons not married
to each other.”
In any prosecution for an offense, except an
53a-67:
offense [of 1st degree sexual assault, 1st
Affirmative
degree aggravated sexual assault, spousal
defenses
sexual assault, 2nd or 3rd degree sexual
assault or 3rd degree sexual assault with a
firearm], it shall be an affirmative defense
that the defendant and the alleged victim
were, at the time of the alleged offense,
living together by mutual consent in a
relationship of cohabitation, regardless of
the legal status of their relationship.”
Compelling “another person to engage in
53a-70:
Sexual assault, sexual intercourse by the use of force against
such other person . . . or by the threat of use
1st degree
of force against such other person, . . . [OR]
engages in sexual intercourse with another
person and such other person is mentally
incapacitated to the extent that such other
person is unable to consent to such sexual
intercourse.”
Committing sexual assault in 1st degree,
53a-70a:
“and in the commission of such offense such
Aggravated
sexual assault, person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of . . . a deadly weapon, with intent
1st degree
to disfigure the victim seriously…under
circumstances evincing an extreme
indifference to human life . . . .”
53A-65:
Definitions

Not only is there a marital
immunity for 4th degree
sexual assault (see 53a-73a),
but cohabitation is an
affirmative defense for 4th
degree sexual assault.

Marital immunity from 1st
degree sexual assault, because
the meaning of sexual
intercourse “is “limited to
persons not married to each
other.”

Marital immunity from 1st
degree aggravated sexual
assault, because a spouse
cannot be convicted of 1st
degree sexual assault.
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CONNECTICUT (CONTINUED)
53a-70b:
Sexual assault
in spousal or
cohabitating
relationship

53a-71:
Sexual assault,
2nd degree
53a-72a:
Sexual assault,
3rd degree
53a-72b:
Sexual assault,
3rd degree
with a firearm
53a-73a:
Sexual assault,
4th degree

“No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the
other spouse or cohabitor to engage in
sexual intercourse by the use of force against
such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the
threat of the use of force against such other
spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes
such other spouse or cohabitor to fear
physical injury.” Sexual intercourse is
defined for purposes of this provision as
including persons married to each other.
Engaging in sexual intercourse with another
person and “ . . . such other person is
physically helpless . . . .”
Compelling “another person to submit to
sexual contact by the use of force . . . or by
the threat of use of force against such other
person or against a third person . . . .”
Committing sexual assault in 3rd degree,
“and in the commission of such offense such
person uses or is armed with and threatens
the use of . . . a pistol, revolver, machine gun,
rifle, shotgun or other firearm.”
Intentionally subjecting “another person to
sexual contact who is . . . mentally
incapacitated to the extent that he is unable
to consent to such sexual contact, or
physically helpless . . . .”

Requires the use of or threat
of the use of force. No
provision against engaging in
sexual intercourse with a
person who is mentally
incapacitated, as in 1st degree
Sexual Assault.

Marital immunity from 2nd,
3rd degree sexual assault,
because the meanings of
sexual intercourse and sexual
contact are limited to persons
not married to the actor.
Marital immunity from 3rd
degree sexual assault with a
firearm because a spouse can
not be convicted of 3rd degree
sexual assault.
Marital immunity from 4th
degree sexual assault because
of definition of sexual contact.

HAWAII
“‘Married’ includes persons legally married,
and a male and female living together as
husband and wife regardless of their legal
status, but does not include spouses living
apart.” ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching
of the sexual or other intimate parts of a
person not married to the actor.”
“Recklessly subject[ing] another person to
707-732:
Sexual assault, an act of sexual penetration by
compulsion; . . . knowingly subject[ing] to
3rd degree
sexual contact another person who
is...mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless, or causes such a person to have
sexual contact with the actor; [OR]
knowingly, by strong compulsion, [having]
sexual contact with another person or
caus[ing] another person to have sexual
contact with the actor.”
707-700:
Definitions

Marital and cohabitant
immunity from 3rd and 4th
degree sexual assault
whenever the crime involves
sexual contact because sexual
contact is defined as “touching
of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person not married
to the actor” and “married”
includes any male and female
living together as husband and
wife.
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HAWAII (CONTINUED)
Knowingly subjecting “another person to
707-733:
Sexual assault, sexual contact by compulsion or caus[ing]
another person to have sexual contact with
4th degree
the actor by compulsion; . . . knowingly
expos[ing] the person’s genitals to another
person under circumstances in which the
actor’s conduct is likely to alarm the other
person or put the other person in fear of
bodily injury; [OR] . . . knowingly
trespass[ing] on property for the purpose of
subjecting another person to surreptitious
surveillance for the sexual gratification of
the actor.”
1st and 2nd degree sexual assault are silent as to marital immunity

IDAHO
18-6107:
Rape of a
spouse

“No person shall be convicted of rape for any
act or acts with that person’s spouse, except
[where she is overcome by force, threatened
with immediate and great bodily harm, or
intoxicated against her will by the offender].”
Forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign
object is silent as to marital immunity

Marital immunity from rape
unless force or nonconsensual
intoxication is used.

“Prosecution of a spouse of a victim . . . for
any violation by the victim’s spouse of
[criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, or
aggravated criminal sexual abuse] is barred
unless the victim reported such offense to a
law enforcement agency or the State’s
Attorney’s office within 30 days after the
offense was committed, except when the court
finds good cause for the delay.”

Marital immunity from all
charges of sexual assault and
sexual abuse made more than
30 days after offense was
committed, except where
court finds good cause for
delay.

ILLINOIS
5/12-18:
General
provisions

IOWA
Committing “sexual abuse in the third degree
709.4:
Sexual abuse, when the person performs a sex act . . . [and]
the act is done by force or against the will of
3rd degree
the other person, whether or not the other
person is the person’s spouse or is
cohabitating with the person; . . . the act is
performed while the other person is under the
influence of a controlled substance, . . . and
the controlled substance prevents the other
person from consenting to the act and the
person performing the act knows or should
have known that the other person was under
the influence of the controlled substance . . . ;
[OR] the act is performed while the other
person is mentally incapacitated, physically
incapacitated, or physically helpless.

No marital immunity when
force is used against the will of
the person. Implicit marital
immunity when the act is
performed while the other
person is under the influence
of a controlled substance or
when the act is performed
while the other person is
mentally or physically or
physically helpless.

1st and 2nd degree sexual abuse are silent as to marital immunity.
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KANSAS
21-3501:
Definitions

21-3517:
Sexual
battery

Spouse is defined as “a lawful husband or
wife, unless the couple is living apart in
separate residences or either spouse has filed
an action for annulment, separate
maintenance or divorce or for relief under the
protection from abuse act.”
“The intentional touching of the person of
another who is 16 or more years of age, who is
not the spouse of the offender and who does
not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse
or satisfy the sexual desires of the offender or
another.” Rape, Aggravated criminal sodomy
and Aggravated sexual battery are silent as to
marital immunity.

Must file some kind of legal
separation action in order to
be considered not married.

Committing “anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse . . . without the lawful consent of a
victim who is not the spouse of the
offender . . . when the victim is incapable of
resisting or of understanding the nature of the
act by reason of a stupor or abnormal
condition of mind produced by an intoxicating
agent or any cause, other than the
administration by the offender of any narcotic
or anesthetic agent or other controlled
dangerous substance and the offender knew
or should have known of the victim’s
incapacity; [OR] when the victim is incapable,
through unsoundness of mind, whether
temporary or permanent, of understanding
the nature of the act and the offender knew or
should have known of the victim’s
incapacity.” “For purposes of this Section, a
person shall not be considered to be a spouse
if a judgment of separation from bed and
board has been rendered, or if the person and
the offender are not legally separated but are
living separate and apart [AND] the offender
knows that a temporary restraining order,
preliminary or permanent injunction, or other
order or decree has been issued . . .
restraining the offender . . . .”
Intentionally “engaging in any of the
following acts with another person, who is not
the spouse of the offender, where the
offender acts without consent of the
victim . . .: the touching of the anus or
genitals of the victim by the offender using
any instrumentality or any part of the body of
the offender; [OR] the touching of the anus or
genitals of the offender by the victim using
any instrumentality or any part of the body of
the victim.” Rape, Aggravated rape, Forcible
rape, and Aggravated sexual battery are silent
as to marital immunity

Marital immunity from simple
rape, defined as raping one’s
spouse when she is incapable
of resisting because of
intoxication or because she is
incapable of understanding
the nature of the act, through
unsoundness of mind. In
order to be considered not a
spouse, one must have a
judgment of separation or
must be living separate and
apart from her spouse and
have a temporary restraining
order issued.

Marital immunity from sexual
battery.

LOUISIANA
43:
Simple rape

43.1:
Sexual
battery

Marital immunity from sexual
battery
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MARYLAND
3-304:
Rape, 2nd
degree

3-307:
Sexual
offense, 3rd
degree

3-318:
Spousal
defense

Engaging “in vaginal intercourse with another
by force, or the threat of force, without the
consent of the other; [OR] if the victim is
a . . . mentally incapacitated individual or a
physically helpless individual, and the person
performing the act knows or reasonably
should know” this.
Engaging “in sexual contact with another
person without the consent of the other;” and
using any of the attendant circumstances
listed under Rape in the 1st degree [OR]
engaging “in sexual contact with another if
the victim is a mentally . . . incapacitated
individual or a physically helpless individual,
and the person performing the act knows or
should know” this.
“A person may not be prosecuted under [1st
or 2nd degree rape, or 3rd degree sexual
offense] for a crime against a victim who was
the person’s legal spouse at the time of the
alleged rape or sexual offense” except for the
following: “A person may be prosecuted
under [1st degree rape], [2nd degree rape by
force or threat of force without consent of the
other], or [3rd degree sexual offense
employing a dangerous weapon or seriously
injuring the victim without consent of the
victim] if at the time of the alleged crime the
person and the person’s legal spouse have
lived apart, without cohabitation and without
interruption under a written separation
agreement executed by the person and the
spouse; or for at least 3 months immediately
before the alleged rape or sexual offense;
[OR] the person in committing the crime uses
force and the act is without consent of the
spouse.” “A person may be prosecuted under
[1st or 2nd degree rape], or [3rd degree sexual
offense] for a crime against the person’s legal
spouse if at the time of the alleged crime the
person and the spouse live apart, without
cohabitation and without interruption, under
a decree of limited divorce.”

Marital immunity from rape in
2nd degree, defined as raping
victim who is mentally
incapacitated, but no
immunity when force used

“A person may be charged and convicted [for
first, second, third, or fourth degree criminal
sexual conduct] even though the victim is his
or her legal spouse. However, a person may
not be charged or convicted solely because his
or her legal spouse is . . . mentally
incapacitated.”

Marital immunity only from
all criminal sexual conduct
charges when committed
against a mentally
incapacitated spouse.

Marital immunity from 3rd
degree rape when person is
mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless. No
immunity when force and nonconsent are used or when
couple is under decree of
limited divorce.
Marital immunity from
forcible crimes unless the
parties have lived apart under
a written separation
agreement or have been living
apart for at least 3 months
following the crime OR unless
force is used without consent.
Marital immunity from all
rape and 3rd degree sexual
offense unless “at the time of
the alleged crime the person
and the spouse live apart,
without cohabitation and
without interruption, under a
decree of limited divorce.”
Marital immunity from 2nd
degree rape or 3rd degree
sexual offense involving a
mentally incapacitated
individual, unless the couple is
under a decree of limited
divorce.

MICHIGAN
750.5201:
Married
persons
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MINNESOTA
Engaging “in sexual penetration with another
Marital and cohabitant
person . . . if . . . the actor uses force or coercion immunity from sexual
to accomplish the penetration; [OR] the actor
conduct in 3rd and 4th
knows or has reason to know that the
degree, which is sexual
complainant is mentally . . . incapacitated or
penetration or contact with
physically helpless . . . .”
someone who is
incapacitated or physically
Engaging “in sexual contact with another
609.345:
person . . . if . . . the actor uses force or coercion helpless or unless the actor
Criminal
uses force or coercion to
to accomplish the sexual penetration . . .; [OR]
sexual
accomplish the act.
conduct, 4th the actor knows or has reason to know that the
complainant is mentally . . . incapacitated or
degree
physically helpless . . . .”
“A person does not commit criminal sexual
Marital and cohabitant
609.349:
conduct [in the 3rd or 4th degree when the actor immunity from sexually
Voluntary
relationships knows or has reason to know that the
penetrating or contacting the
complainant is mentally incapacitated or
complainant if she is
physically helpless], if the actor and complainant mentally incapacitated or
were adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary
physically helpless at the
sexual relationship at the time of the alleged
time, unless the couple is
offense, or if the complainant is the actor’s legal living apart and one of them
spouse, unless the couple is living apart and one has filed for legal separation.
of them has filed for legal separation or
dissolution of the marriage. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to prohibit or restrain
the prosecution for any other offense committed
by one legal spouse against the other.”
No immunity from 1st, 2nd, or 5th degree sexual conduct
609.344:
Criminal
sexual
conduct, 3rd
degree

MISSISSIPPI
97-3-99:
Defense of
marriage

“A person is not guilty of [sexual battery] if the
alleged victim is that person’s legal spouse and
at the time of the alleged offense such person
and the alleged victim are not separated and
living apart; provided, however, that the legal
spouse of the alleged victim may be found guilty
of sexual battery if the legal spouse engaged in
forcible sexual penetration without the consent
of the alleged victim.”

Marital immunity for sexual
battery when victim is
mentally incapacitated
physically helpless or when
she does not consent. No
immunity for forcible
penetration or if couple is
separated and living apart.
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NEW YORK
130.00:
Definitions

130.20:
Sexual
misconduct

Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as “sexual
conduct between persons not married to each
other consisting of contact between the penis
and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth
and the vulva. Sexual contact is defined as “any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
a person not married to the actor . . . .” Not
married is defined as “the lack of an existing
relationship of husband and wife between the
female and the actor which is recognized by law,
[OR] the existence of the relationship of
husband and wife between the actor and which
is recognized by law at the time the actor
commits an offense . . . by means of forcible
compulsion against the female [AND] the
female and actor are living apart at such time
pursuant to a valid and effective order issued by
a court, decree or judgment of separation, or
written agreement of separation subscribed by
them.”
Engaging “in sexual intercourse with another
person without such person’s consent; [OR]
engag[ing] in deviate sexual intercourse with
another person without such person’s
consent . . . .”

Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with a
person who is incapable of consent by reason of
some factor other than being less than 17 years
old; [OR] engag[ing] in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person without such
person’s consent where such lack of consent is
by reason of some factor other than incapacity
to consent.”
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with
130.45:
another person who is incapable consent by
Sodomy,
2nd degree reason of being mentally disabled or mentally
incapacitated.”
Engaging “in deviate sexual intercourse with
130.45:
Sodomy, 1st another person by forcible compulsion; [OR]
who is incapable of consent by reason of being
degree
physically helpless . . . .”
130.40:
Sodomy,
3rd degree

Marital immunity from
sexual misconduct involving
deviate sexual intercourse
because deviate sexual
intercourse can only be
between “persons not
married.”
Marital immunity from all
sodomy crimes because
deviate sexual intercourse
can only be between
“persons not married.”
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NEW YORK (CONTINUED)
130.55:
Sexual
abuse, 3rd
degree

Subjecting “another person to sexual contact
without the latter’s consent.”

130.60:
Sexual
abuse, 2nd
degree
130.65:
Sexual
abuse, 1st
degree

Subjecting “another person to sexual contact
and when such other person is incapable of
consent by reason of some factor other than
being less than 17 years old.”
Subjecting “another person to sexual contact by
forcible compulsion; [OR] when the other
person is incapable of consent by reason of
being physically helpless.” 1st, 2nd, 3rd degree
rape, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th degree aggravated sexual
abuse are silent as to marital immunity

Marital immunity from all
sexual abuse crimes because
sexual contact can only be
the touching of “a person not
married to the actor.”

NEVADA
200.373:
Sexual
assault of
spouse by
spouse

“It is no defense to a charge of sexual assault
that the perpetrator was, at the time of the
assault, married to the victim, if the assault was
committed by force or by the threat of force.”

Marital immunity from
sexual assault unless
committed by force or threat
of force.

Spouse is defined as “a person married to an
offender at the time of an alleged offense, except
that such person shall not be considered the
spouse when . . . the parties have entered into a
written separation agreement . . . ; during the
pendency of an action between the parties for
annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or
legal separation.”
Engaging “in sexual conduct with another who is
not the spouse of the offender or who is the
spouse of the offender but is living separate and
apart from the offender, when . . . for the
purpose of preventing resistance, the offender
substantially impairs the other person’s
judgment or control by administering any drug,
intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other
person surreptitiously or by force, threat of
force, or deception; [OR] . . . the other person’s
ability to resist or consent is substantially
impaired because of a mental or physical
condition or because of advanced age, and the
offender knows or has reasonable cause to
believe” this.

In order to not be considered
a spouse of another, the
parties must have entered
into a written separation
agreement.

OHIO
2907.01:
Definitions

2907.02:
Rape

Marital immunity from rape
when the offender
administers an intoxicant
against the will of the other
or when the other person is
impaired because of a mental
or physical condition, unless
the couple is living apart.

“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with Marital rape immunity unless
another when the offender purposely compels
force is used.
the other person to submit by force or threat of
force.”
“It is not a defense to a charge [of forced rape]
that the offender and the victim were married or
were cohabiting at the time of the commission of
the offense.”
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OHIO (CONTINUED)
2907.03:
Sexual
battery

2907.05:
Gross
sexual
imposition

2907.06:
Sexual
imposition

“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another, not the spouse of the offender, when
the offender knowingly coerces the other person
to submit by any means that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; the
offender knows that the other person’s ability to
appraise the nature of or control the other
person’s own conduct is substantially impaired;
[OR] the offender knows that the other person
submits because the other person is unaware
that the act is being committed.”
“No person shall have sexual contact with
another, not the spouse of the offender; or cause
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have
sexual contact with the offender . . . when . . . the
offender purposely compels the other person, or
one of the other persons, to submit by force or
threat of force; for the purpose of preventing
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the
judgment or control of the other person or of
one of the other persons by administering any
drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the
other person surreptitiously or by force, threat
of force, or deception; [OR] the ability of the
other person to resist or consent . . . is
substantially impaired because of a mental or
physical condition . . . .”
“No person shall have sexual contact with
another, not the spouse of the offender; or cause
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have
sexual contact with the offender . . . when . . . the
offender knows that the sexual contact is
offensive to the other person . . . or is reckless in
that regard; the offender knows that the other
person’s . . . ability to appraise the nature of or
control the offender’s or touching person’s
conduct is substantially impaired; [OR] the
offender knows that the other person . . .
submits because of being unaware of the sexual
contact.”

Marital immunity from
sexual battery when the
sexual conduct is coerced,
the other person’s ability to
understand what is going on
is substantially impaired or
the other person is unaware
the act is being committed.

Marital immunity from gross
sexual imposition when the
victim is compelled to submit
by force, the offender
administers an intoxicant
against the will of the person
to prevent resistance, or the
victim is substantially
impaired because of a mental
or physical condition.

Marital immunity from
sexual imposition when the
offender knows that the
contact is offensive, that the
other person’s ability to
understand the act is
substantially impaired, or
that the other person is
unaware of the contact.
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OKLAHOMA
“An act of sexual intercourse involving vaginal
or anal penetration accomplished with a male or
female who is not the spouse of the
perpetrator . . . where the victim is incapable
through mental illness or any other unsoundness
of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of
giving legal consent; where force or violence is
used or threatened, accompanied by apparent
power of execution to the victim or to another
person; where the victim is intoxicated by a
narcotic . . . administered by or with the privity
of the accused as a means of forcing the victim
to submit; [OR] where the victim is at the time
unconscious of the nature of the act and this fact
is known to the accused.”
“Rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a male or female who is the
spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is
used or threatened, accompanied by apparent
power of execution to the victim or to another
person.”
“An act within or without the bonds of
1111.1:
matrimony in which any inanimate object or any
Rape by
instrumenta part of the human body, not amounting to sexual
intercourse is used in the carnal knowledge of
tion
another person without his or her consent and
penetration of the anus or vagina occurs to that
person.”
“Rape in the first degree shall include: rape
1114:
Rape, 1st & committed upon a person incapable through
2nd degree mental illness or any unsoundness of mind of
giving legal consent regardless of the age of the
person committing the crime; or rape
accomplished with any person by means of
force, violence, or threats of force or violence
accompanied by apparent power of execution
regardless of the age of the person committing
the crime; [OR] rape by instrumentation
resulting in bodily harm . . . .”
“In all other cases, rape or rape by
instrumentation is rape in the second degree.”
1111:
Definition
of rape

Marital rape immunity where
the victim is incapable of
giving legal consent because
of unsoundness of mind, the
victim is administered an
intoxicant against her will, or
the victim is unconscious.
Marital rape immunity unless
force or the threat of force is
used.

No marital rape immunity
from by instrumentation.

Marital rape immunity for
1st & 2nd degree rape unless
force or threat of force is
used.
See 1111.
No marital rape immunity
for rape by instrumentation.
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RHODE ISLAND
11-37-1:
Definitions

11-37-2:
Sexual
assault, 1st
degree

Spouse is defined as “a person married to the
accused at the time of the alleged sexual assault,
except that the person shall not be considered
the spouse if the couple is living apart and a
decision for divorce has been granted, whether
or not a final decree has been entered.”
Engaging “in sexual penetration with another
person . . . if . . . the accused, not being the
spouse, knows or has reason to know that the
victim is mentally incapacitated . . . or physically
helpless; the accused uses force or coercion;
[OR] the accused, through concealment or by
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the
victim . . . .”

In order to not be considered
a spouse of another, the
parties must be living apart
and a decision for divorce
must have been granted.
Marital immunity from
sexual assault if the accused
knows that the victim is
mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless.

2nd degree sexual assault is silent as to marital immunity.

SOUTH CAROLINA
16-3-615:
Spousal
sexual
battery

16-3-652:
Criminal
sexual
conduct, 1st
degree

“Sexual battery . . . when accomplished through
use of aggravated force, defined as the use of or
the threat of use of a weapon or the use or threat
of use of physical force or physical violence of a
high and aggravated nature, by one spouse
against the other spouse if they are living
together, constitutes a felony of spousal sexual
battery and, upon conviction, a person must be
imprisoned not more than ten years.”
“The offending spouse’s conduct must be
reported to appropriate law enforcement
authorities within thirty days in order for that
spouse to be prosecuted for this offense.”
Engaging “in sexual battery with the
victim . . . if . . . the actor uses aggravated force
to accomplish sexual battery; . . . [OR] the actor
causes the victim, without the victim’s consent,
to become mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless by administering, distributing,
dispensing, delivering . . . a controlled
substance . . . .”
“Punishable by imprisonment for not more than
thirty years . . . .”

Conviction of spousal sexual
battery results in a prison
term of not more than ten
years, less than given for 1st
or 2nd degree criminal
sexual conduct, and requires
aggravated force.
Must report spousal sexual
battery within 30 days of the
offense.

Marital immunity from 1st
and 2nd degree sexual
conduct unless spouses are
living apart.
Punished more harshly than
spousal sexual battery
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SOUTH CAROLINA (CONTINUED)
16-3-653:
Criminal
sexual
conduct,
2nd degree
16-3-654:
Criminal
sexual
conduct, 3rd
degree

16-3-658:
Criminal
sexual
conduct:
where
victim is
spouse

Using “aggravated coercion to accomplish
sexual battery . . . Punishable by imprisonment
for not more than twenty years . . . .”

Engaging “in sexual battery with the victim . . .
if . . . the actor uses force or coercion to
accomplish the sexual battery in the absence of
aggravating circumstances; the actor knows or
has reason to know that the victim is . . .
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless and
aggravated force or aggravated coercion was not
used to accomplish sexual battery . . . Punishable
by imprisonment for not more than ten
years . . . ”
“A person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual
conduct [in 1st, 2nd, or 3rd degree] if the victim
is the legal spouse unless the couple is living
apart and the offending spouse’s conduct
constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree or second degree . . . The offending
spouse’s conduct must be reported to
appropriate law enforcement authorities within
thirty days in order for a person to be
prosecuted for these offenses.”

Marital immunity from 3rd
degree criminal sexual
conduct.
Punishment is equal to
spousal sexual battery.

Victim and offender must be
living apart, the offender’s
conduct must be that of 1st
or 2nd degree criminal
sexual assault, and the
conduct must be reported
within 30 days in order to
convict spouse for criminal
sexual conduct.

SOUTH DAKOTA
22-22-7.2:
Sexual
contact with
person
incapable of
consenting
22-22-7.4:
Sexual
contact
without
consent
with person
capable of
consenting

Knowingly engaging “in sexual contact with
another person, other than his spouse . . . if the
other person is incapable, because of physical or
mental incapacity, of consenting to sexual
contact.”

Marital immunity from
sexual contact with person
incapable of consenting.

“No person . . . may knowingly engage in sexual
contact with another person
other than his spouse who, although capable of
consenting, has not consented to such contact.”
1st and 2nd degree rape are silent as to marital
immunity.

Marital immunity from
sexual contact without
consent with person capable
of consenting.
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TENNESSEE
39-13-507:
Spousal
exclusion

“A person does not commit an offense…if the
victim is the legal spouse of the perpetrator
except” for: “‘Spousal rape’ means the unlawful
sexual penetration of one spouse by the other
where the defendant is armed with a weapon or
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead
the victim reasonably to believe it to be a
weapon, or the defendant causes bodily injury to
the victim; [OR] the spouses are living apart and
one of them has filed for separate maintenance
or divorce.” Spousal rape is class C felony.
“‘Aggravated spousal rape’ is the unlawful
sexual penetration of one spouse by the other
where the defendant knowingly engaged in
conduct that was especially cruel, vile and
inhumane to the victim during commission of
the offense; [AND] either causes serious bodily
injury to the victim or is armed with a weapon or
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead
the victim to reasonably believe it to be a
weapon.” Class B felony. “‘Spousal sexual
battery’ means the unlawful sexual contact by
one spouse of another where the defendant is
armed with a weapon or any article used or
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to
reasonably believe it to be a weapon; the
defendant causes serious bodily injury to the
victim; [OR] the spouses are living apart and one
of them has filed for separate maintenance or
divorce.” Class D felony.

Spousal rape requires either
a weapon, bodily injury or
spouses living apart.
Aggravated spousal rape
requires especially cruel, vile
and inhuman conduct against
the spouse and either serious
bodily injury or being armed
with a weapon. Spousal
sexual battery requires either
a weapon, bodily injury or
spouses living apart. A
spouse can be convicted of
spousal rape, aggravated
spousal rape and spousal
sexual battery but they are
punished less severely and
require more force than
rape, aggravated rape and
aggravated sexual battery.
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VIRGINIA
18.2-61:
Rape

18.2-67.1:
Forcible
sodomy

Having “sexual intercourse with a complaining
witness who is not his or her spouse . . . and such
act is accomplished against the complaining
witness’s will, by force, threat or intimidation of
or against the complaining witness or another
person; [OR] through the use of the complaining
witness’s mental incapacity or physical
helplessness . . . ”
“If any person has sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse and such act is accomplished against
the spouse’s will by force, threat or intimidation
of or against the spouse of another, he or she
shall be guilty of rape.”
“All or part of any sentence imposed for a
violation of [spousal rape] may be suspended
upon the defendant’s completion of counseling
or therapy . . . if . . . the court finds such action
will promote maintenance of the family unit and
will be in the best interest of the complaining
witness.”
“Upon a finding of guilt [of spousal rape] . . . the
court, without entering a judgment of
guilt . . . may defer proceedings and place the
defendant on probation pending completion of
counseling or therapy . . . . If such counseling is
completed . . ., the court may discharge the
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against
him if . . . the court finds such action will
promote maintenance of the family unit and be
in the best interest of the complaining witness.”
Engaging in “cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus, or
anal intercourse with a complaining witness who
is not his or her spouse, or caus[ing] a
complaining witness whether or not his or her
spouse, to engage in such acts with any other
person, and . . . the act is accomplished against
the will of the complaining witness, by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the
complaining witness or another person, or
through the use of the complaining witness’s
mental incapacity or physical helplessness.”
“An accused shall be guilty of forcible sodomy if
[he engages in forcible sodomy] and such act is
accomplished against the will of the spouse, by
force, threat or intimidation of or against the
spouse or another person.”
“However, no person shall be found
guilty . . . unless, at the time of the alleged
offense, the spouses were living apart, or the
defendant caused bodily injury to the spouse by
the use of force or violence.”
The court may commute or defer sentences for
spousal forcible sodomy in the same way as
listed under Rape.

Marital rape immunity unless
defendant uses force.
Sentence may be suspended
if the defendant completes
counseling. If tried without a
jury, his conviction may even
be deferred and ultimately
dismissed if he completes
counseling.

Marital immunity unless the
defendant uses force and
causes bodily injury or unless
living apart from his spouse.
Sentence may be suspended
if the defendant completes
counseling. If tried without a
jury, his conviction may even
be deferred and ultimately
dismissed if he completes
counseling.
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VIRGINIA (CONTINUED)
18.2-67.2:
Object
sexual
penetration

18.2-67.2:1:
Marital
sexual
assault

Penetrating “the labia majora or anus of a
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse
with any object, . . . or caus[ing] a complaining
witness to so penetrate his or her own body with
an object or caus[ing] a complaining witness,
whether or not his or her spouse, to engage in
such acts with any other person or to penetrate,
or to be penetrated by, an animal, and . . . the act
is accomplished against the will of the
complaining witness, by force, threat or
intimidation of or against the complaining
witness or another person, or through the use of
the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or
physical helplessness.”
“An accused shall be guilty of [spousal object
sexual penetration] . . . if such act is
accomplished against the spouse’s will by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the spouse or
another person.”
“However, no person shall be found
guilty . . . unless, at the time of the alleged
offense, the spouses were living separate and
apart or the defendant caused bodily injury to
the spouse by the use of force or violence.”
The court may commute or defer sentences for
object sexual penetration in the same way as
listed under Rape.
Engaging “in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio, anallingus or anal intercourse with his or
her spouse, or penetrat[ing] the labia majora or
anus of his or her spouse with any object . . . or
caus[ing] such spouse to so penetrate his or her
own body with an object, and such act is
accomplished against the spouse’s will by force
or a present threat of force or intimidation of or
against the spouse . . . .” The court may
commute or defer sentences for marital sexual
assault in the same way as listed under Rape.
Punishable by confinement of not more than
twenty years. Sexual battery and aggravated
sexual battery are silent as to marital immunity.

Marital immunity unless the
defendant uses force and
causes bodily injury or unless
living apart from his spouse.
Sentence may be suspended
if the defendant completes
counseling. If tried without a
jury, his conviction may even
be deferred and ultimately
dismissed if he completes
counseling.

Spouse must use force or a
present threat of force.
Sentence may be suspended
if the defendant completes
counseling. If tried without a
jury, his conviction may even
be deferred and ultimately
dismissed if he completes
counseling.
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WASHINGTON
9a.44.010:
Definitions

9A.44.060:
Rape, 3rd
degree

9A.44.100
Indecent
liberties

Married is defined as “one who is legally
married to another, but does not include a
person who is living separate and apart from his
or her spouse and who has filed in an
appropriate court for legal separation or for
dissolution of his or her marriage.”
Engaging “in sexual intercourse with another
person [under circumstances not constituting
rape in 1st or 2nd degrees], not married to the
perpetrator where the victim did not
consent . . . to sexual intercourse with the
perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly
expressed by the victim’s words or conduct;
[OR] where there is threat of substantially
unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.”
“Knowingly caus[ing] another person who is not
his or her spouse to have sexual contact with him
or her or another by forcible compulsion; [OR]
when the other person is incapable of consent by
reason of being . . . mentally incapacitated or
physically helpless.”

In order not to be considered
married, one must be living
separate and apart from her
spouse and have filed for
legal separation or divorce
Marital rape immunity from
3rd degree rape when the
victim did not consent and
such lack of consent was
clearly expressed by the
victim’s words or conduct.

Marital immunity from
indecent liberties.

1st and 2nd degree rape are silent as to marital immunity.

WYOMING
Subjecting “a victim to sexual contact under any
of the circumstances of [1st or 2nd degree sexual
assault] without inflicting sexual intrusion on the
victim and without causing serious bodily injury
to the victim.”
“The fact that the actor and the victim are
6-2-307:
Evidence of married to each other is not by itself a defense to
marriage as a violation of [1st or 2nd degree sexual assault].
defense
“Except under circumstances constituting a
6-2-313:
rd
violation of [1st, 2nd or 3 degree sexual
Sexual
assault], an actor who unlawfully subjects
battery
another person to any sexual contact is guilty of
sexual battery.”
6-2-304:
Sexual
assault, 3rd
degree

Marital immunity when no
serious bodily injury is
inflicted on the victim and no
sexual intrusion occurs.
By inference, marriage is a
defense for 3rd degree sexual
assault and sexual battery.
Marital immunity.

